Patterns of international migration: Similarities and Differences
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International migration is one of the key forces shaping the current world and appreciably predetermining attributes of a future one. As some scholars argue, the 21st century is a century of migration. People move to greater distances, more frequently and more easily than whenever before in human history. Therefore, it is not incorrect to define the present times as the age of migration, with many emerging patterns and challenges applying to autochthonous and immigrant populations, to countries of origin, transit and destination, to whole societies, various communities and individuals.

After the period of relative stabilisation and optimistic expectations in the 1990s, the 21st century confronts us increasingly with a multitude of events, phenomena and processes of not only a positive, but also a quite uncertain and disquieting character. This has been well manifested in recent developments in the economies, politics, law and security systems, social sphere, demographics, human thinking as well as the environment at the global, macro-regional or national levels. The area of international migration cannot be an exception, since it is largely influenced by – and also influencing – the above-mentioned domains.

Mass migration is an everyday and pervasive phenomenon, beneficial and ambiguous simultaneously, so one can clearly distinguish a wide range of existing questions. They require a new instrumentarium to be produced and applied by political officials, intellectual elites, migration organisations, researchers and other relevant stakeholders in the field. Rational, coherent, effective and humane solutions should be discussed, created, adopted and then reasonably implemented in all components of migration management – immigration and border, labour migration, asylum, integration, naturalisation and return policies, legal norms, institutions, as well as in developing a high-quality information environment for all those concerned. This approach has been well accentuated over the recent months during hard works on the preparation under the auspices of the United Nations of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration as the first universal tool to cover all aspects of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive way.

This is also appropriately addressed through the World Refugee Council, which is an independent group of individuals from politics, business, academia and civil society with the goal to co-create an informed strategy for reforming the refugee system with more global cooperation and responsibility sharing.

The choice of the authors for scientific volume *Globe in Motion. Patterns of International Migration: Similarities and Differences* has been based on the need to reflect the heterogeneous substance of migration as well as to inform on, compare and evaluate hitherto experiences in various geographical and social dimensions. Though being global in an interconnected world, international migration still provides very good opportunities to juxtapose and assess diverse practices, policies and attitudes at the EU, national, regional or local levels. This book has been published as an outcome of a project supported by the European Union within the scheme Interreg (DRIM – Danube Region Information Platform for Economic Integration of Migrants).

It is also due to this fact that the presented work is the result of collaboration within a well-balanced group of researchers, policy-makers and practitioners from several countries; this is one of its added values. Then, the book does not repeat already known theories, but rather combines empirical findings and personal views by experts from more institutional backgrounds and disciplines. And another asset is that it enriches the not too abundant portfolio of migration literature sources originating in the region of Central Europe, which currently plays a non-negligible role in the perception of international migration, at least in the EU framework.

Rita Süssmuth
ex-President of the Bundestag
October 17th, 2018, Berlin

This volume stems from the international conference ‘Information matters: towards positive pathways of migrants’ integration’, which, among others, called for a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the role of information in the process of integration. Although access to information is widely believed to be one of the cornerstones of integration measures, the effective information infrastructure for migrants is still insufficient in most European countries and in some, almost non-existent. We also have very limited knowledge on the most appropriate strategies for reaching diverse groups of mobile individuals and groups, or even knowledge on the capacities of public institutions to provide this information. Experiences in providing information to migrants vary significantly across different national, regional and local contexts. Historical migration developments and trends, institutional frameworks and the wider socio-political context influence not only the level of such access, but also migrants’ everyday strategies in gaining meaningful information. Alternative means to access information, for instance, the influence of ICT, have in recent decades altered the ways in which information is conveyed, understood and used.

The need for a more comprehensive provision of information for migrants is very much apparent in the countries of Central and South-East Europe as well, which are faced with significant immigration and/or emigration flows that influence demographic, labour market and social policy outcomes. While there have been a number of initiatives that respond to this need in a national framework, the attempts to tackle this issue transnationally have not been developed yet.

Why transnationally? Apart from migration being essentially a transnational phenomenon, these regions are also characterised by strong intra-regional migration, challenges of which should be addressed also within a common transnational framework.

This is the main idea behind the project DRIM (Danube Region Information Platform for Economic Integration of Migrants) where the consortium of partners from eight countries (Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia, Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Germany and Serbia) aims to improve the capacity of public institutions to respond to the needs of both newly arrived and resident migrants by effective transnational information sharing. Through various activities targeting decision-makers and public
institutions including migrants in the region and, especially by developing a comprehensive, multilingual and transnational information platform of the DANUBE COMPASS (danubecompass.org), the project not only facilitates migrants' better access to information on jobs, housing, health services, education and other aspects of everyday life in the new environment, but also supports the further development of multi-level governance structures in the Danube macro-region. DR iM's approach of positioning access to information as a human right and as part of the transparent and modern public services thereby highlights the demand for the region's public institutions to begin transformations into a user-centred citizens' service that acknowledges the increasing diversity of their constituencies.

Martina Bofulin Project Manager of the project DRIM October 17th, 2018, Ljubljana

Although the term ‘migration’ (in various forms and meanings) is an extremely frequent and topical issue in the current scientific, political and media discourse especially, it is – in fact – an ancient phenomenon in the global history.

Human migration has always played a crucial role and was a fundamental *spitus movens* that determined the course of many important events. Migrations contributed to the discovery and settlement of the continents, resulted in the encounter, coexistence and ‘blood-mixing’ of various cultures, and stood at the birth of contemporary ethnic groups and nations. People, animals, plants, micro-organisms, information, skills, technology, values, cultures, and religions have always been in motion and provided the world’s present shape.

Following the wave of national liberation movements in the mid-19th century and after the final collapse of the colonial system in the 20th century, the contours of Europe were stabilised in the form of borders of the current states as a consequence of international conventions (mainly those concluded after World War II).

The world in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries witnessed mass migrations from Europe to the Americas, in particular for reasons of labour. However, from the 1960s onward, Europe saw a contrast in large movements of migrant workers to its north-western regions, where there were booming economies and a labour force shortage.

The next large-scale migration waves on the continent were caused by *perestroika* and the collapse of the Communist bloc, the ethnic and religious wars in the Balkans, the enlargement of the European Union and establishment of the Schengen Area with the opening of internal borders, as well as by the refugee/migration crisis in recent years.

For these and other reasons, international migration has become one of the most complex subjects in the 21st century, and especially in the European Union. High-ranking as well as local officials, the media, scholars, other stakeholders and common citizens still heatedly debate about the impacts of the recent migration crisis, the ongoing immigration of third-country nationals, the strengthening of border controls, the need for a new asylum system, ways of migrants’ integration, relations between migrants and autochthonous populations. Appropriate solutions, policies and strategies at the EU and national levels have been intensively sought, presented and discussed. At the global level, the recent creation of the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration alongside the Global Compact on Refugees, both prepared under the auspices of the United Nations, has provided a unique opportunity to design a universal framework for dealing with a wide range of migration issues. The world is indeed in motion – physically as well as mentally.

However, expectations may often differ to a greater degree and unbiased expert opinions can help respond to many existing challenges in this field. This is why we decided to publish a book with the aim to address the various aspects of migration and to offer a number of insights in order to look for potential ‘patterns of migration’ and ‘patterns of actions’.

Many migrants, who successfully cross state visible ‘borders’, face obstacles and invisible ‘barriers’ when trying to assimilate into the new societal conditions.

For this reason, we have formed a team of experienced specialists from several countries (from the United Kingdom to Slovakia, from Canada to Slovenia) and from diverse areas of activities – policymakers, researchers, persons from practice. We are happy to be able to present their interesting contributions in this volume and would like to thank them for their comprehensive and thorough work, smooth cooperation, and inspiring ideas.

Boris Divinský & Tatiana Zachar Podolinská October 18th, 2018, Bratislava
In today's increasingly interconnected world, international migration has become a reality that affects nearly every corner of the globe. Modern transportation has made it easier, cheaper and faster for people to move in search of jobs, opportunities, education and quality of life. At the same time, conflict, poverty, inequality and a lack of sustainable livelihoods compel people to leave their homes to seek a better future for themselves and their families abroad.

The contribution is meant to be a kick-off into the general social theory connected directly or indirectly with the topic of migration and as a general up-to-date overview of the migration theory in order to offer a theoretical framework from various angles and perspectives for this volume on migration. After a short and instructive compendium of the basic data on international migration, key words and the typology of migratory flows are offered. Afterwards, various theoretical approaches are explored with the aim to explain the patterns of current people flows (economic, cultural, migration theory and networks theories). The contribution also relies on recent comparative research, which indicates that migration flows react to economic incentives, mainly with regard to the labour market, but also to cultural and colonial linkages. The response of migration patterns to shortages in the labour market is shown to be highly efficient, while the analysis shows that immigrants are not attracted by high levels of social expenditure.

What is very likely is that the current trends of high mobility, linked to income diversification, will continue and intensify. Mobility is becoming not only larger in scale and scope, but also more complex in nature. The old paradigm of permanent migration settlement is progressively giving way to temporary and circular migration. The socially or ethnically homogenous nation states with a single culture have become confronted with an increasing degree of cultural diversity connected with international migration. International migration thus represents one of the most challenging and important issues of the 21st century.

This contribution seeks to examine the EU policy of integration of third-country nationals, which is one of the most important tools in the area of migration management in the Union. Although the EU has taken an increasingly important role on migration issues, the definition and implementation of integration policies remain largely in the hands of Member States. This is why the situation in this field is far from being homogeneous. In addition, the size of the population of third-country nationals can differ greatly from one country to another, as can their reasons for migration, skills levels, age and other characteristics – as we document in the contribution with factual evidence. This in turn influences integration outcomes.

Despite limited competences, the recent interest in this issue has triggered a whole range of policy initiatives at the EU level to foster cooperation, promote good practices and financially support the implementation of measures on integration. The most significant instruments of this kind – agendas, policies, websites, forums, networks, financial funds, action plans, dialogues, partnerships etc. – are described in the text in relative detail.

If integration measures can be considered an expense in the short-term, they should be considered an investment which can prove beneficial from the mid- and long-term perspective. Given the demographic outlook at the EU level and the growing skills shortages in many economic sectors, the implementation of appropriate migration and integration policies will become crucial in order to maintain the competitiveness of the EU economy in the coming years. The future cohesion of European societies and the European Union as such, is thus decidedly dependent on the successful integration of migrants.

This approach to the study of integration processes and policies is relevant for both researchers and practitioners. For example, analysing information practices and campaigns as policies (their frames, aims, target groups, actors, etc.) will make it clear where the provision of information is placed in the heuristic model of integration processes, which dimension is targeted, which actors participate and on what level, and what form of interaction is involved. Systematic comparative analyses of these policies and practices in various countries and locations will then certainly shed more light on how
particular immigrant cultures and migratory histories contribute (or not) to integration outcomes on the one hand, and general public institutions and immigrant policies on the other.

04 CHLEBO, Jaroslav
Reflection on Some Aspects of Slovakia’s Approach to Migration

The Slovak Republic prefers a comprehensive approach to international migration and cares as well about cultural, security and humanitarian issues, not only about the framework represented by economic dimension. The standards of the country’s proceedings associated with migration are reasonably high, despite the fact that a long way is ahead of us to set the parameters of Slovak migration policy in line with domestic and external expectations. More consistency is required for the implementation of the country’s current valid migration policy until the year 2020. It is also important to launch a factual debate which can change prevailing negative stereotypes connected to this topic and prevent further accumulation of challenges in terms of labour migration.

The assessment of the EU measures is more complicated. Using a problematic legal basis and extensive approach to its argumentation, the reform of the common asylum system, which has the potential to negatively influence other, non-related, policies of the EU and thus burden Slovak membership with additional problems, are among the basic factors. Although today’s migration is predominantly labour-related, we consider it irresponsible to work with an inflation of the economic impacts of migration only. For instance, it would be useful to design a global financial transfer mechanism capable of sponsoring the education of migrants; there is also room with respect to practical measures for the concept of ‘global skill partnerships’.

A closer look at the context of Slovakia’s approach to migration may lead to the impression that the country is moving against the mainstream. This is influenced by the fact that migration is a new phenomenon for us, where respective policies and processes are still under development. At the same time, the Slovak Republic participates responsibly in the process of creating a global framework for migration and refugees.

05 DUNCAN, Howard
Immigration Policy in Canada – A Case of Exceptionalism?

This contribution presents Canada’s approach to immigration and refugee protection over the past 50 years, at the social, political, and economic environments, of which it developed an exceptional position. The country set as its principal objectives for immigration economic prosperity, family reunification and refugee protection. For immigrants who are selected because of their potential to contribute to the economy, the country supports several significant economic programmes at both the national and provincial level. The means for determining the economic migration stream is a point system that rewards potential immigrants for their human capital (education and training, occupational demand, occupational skills, age, pre-arranged employment, knowledge of French and English, etc.).

Immigrant integration is a key aspect of managing migration in Canada. The policy environment offers significant rights and protection to newcomers and ethnic groups that are formed as a result of long-term immigration. The first Immigration Act was approved in 1976 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was adopted as a constituent part of the Constitution Act in 1982. The policy of multiculturalism was inaugurated in 1970 and enshrined in legislation in 1988 through adoption of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. These acts, as well as several specific programmes/policies, provide a good foundation for successful immigrant integration and the offer of citizenship. This all has been reflected in the growing diversity of the Canadian society, with over 20% of today’s population born outside the country.

The public supports most those immigrants who are admitted to Canada with the expectation that they will make a contribution to the economy. The end result is thus not only large-scale immigration, but also a more dynamic country with a wealthier economy.

06 WILLIAMS-WOODS, Alexandra
Borders or People?
The UK Response to Human Trafficking in the Context of the Immigration System

This contribution explores the tension within the current policy landscape in the country aiming to identify, support and protect victims of human trafficking and, at the same time, creating an environment hostile to illegal immigrants. The text first defines elementary concepts and theories applied in research and facts that appear in reality. For example, the securitisation of migration has been particularly apparent in the United Kingdom over the past years. It has a significant impact on the policies surrounding human trafficking and the perception of its victims. Furthermore, the British media have traditionally held a biased view of immigration. A general lack of understanding and the negative stereotyping of all groups of migrants may result in the unfavourable perception of victims of human trafficking.

In this context, the important question is to what extent nation states are able to control their borders. Despite increasing globalisation occurring in numerous ways, borders have mostly been tightened, with occasional exceptions such as the EU Schengen agreement. However, it is difficult to clearly state whether such approaches help reduce migrant smuggling and trafficking or not. Discourse on this topic needs to continue.
Since the UK Modern Slavery Act came into effect back in 2015, officials reported over 5,000 victims of this crime in the country within the first two years, mostly foreigners. After initial support, many victims have been left in a precarious position concerning their status, housing, employment, and social assistance. Many gaps in the provision of protection for victims have not been addressed yet. It seems necessary that the UK Government take more responsibility for their vulnerable situation by addressing this problem more energetically.

If protecting borders is to remain a priority, more innovative ways must also be contrived to protect people.

07 GYÁRFÁŠOVÁ, Oľga
New ‘Others’ in Public Perception in Slovakia

Migration is one of those phenomena which manifest considerable effects on many areas, chiefly the economy, but also on culture – it changes identities, multiplies diversity, is a source of manifold benefits, as well as challenges. Slovakia is not a traditional country of destination and has only recently begun to face larger migration inflows. The public perception of migrants, or more generally, new minorities in the country, is affected by the legacy of previous cultural closeness, enforced by predominant political discourse that utilises the topic, among others, for populist appeals.

This contribution builds on several recent sociological surveys (produced by ISSP Slovakia 2016, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Institute for Public Affairs, NDI, Eurobarometer and other publicly accessible sources) to identify not only the distribution of public views, but also to provide deeper analyses of the social background of groups more susceptible to anti-immigrant opinions and xenophobia. In addition, the objective of the contribution is to deconstruct related stereotypes and prejudices. The analyses focus on the years 2016–2017, i.e., not the very peak of the refugee crisis and the domestic pre-election campaign, but rather on more stable times in terms of migration debates.

The findings presented indicate that Slovakia has long held a clear social distance from national minorities, foreigners and, in general, from any kind of otherness. It is based on prejudices and concerns that often result from a lack of information or personal experience. This was reinforced by the recent discourse on refugees/immigrants, which lacked a stronger voice in favour of openness and inclusion. It is these attitudes of closeness, intolerance and the failure to respect cultural differences that can be fertile ground for extremist tendencies.

08 BOFULIN, Martina and CUKUT KRILIĆ, Sanja
Enabling Integration through Access to Information: An Overview of Information Services for Migrants in the Danube Region and Beyond

The diversification of migration flows and their increase in the European Union over recent years have brought about new challenges concerning the integration of migrants, as well as better migration management both at the EU and national levels. In this respect, it comes as no surprise that international migration organisations (e.g. IOM, other UN agencies, European Migration Network) have also stressed the need to improve migrants’ access to effective information. It has to be seen as a basic right protected by international and regional human rights instruments, and it is of crucial importance not only in relation to migrants’ arrival and stay, but particularly for their proper integration, participation and empowerment in the countries of destination.

Nevertheless, experiences in providing information to migrants vary significantly across the national, regional and local contexts. Historical migration developments and trends, migration management and policies, legal and institutional frameworks, and the entire socio-political climate could influence not only the quality of such access, but also migrants’ strategies in gaining meaningful information. In this context, the establishment of a unique transnational platform for the provision of information on legal procedures, various services, fundamental facts, contacts, and other relevant matters for migrants, appears to be of utmost importance – the Danube Compass Online Platform (part of the DRIM project) can be a very good example.

Best practices compiled within the DRIM project in nine countries of the Danube region pertaining to migrants' access to information in different environments, as well as further experiences, analyses and comparisons, strongly argue for access to information as the principal precondition to a comprehensive, effective, quicker and successful integration of migrants.

09 SCHÜTT, Petra and KOHLRUSCH, Antje
Providing the Right Information? Or Merely Dumping It? Public Institutions as User-Oriented Information Brokers for Migrants

Immigration has concentrated mainly in large urban centres, and the social integration of migrants from various countries in these centres is a continuous issue. However, the wave of refugees since 2015 has led to new challenges – newly arrived persons come from different and more diverse backgrounds than earlier migrants. Taking the City of Munich as an example, this contribution explains the task for local authorities of ‘bringing the right information through the right medium at the right time to the right person’.

First, a study about self-employed migrants (44 qualitative interviews) assesses their need for information and support on an empirical basis. The city considers migrants and the values they bring to cultural and economic diversity as an asset. Migrant-run businesses also widen the range of goods and services and increase competition on the local and regional markets. The contribution depicts a new typology of such companies in Munich, the structural, cultural and
individual difficulties in doing business, some locally specific problems regarding information provided, as well as inspiring solution approaches (e.g. the activities of Munich Business Startup Office).

The second example presents the substance and findings of the so-called design thinking process related to refugees. As demonstrated, new approaches for migrant-oriented information policies are rather necessary, but have to avoid 'information dumping'. Local authorities also have to act quickly, and communication channels used to deliver information need to be improved. It is also essential to encourage migrant communities' members to identify the core problems themselves, and to closely align the sets of provided information with their needs. The development of a digital map of Munich from the viewpoint of refugees and persons who assist them may serve as a highly positive outcome of applying such new ideas, approaches and methods.

This contribution attempts to present and assess the given Plan and the reactions to it, using daily media monitoring carried out by the author in 2015–2017. Since their publication, Soros’ views have attracted the attention of policymakers, scholars, governments, non-governmental and international organisations, political parties and the media especially. However, it seems that just a few migration stakeholders have studied them sufficiently in depth. This may be the reason why the Soros Migration Plan is widely misinterpreted or largely distorted and even denied by many institutions and individuals.

Along with a deeper characterisation of the Plan (more exactly, a series of three essays released successively in September 2015, April 2016, and July/September 2016), this contribution critically assesses its timing, broader context, argumentation schemes, positive features, weak points and flaws. We also seek to answer which position the Plan could have in debates on international migration and how it has reacted to policy developments. Finally, we compare the recommendations and measures proposed by the Plan with actions, initiatives and policies implemented by competent authorities to curb the migration crisis in the European Union.
1. The Globe in Motion: International Migration (Data Compendium and Theoretical Take-Off)

INTRODUCTION

When looking back at history, one may see that the world has never been static; the very opposite is true, it has always been in motion, whether it concerns people (physical bodies), goods and objects, or ideas (knowledge, information, services). In today's increasingly interconnected world, international migration has become a reality that affects nearly every corner of the globe. Modern transportation has made it easier, cheaper and faster for people to move in search of jobs, opportunities, education and quality of life. At the same time, conflicts, poverty, inequality and a lack of sustainable livelihoods compel people to leave their homes to seek a better future for themselves and their families abroad (UN DESA, 2017).

Migration has become massive on a global scale. Industrial society is widely seen as going through a decisive transitional period into a form defined in various ways such as ‘post-Enlightenment’, ‘post-Fordist’ or ‘postmodern’ era, and characterised by global social change. The changing nature of society’s relation to production and distribution is related to the environmental impact as a totalling, globalising economy based on scientific and technical knowledge, and has become more central with regards to social organisation and social conflict. The notions of a ‘risk society’ (Beck, 2012) and ‘liquid modernity’ (Bauman, 2005) are connected not only with the rise of mobility, but also with new and more fluid forms of mobility.

According to the ‘mobility transition’ hypothesis (Żelinsky, 1971), personal mobility is described as the ‘widening range of options for locating and patterning one’s life’, which is one of the essential components of the modernisation process. The ‘liquid modernity’ (Bauman, 2005) theory claims that stable social institutions (class, family, local labour market, community, nation state) are of fading relevance and are being replaced by flexible institutions (reference group, relationships with ‘no strings attached’, global labour, individual, current country of residence). The transformation of traditional institutions that have shaped migration in the past, has advanced communication technologies, and the disappearance of internal borders have profoundly changed the migration patterns in post-industrial societies.

Regarding transition towards liquid modernity, social scientists find more and more problems with a reliable classification of migratory movements when using standard descriptions of migration (such as long- and short-term, settlement and seasonal migration), which were created by proliferation of new migration strategies. The so-called liquid migration (Glorius et al., Eds., 2013) presents challenges as well for the modelling of the decision-making processes at the individual level. More and more migrants try to avoid long-term planning (intentional unpredictability), since the ability to make quick, independent decisions can be regarded as an asset in the rapidly changing contemporary world.

How to grasp and theoretically reflect this fluid phenomena? Not surprisingly, literature on the topic of migration in current social science is proliferating and profuse in number, and goes hand in hand with growing migration. This contribution is meant to be a kick-off into the general social theory connected either directly or indirectly with the topic of migration, as well as a general up-to-date overview of the migration theory in order to offer a theoretical framework from various angles and perspectives for this volume on migration.

1. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN A NUTSHELL

1.1. The globe in motion

The simultaneous growth of internationalisation and divergence in global society, as well as the re-division of the geopolitical map, has led to an increasing number of international migrants. The number of international migrants worldwide has continued to grow rapidly in recent years, reaching 258 million in 2017 (UN DESA, 2017). The International Migration Report 2017, a biennial publication of the United Nations department states that 3.4% of the world’s inhabitants today are international migrants. Over 60% of all international migrants live in Asia (80 million) or Europe (78 million). North America hosted the third largest number of international migrants (58 million), followed by Africa (25 million), Latin America and the Caribbean (10 million), and Oceania (8 million) (UN DESA, 2017).

In 2017, two thirds (67%) of all international migrants were living in just twenty countries. The largest number of international migrants (50 million) resided in the United States of America. Saudi Arabia, Germany and the Russian Federation are the other five countries with over ten million international migrants each. The number of international migrants has grown by 38% since 2000, with significant increases observed for every continent. For instance, the number of international migrants living in North America grew by 49% between 2000 and 2017, while in Latin America the increase was 80%.

1 Up from 244 million international migrants in 2015, 220 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000; there is an increase of 49% since 2000.
3 This reflects a modest increase from 2.8% in 2000. By contrast, the number of migrants as a fraction of the population residing in high-income countries rose from 9.6% in 2000 to 14% in 2017 (UN DESA, 2017).
The United States is now well into its first-and second-generation Americans (around 12 million each), followed by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (nearly 9 million).

India was the largest country of origin of international migrants (17 million), followed by Mexico (13 million). Other countries of origin with large migrant populations include the Russian Federation (11 million), China (10 million), Bangladesh (7 million), the Syrian Arab Republic (7 million), and Pakistan and Ukraine (6 million each) (UN DESA, 2017).

The United States is now well into its fourth great wave of immigration. At the beginning of the 21st century, the immigrant population stands at a historic high of 40 million, representing 12.9% of the total population. As the foreign-born share of the US population continues to increase, the number of second-generation Americans, the children of immigrants, tends to rise as well. In 2013, first- and second-generation Americans accounted for 24.5% of the US population, and this figure is projected to rise to 36.9% of the population by 2025 (Pew Research Centre, 2013).

In Canada, the establishment of a point system in 1967 for entry based on skills and the reunion of families has not only increased the volume of immigrants, but has also diversified their places of origin (Reitz, 2014). The same is true for Australia, where 40% of population growth in the post-World War II period has been the result of immigration. With the abandonment in the 1960s of the White Australia Policy which prohibited non-European settlers, Australia has become a multicultural nation (Castles et al., 2014), just as the United States became a more multicultural society in the wake of the 1965 Hart-Celler Act, which radically altered the composition of immigration, opening the door to Asians, Latin Americans, and immigrants from the four corners of the globe (Brettell & Hollifield, Eds., 2015). Even Japan and South Korea, countries with long histories of restricting immigration, began admitting foreign workers in the 1980s and 1990s (Chung, 2014). Finally, the movement of large populations throughout the southern hemisphere, such as refugees in Africa or ‘guest workers’ in Asia and the Persian Gulf states, led one analyst to speak of a global migration crisis (Brettell & Hollifield, Eds., 2015).

International migration makes an important contribution to population growth in many parts of the world, and even reverses population decline in some countries or areas. Between 2000 and 2015, migration contributed to 42% of the population growth in North America and 31% in Oceania. In Europe, the size of the total population would have declined during the period 2000–15 in the absence of migration. In 2017, around three quarters (74%) of all international migrants were of working age, or between 20 and 64 years of age, compared to 57% of the global population. Because international migrants comprise a larger proportion of working-age persons compared to the overall population, the net inflow of migrants lowers the dependency ratio, that is, the number of children and older persons compared to those of working age. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America including the Caribbean, the net impact of migration on population growth is negative in most countries, but typically small compared to other population changes. In some small developing countries, however, the negative impact of outmigration on the size of the population can be substantial, especially among adults of working age. In 2017, high-income countries hosted 64%, or nearly 165 million of the total number of international migrants worldwide. Moreover, most of the growth in the global population of international migrants has been caused by movements toward high-income countries, which host 64 million of the 85 million additional migrants since the year 2000 (UN DESA, 2017).

These migration patterns are consistent with the growth seen during the period 2000–2017, when Asia added some 30 million migrants, followed by Europe, which added 22 million, North America, 17 million, and Africa, 10 million. Between 2000 and 2017, Africa experienced the largest relative increase in the number of international migrants who originated in that region (+68%), followed by Asia (+62%), Latin America and the Caribbean (+52%), as well as Oceania (+51%). India has the largest number of persons born in the country who are now living outside its borders. The number of Indian-born persons residing abroad numbered 17 million in 2017, ahead of the number of Mexican-born persons living outside Mexico (13 million). The Russian Federation, China, Bangladesh, the Syrian Arab Republic, Pakistan and the Ukraine also have large migrant populations living abroad, ranging from 6 to 11 million each (UN DESA, 2017).

The number of international migrants includes 26 million refugees or asylum seekers, or about 10% of the total. Although the majority of the world’s international migrants live in high-income countries, low- and middle-income countries host nearly 22 million, or 84%, of all refugees and asylum seekers.

1.2. Europe in motion

Europe has experienced a similar influx of foreigners that began in some countries as early as the 1940s. In 2011, the foreign-born population of Europe stood at 48.9 million or 9.7% of the total (EU27) population (Brettell & Hollifield, Eds., 2015). The foreign-born population constitutes 12% of the German population, 11.2% of the French population, 12.4% of the Irish population, and 24.7% of the Swiss population, to give but a few examples (Brettell & Hollifield, Eds., 2015). Since the 1960s, migration to Western Europe has increased substantially, despite the fact that since the early 1970s various countries have adopted restrictive legislation with regard to the entry of foreigners into the country (Castles & Miller, 2003; Krieger, 2004; OECD, 2006). These legal obstacles have apparently not prevented an ever-increasing number of persons to settle in Western Europe, either in the form of economic or labour migrants, political asylum seekers, or in the form of various procedures with regard to family reunification (Zlotnik, 1998).

The EU enlargement at the beginning of 21st century can be seen by demographers

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as a huge natural experiment regarding migration. At present, immigration tops the list of challenges of greatest concern to European Union citizens. The EU’s demographics show that population growth due to natural change (the balance between live births and deaths) has declined from 0.8% in the 1960s to essentially zero. In 2015, the EU saw a natural population decline for the first time, at least since 1960. Net immigration into the EU was close to zero from the 1960s to the early 1980s when it began to increase. Since 1992, net immigration has been a more important source of population increase than natural change (Batsaikhan et al., Eds., 2018, p. 9).

Although the figures confirm the long-term trend of developing countries as being far more prone to not only the source, but also to the host countries of the refugee population (Gomez et al., 2010), the situation is becoming more difficult for the developed world as well. In 2014, the OECD had reported the highest amount of asylum applicants in 20 years. The number of asylum seekers skyrocketed in the EU in 2015, significantly reaching above the 1 million threshold. The large inflow of refugees in 2015–2016 was not historically unprecedented. However, the circumstances of immigration, the composition of flows of immigrants and the uneven distribution of asylum seekers across EU countries were unprecedented. While in some years immigration has been primarily driven by economic motives and family reunification, in the last few years Europe has experienced a major surge of refugees fleeing wars and conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries. The arrival of large numbers of asylum seekers in a short period of time has created huge administrative, border-protection and financial difficulties in several EU countries, and even led to a partial suspension of the border-free intra-EU travel area.

1.2.1. ‘Refugee crises’ and anti-migrant attitudes

The so-called ‘refugee crisis’ that is currently happening in the international arena is one of the greatest in recent history (Berry et al., 2015). While the number of refugees did not reach 6 million in 1980, in 2017, the threshold of 25.4 million was exceeded (UNHCR, 2018). The number of refugees is thus significantly rising. The highest number of the refugee population originates from Syria (6.3 million), followed by Afghanistan (2.6 million) and South Sudan (2.4 million). The top three source countries are responsible for 57% of the overall international refugee population. At the other end of the refugee flows are the host countries, in other words, countries responsible for the protection and hosting of the endangered population. The highest number of refugees is hosted by Turkey (3.5 million), followed by Uganda and Pakistan with 1.4 million each. The fourth place belongs to Lebanon with a refugee population of 1 million, closely followed by Iran, which has slightly less than 1 million in its refugee population (UNHCR, 2018). Although a slow decrease in the number of asylum seekers could be observed in 2016 and 2017 (Eurostat, 2018), the EU Member States has been struggling to find a common solution to the hosting of asylum seekers ever since.

The public perception of refugees and other immigrants has been shaped by the devastating conflicts in a number of EU neighbourhood countries and the tragic deaths of migrants seeking to cross the Mediterranean Sea. Concerns are also voiced frequently about the difficulties of integrating people with different cultural backgrounds. At the same time, there are economic and political reasons to allow the immigration of workers, students and family members, while the provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees is a key value of the European Union. According to a recent survey, EU citizens have become relatively less concerned about economic issues and more concerned about immigration and terrorism. Surveys show that citizens tend to associate terrorism with immigration. Europeans are more negative about immigration than people on other continents. On average – though there are major differences between countries – EU citizens have the perception that immigrants take more jobs than are created, and take away more fiscal resources than they contribute. There is a major difference between public perceptions of migration from other EU countries and immigration from outside the EU. Support for intra-EU mobility has increased and exceeds two-thirds of the EU population. Support for extra-EU immigration is generally lower (Batsaikhan et al., Eds., 2018, pp. 9–10).

1.3. Seeking for global solutions

International migration on a global scale is a critical concern for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In response to large movements of refugees and other immigrants, the General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants on 19th September 2016, in which UN Member States agreed to implement well-managed migration policies. They also committed themselves to sharing the burden and responsibility more equitably for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees, protecting the human rights of all migrants, and countering self-evidently, this does not yet imply any causality as it is also likely that immigrants are more strongly attracted to societies with lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiments.

It seems that the perception that immigration could be a problem, rather than the actual presence of immigrants, possesses greater influence over public support for immigration. There is a huge gap between perceived and actual stocks of immigrants. EU citizens generally disapprove of the way the refugee crisis has been handled in Europe. Nevertheless, a large majority of Europeans is in favour of a common European asylum policy and increased EU efforts to fight illegal immigration (Batsaikhan et al., Eds., 2018, pp. 9–11).
xenophobia and intolerance directed towards migrants. The Declaration calls for the development of two global compacts, both to be adopted in 2018. Whereas a proposed refugee compact is being developed under the auspices of the United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR) and was presented in 2018 for consideration by Member States, the development of the migration compact is being led by the General Assembly. An international conference on migration in Marrakech (Morocco, December 10th–11th, 2018) is devoted to the purpose of adopting a Global Compact (GCM) for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The GCM is a non-binding agreement that was negotiated through intergovernmental efforts and prepared under the auspices of the United Nations, with an attempt to cover “all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner.” Despite the original intent of the document, it has become a source of international polarisation and negative responses from the side of various European and other countries.

2. THEORETICAL TAKE-OFF

2.1. Key words

Migration can be defined as a ‘permanent or semi-permanent change of residence’ (Lee, 1966, p. 49, italics T.Z.P.), or as a ‘process by which individuals, families, or groups move from one country of residence to work or settle in another’ (Parry, 2007, p. 565). In contemporary definitions, migration is simply interpreted as a form of mobility (Uherek, 2017, p. 223).

The reasons behind migration vary, and often at times migrants have multiple reasons to move. They may migrate in order to enhance their access to education, labour, business opportunities (economic migration). Or they might migrate to reunite their families or seek protection from their domestic environment. There are many different categorisations of migration based either on the reasons that motivate people to migrate, or on its spatial and temporal character. This means that people can migrate domestically or internationally, within the countryside (rural-rural migration), from the countryside to the cities (rural-urban migration), or from one city to another (urban-urban migration) to seek better living and working conditions. Some authors distinguish between job mobility and geographical mobility as well (Grabowska-Lusińska, 2012, p. 58). Job mobility appears both in the case of changing the employer as well as changing the employee’s situation (e.g. becoming unemployed, or finding a job after a period of unemployment), as well as in cases of work promotion or degradation, with the consequence of changing one’s social and material status. In cases of geographical mobility, the reason for migration can be classified as either compulsory or voluntary, while from the point of view of the aims of migration, one can distinguish mainly educational, religious, ecological, political, patriotic and economic reasons (Kawczyńska-Butrym, 2009, pp. 16-24).

People can migrate temporarily, for short periods of time (pendular, circular, irregular migration, return migration etc.), or their migration can be of a permanent nature. The movement can be either voluntary or involuntary in the case that migrants are forced to leave their homes in face of conflict or war (forced migration). Furthermore, conflicts and wars can motivate economic migration as well, however, the voluntary label on any type of economic migration, regardless of security conditions, prevails.

Migration is linked in complex ways to class, gender, generation, ethnicity and other social cleavages, which are embodied in hierarchies of power and social status, in positions in home and host communities, as well as in work and domestic relationships – all of which may be transformed in the course of the migratory process (Van Hear, 2010).

2.2. Concepts and theories

According to Stephen Castles, “migration from one place to another is an existential shift which affects every part of human life. No single discipline can adequately describe and analyse this experience on its own” (Castles, 2003). Massey et al. (1998) already remarked that we have access only to a ‘fragmented set of theories’ to explain migration patterns.

In early sociology, we can find developmental models, such as those by Herbert Spencer or Émile Durkheim, which assert the superiority of the western industrial model. Later, we find models of social order and conformity in the work of Parsons and other functionals. The exception to this preoccupation with the national is Marx’s political economy, which foreshadows globalisation theory. However, later critical sociology, which drew heavily on Marxist ideas, often implicitly took the nation-state as the framework for class analysis (Castles, 2003).

The sociology of migration is a fairly new area that has developed mainly in the context of voluntary (i.e. mainly economic) migration. Migration research has traditionally been dominated by economists and geographers. However, the frequent failure of policies based on their work has highlighted the need to understand the social dynamics of the migratory process. This has led to a new emphasis on the role of family and community in shaping migration, as well as on the study of social networks, social capital and cultural capital as important factors in the process (Brettel & Hollifield, Eds., 2016; Massey et al., 1998; Massey et al., 1993; Portes, 1997).

Deema Kanef and Frances Pine state that migrations and the resulting migration theory, as studied in the last thirty years, can be basically grouped into (1) those which address the structural...
Modern economic literature distinguishes a dozen models dedicated to the nature of migration. Sokolowicz & Lishchynskyy (2018, pp. 45–65) have created 5 group models in this regard:

(1) The first group of models investigates the origin of migration. According to the neoclassical approach, migration is determined by macro-differences in labour demand and labour supply, resulting in income divergences throughout regions and states (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Schiff, 1994; Todaro & Maruszko, 1987).

Overviews of the literature on the causes of international migration invariably start with the presentation of the ‘push-pull framework’, which has its origins in liberal economic theories (Castles & Miller, 2003). These theories typically lead to the conclusion that people migrate from low-income to high-income economies, or from regions experiencing a downward economic trend to regions experiencing economic expansion (Borjas, 1995; Hooghe et al., 2008, pp. 476–477). The research based on the ‘push-pull’ approach of Dorigo & Tobler (1983) emphasises the repulsive (push) factors in a domestic country and attracting forces (pull factors) in the potential host countries. Economic and labour theories assume that migrants react to shortages in the labour market, thus providing for equilibrium in labour markets, both in their country of origin and in the country they aim for (DaVanzo, 1978; Borjas, 1995; Feld, 2005).

(2) The second group of models considers migration from the perspective of its spatial expansion and temporal duration. In this line, the ‘vital transition’ of Zelinsky (1971) and ‘development tiers’ of Skeldon (1997) are usually mentioned, arguing that there is long-term dependence between migration, economic development, and state formation. The ‘migration hump’ approach considers the short-term effect of trade reforms (Martin & Tylor, 1996) or FDI flows (de Haas, 2007) on migration intensity.

(3) The third type of models (the so-called dependency school) with its roots in Marxist economics, includes the continuation of Wallerstein’s ‘world-systems’ (1980), or Piore’s ‘dual labour market’ (1969) approaches, according to which the capitalist system drains the peripheries via migration. The cultural and world system theory assumes that migration patterns reflect centre/periphery relations in the world system. Migrants typically move from the periphery to the centre, in terms of linguistic dominance or cultural hegemony.

According to the ‘world system’s’ theory, which developed from the historical-structural theory, migrant flows are triggered when capitalist economic relations enter non- or pre-capitalist societies. Various types of links are created between core capitalist countries and countries situated in the periphery of this core. Among these links, enduring cultural ties are of crucial importance, such as the vestiges of colonisation in the organisation of the education system in former colonies (Massey et al., 1998, p. 40), which is one of the factors that contributes to the attraction of former colonial subjects to their former coloniser. Portes & Rumbaut (1996, p. 273) also situate migration in the context of structural unbalancing of peripheral societies under the influence of core capitalist countries, as described in various versions of the world system theory. Apart from historical causes such as occupation, colonisation, or active recruitment of foreign labourers, this kind of structural unbalancing may also be brought about by means of mass communication, which spreads information on Western lifestyle and shapes consumption expectations in culturally peripheral societies.

(4) The fourth group emphasises the social dimensions of migration. The network migration approach explains the nature of subsequent facilitating by already settled migration channels via bonds of kinship, friendship, and common origin (Appleyard, 1992; Flores-Yeffal, 2012). The social capital or social network approach basically assumes that migrants are attracted by the fact that other migrants from the same ethnic group have already settled in the receiving society, thus allowing for the occurrence of networks of recruitment (Massey et al., 1998, Hooghe et al., 2008, pp. 476–477).

The ‘new economics of migration’ postulates that households, but not individuals, are the main decision-making forces of migration, which are aimed at risk diversification in comparison with other households etc. (Stark & Bloom, 1985). The ‘cumulative causation’ approach through network expansion also belongs to this group (Fussell & Massey, 2004; Massey et al., 1993). Massey (1990) reintroduced the concept of cumulative causation, originally introduced by Myrdal (1957) in the development theory to explain increasing inequalities between rich and poor regions and countries (de Haas, 2010, p. 1593). Massey applied the concept to explain the continuation of migration, in which cumulative causation stands for ‘the idea that migration induces changes in social and economic structures that make additional migration likely’ (Massey, 1990, pp. 5–6). The cumulative causation theory, as applied to migration by Massey, has strong conceptual parallels with neo-Marxist theories on migration and development, according to which migration undermines the economies of the sending communities by depriving them of their human and material resources, and increasing their dependence on the outside world (de Haas, 2010). The resulting ‘development

Although this comes rather close to Mabogunje’s (1970) migration systems theory, Massey identified a number of additional contextual feedback mechanisms operating through the impacts of migration on the income inequality and the economic structure of sending communities (2015).
of underdevelopment’ (Frank, 1966) is seen as the fuel to even more out-migration. According to the hypothesis of the ‘migrant syndrome’ (Reichert, 1981), this would create a vicious circle of migration – more underdevelopment – more migration, and so on.

The cumulative causation theory, as applied to migration by Massey, predicts that migration-driven employment growth at the destination is likely to generate more migration (Massey, 1990, p. 15). The cumulative causation theory hypothesises that migration, because it is a selective process attracting the most talented members of society, contributes to economic growth and labour demand in receiving societies, while having the opposite effect in sending societies, since it engenders further opportunity disparities that lead to more migration and so on. Ethnic enclaves might provide labour in ethnic businesses. If they are sufficiently large in number (de Hass, 2010, p. 1595), immigrant populations could possibly produce network externalities that would attract other migrants (Epstein, 2008, p. 568). More generally, patterns of occupational specialisation (also outside of ‘ethnic businesses’) and the segmentation of labour markets tend to perpetuate the demand for migrant labour within specific economic niches (Castles & Miller, 2003; Massey et al., 1993; Piore, 1979).

(5) A fifth group of models attempts to present a more complex vision. Among the approaches of this style, we could mention the ‘migration systems theory’ (van Dalen et al., 2005; Guarnizo et al., 2003) and the ‘synthetic theory of international migration’ (Massey, 2015). The migration systems theory, as pioneered by geographer Mabogunje (1970), has been the earliest known attempt at theorising contextual feedback mechanisms. According to this theory, the migration system can be defined as a set of places linked by flows and counter-flows of people, goods, services and information, which tend to facilitate further exchange, including migration between places. The migration systems theory can be extended to international migration (Fawcett, 1989).

According to Sokolowicz and Lishchynskyy, the neoclassical approach could be the most appropriate for explaining the launching of the process, however, the ‘network migration’, ‘new economics of migration’ and ‘cumulative causation’ approaches explain its maintenance, continuing nature, and its encouragement (2018, pp. 47–48).

The traditional push-pull theories have been subject to much criticism, often due to their association with the economic theory, which has come to be perceived as too narrow a focus on a complex phenomenon such as migration. Critics would argue that the concepts were developed in an industrial era, and as such, they no longer offer the best perspective on migration in a post-industrial, globalising world (Massey et al., 1998, p. 12). From an empirical perspective, it has been ascertained that people leaving their country do not typically originate from the poorest countries as cost-benefit approaches would suggest, but rather from regions undergoing rapid social and economic change (Castles & Miller, 2003, p. 22; Hooghe et al., 2008, p. 478).

The world system theory paradigm on the other hand, stresses the role of cultural elements. Here, it is assumed that migrants tend to move from peripheral to central countries. In this approach, migration is seen as a form of cultural hegemony and Massey et al. (1998, p. 41) state that this paradigm leads to the hypothesis: International migration is especially likely between past colonial powers and their former colonies because cultural, linguistic, administrative, investment, transportation, and communication links were established early and were allowed to develop free from outside competition during the colonial era, which led to the formation of specific transnational markets and cultural systems.

Although this theory goes beyond the usual focus on networks by emphasising the importance of flows of information and ideas, it ignores various other contextual feedback mechanisms through which ongoing migration changes the initial conditions under which migration takes place, and which tend to give migration its own momentum (‘contextual feedback mechanisms’ should include inequality and relative deprivation, economies and labour markets, and cultural change).

While economic and cultural pull factors tend to be universal, attracting people from different countries. The network effect is, of course, a very specific pull factor which only exerts influence on people from that one specific ethnic group, not on others (Hooghe et al., 2008, p. 482).

Massey et al. (1998) argue that these various theoretical approaches do not exclude one another, and they do not necessarily contradict one another either. In the current state of research, there is no clear-cut answer to the question as to why migrants seem to prefer some countries over others: ‘At present, there is no single theory that is widely accepted by social scientists to account for the emergence and perpetuation of international migration throughout the world’ (Massey et al., 1998, p. 17).

2.3. Empirical take-off (OECD data set)

Hooghe et al. (2008) tried to integrate the presented approaches and develop a fully comparative model by using the OECD data set on migration trends for the 1980–2004 period. Their results indicate that both the economic and the cultural approach can help us determine the structure of migration patterns. Regarding the economic factor, it seems clear that potential immigrants do not systematically select countries with the highest GDP, nor do they seem particularly attracted to countries with a generous social security system.

Immigrants, on the other hand, do seem to be clearly attracted by shortages in the labour market, precisely as the economic theory would predict. They even react quite efficiently to labour market shortages with a time lag of approximately one year (Hooghe et al., 2008, p. 502).
Secondly, the former colonial past continues to play a role. Countries like Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France increasingly attract immigrants from their former colonies. For the UK, the percentage of Commonwealth settlers is decreasing, but it still remains at a very high level.

Looking back at Hooghe et al. (2008) analysis, perhaps the most interesting finding is that they succeeded in finding stable explanatory factors. The migration figures are at least significantly related to unemployment figures. But more substantively, it means that clear and well-defined pull factors are at work. Immigrants do not settle randomly or in the ‘easiest’ country. They are clearly attracted by shortages in the labour market and by historical ties to a host country. The lessons to be learnt from this finding are, on the one hand, that we cannot undo the former colonial history, but on the other hand, that immigration seems to be an efficient mechanism to restore imbalances on the labour market (Hooghe et al., 2008).

2.4. Trends, Patterns and Challenges

(1) Social inequalities. Zygmunt Bauman argues that ‘mobility has become the most powerful and most coveted stratifying factor’ (Bauman, 2005). Generally, it is assumed that movement from poor to rich countries is the predominant form of migration. Underlying these trends is the growing need for the diversification of income sources and the spatially unequal distribution of economic opportunities. The most significant expression of social inequality is the North-South divide. At a broader level, trade, investment and intellectual property regimes that favour the industrialised countries maintain underdevelopment in the South. Conflict and forced migration are thus ultimately an integral part of the North-South division (Castles, 2003). Persistent underdevelopment is increasingly seen as a threat to security in the North. This is because the South connects with the North in unexpected and unwanted ways: through the proliferation of transnational informal networks, such as international crime, the drug trade, people smuggling and trafficking, as well as migrant networks which facilitate irregular mobility (Castles, 2003).

There are many countries which belong geographically to the South, but which have achieved industrial take-off. The ‘Asian tigers’ (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) are being joined by the ‘little tigers’ (Malaysia and Thailand), as well as by newly industrialising countries in Latin America.

Giant states like India, China, Mexico and Brazil have dualistic economies with fast-growing modern industries. Russia and other former parts of the Soviet Empire are in danger of joining the South (Castles, 2003). On the other hand, Eastern and Central Europe are experiencing modernisation and expansion.

(2) ‘Brain waste’ is a worldwide phenomenon connected with globalisation. The impact of migration is commonly seen as the creation of gaps in the sending country – brain drain, skills shortages, ‘unemployment export’, a reduced working-age population supporting an increasingly aged population, and so on. In recent decades however, scholars and policymakers have become more aware that migration creates ties as well as gaps: ties with foreign receiving countries that have an impact on sending ones. Kapur (2010, p. 14), writing about India, distinguishes four channels of impact: a prospect channel (where hope of future migration shapes stayers’ behaviour), an absence channel, a diaspora channel and a return channel (White et al., 2018, p. 44). If talking about Europe, EU enlargement caused massive post-accession migration. Glorius et al. (Eds., 2013) offered insight into motives that explain why young, highly skilled people from CEECs made decisions relatively easily about emigration, and accepted jobs significantly below their qualifications in destination countries. They referred not only to economic differences to explain the migration moves, but also pointed to labour market discrimination of migrants and the glass ceiling in the receiving countries, as well as to migration networks. Thus, the ‘brain waste’ problem is more complex and covers not only higher mobility of skilled young persons, but can also be seen through the lens of the contrast between the aims of immigration policies (filtering of the highly skilled) and different needs of the labour markets in receiving countries (higher demand for lower skilled jobs). Some authors also pointed out that the problem of the ‘brain waste’ seems to be rooted in the evolution of tertiary educational systems in CEECs (Glorius et al., 2013) that resulted in the production of an ‘overeducated generation’, i.e. overprovision of graduates (especially in marketing, management and pedagogy). The phenomenon of ‘flying professors’ and ‘flying postdoctoral students’ moving across Europe (or worldwide) from one university or academic post to another depended on the short-term projects is also a phenomenon connected with the opening of Europe.
(3) High- and less-skilled migration. This is also related to the circulation of business people, executives and highly-skilled personnel that are often characterised as knowledge workers or ‘creative class’ required by the knowledge-based economy and society (Bitušíková, 2011, p. 40, 43). Their mobility is closely connected with the network of global cities with a high concentration of capital, power, knowledge, skills and information. They usually become part of the pool of transmigrants, being the legal citizens of two or more states, developing multiple identifications with the home and host country and a larger supranational community (Castells, 1996; Held et al., 1999). Flows and networks can relate to economic factors such as trade and investment, to political cooperation and international organisations, and to cultural and social networks. However, such flows are always linked to flows of people as well (Castles, 2003).

(4) Transnational networks. The crucial characteristics of globalisation include the growth of cross-border flows and their organisation by means of multi-nodal transnational networks (Castells, 1996; Held et al., 1999). Flows and networks can relate to economic factors such as trade and investment, to political cooperation and international organisations, and to cultural and social networks. However, such flows are always linked to flows of people as well (Castles, 2003).

(5) Chain migration. The idea that migration often leads to more migration is not new. Migration literature has particularly highlighted the migration-facilitating role of migrant networks. Once a critical number of migrants has settled at the destination, migration becomes self-perpetuating since it creates the social structures to sustain the process (Castles & Miller, 2003; Massey, 1990; Massey et al., 1998). While the term ‘chain migration’ had already been used by Kenny (1962) and particularly by Price (1963), it was defined by MacDonald & MacDonald (1964). This idea that social ties based on kinship and community membership facilitate processes of chain migration has been further elaborated by Tilly & Brown (1967) and Choldin (1973), and has retained currency in the migration literature. In recent literature, the term ‘network migration’ has gradually replaced chain migration.

(6) Migratory capital. Bourdieu argued that the benefits which accrue from membership of a group are consciously or unconsciously the basis of the solidarity that makes them possible (Bourdieu, 1985). Social capital classifies as ‘capital’ because it is a resource that can be converted into other forms of cultural, human and economic capital (Bourdieu, 1985; Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998). Migrant networks can then be conceived as a form of location-specific social capital that people draw upon in order to gain access to resources elsewhere (Massey et al., 1998). Migrant networks tend to decrease the economic, social and psychological costs of migration (de Haas, 2010).

However, there is also the concept of ‘downside of social capital’ elaborated by Portes (1998) who argued that social capital also has at least four possible negative implications: (a) restricted access to opportunities through exclusion; (b) excessive claims on group members; (c) restrictions on individual freedom; and (d) downward levelling norms. The concept of a so-called negative social capital points to exclusionary mechanisms of group formation and helps explain the limited diffusion of migration across communities and societies. A mechanism of strong moral pressure within the community of migrants seems to play an important role in the breakdown of migration systems. Apart from external macro-level factors such as migration policies, economic development and labour market conditions, this helps explain why settled migrants and their descendants often evolve from being ‘bridgeheads’ to becoming ‘gatekeepers’ (de Haas, 2010).

(7) Non-permanent migration is becoming more and more popular. The extent of temporary, circular and seasonal migration that often underpins income diversification is usually underestimated. In India, an estimated 20 million people migrate temporarily each year. In northern Bihar, temporary movement to urban centres has grown from 3% of the total in 1983 to about 24% in 2000 (Tacoli, 2009, p. 525). Seasonal migration is related to return or circular migration. In 1999, about 60% of registered migrants in the industrial and construction hubs in the coastal region of China had lived in their current place for less than one year, and only between 15 and 30% intended to settle permanently. In Burkina Faso, circular movement, which involved returning to home areas within two years, is especially high among those engaging in cross-border migration, but also rural–urban migrants and, to a lesser extent, rural–rural migrants. In Vietnam’s Red River Delta, it is increasingly common for farmers to move to urban centres to work in the construction sector for a few months every year, and then to return to their villages (Tacoli, 2009, p. 527).

Owing to the international integration taking place in many parts of the world (especially in the European Union) and the related removal of legal barriers on labour markets, non-permanent forms of migration are becoming more and more common. This phenomenon is noticeable in the case of trans-border migration as well (Sokolowicz & Lishchynskyy, 2018, pp. 47–48). Castles (2010) argued that the increased use of employment practices such as subcontracting, spurious self-employment, temporary employment, casual work and irregular employment...
(for instance, in domestic service and restaurant work) and the associated growth of informal economies in wealthy countries has fuelled (often irregular) migration. According to Wallace & Stola (Eds., 2001), Central Europe is developing into a migration zone of its own, located between Western Europe and the East, characterised by the predominance of pendular, short-term migration, the presence of ethnic minorities returning home, and the width of the informal sector that opens opportunities for employment, trading and trafficking. The authors are using in this context the terms ‘quasi’ and ‘incomplete’ migration. Polish researchers speak of ‘lasing temporariness’ (Gryzmała-Kazłowska, 2005).

(8) Rural–rural, rural–urban and urban–urban migration. In recent years, migration has become ever more worldwide, and essentially an urban affair. About 50% of international migrants reside in ten highly urbanised, high-income countries, such as Australia, Canada and the United States, several countries in Europe (France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom), the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Migrants, in fact, tend to concentrate in the cities of these countries (IOM, 2016, p. 2). Rural–rural migration is prevalent in agriculture-based economies such as many low-income African nations, while urban–urban movement is more important in regions with high levels of urbanisation, such as much of Latin America and the Caribbean. Rural–urban migration tends to be high in areas with high levels of economic growth and expanding industry and services sectors, but even in countries such as India and Vietnam, rural–rural migration flows remain large. In Vietnam, 37% of the migration recorded by the 1999 census was between rural areas, compared to 26% between urban centres, 10% from urban to rural areas and 27% of rural–urban migration; in India, 38% of recent migrants are estimated to move between rural areas. Rural–rural migration tends to be dominated by the poorest groups, who often do not have the skills, financial capital and social networks to move to the urban centres (Tacoli, 2009, pp. 515–517).

(9) Culture of Migration. According to some scholars, this can even give rise to a ‘culture of migration’ (Massey et al., 1993). Such migration-affected cultural change can further strengthen migration aspirations along established pathways in communities and societies that may become obsessed with migration. It is important to distinguish this aspirations-increasing effect from the more instrumental migration-facilitating role of networks and remittances.

(10) Growing importance of (social) remittances. Circular migration is an effective form of income in many countries of the world. Household members move to urban centres or more developed countries, especially where there is a demand for migrant labour, and send home remittances on a regular basis. Remittances and earnings from non-farm activities have proved to play a major role in financing innovation and intensification of farming in both Africa and Asia (Guest, 1998).

While the role of reverse flows of information and ideas was already acknowledged by Lee (1966) and Mabogunje (1970), Levitt (1998) coined the term ‘social remittances’ to describe ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital flowing from receiving to sending communities. Migration and the associated confrontation with other norms and practices, as well as increasing awareness of opportunities and lifestyles elsewhere, can have a profound influence on identity formation, norms and behaviour in migrant sending communities (de Haas, 2010). However, it should be indicated that remittances often increase income inequality in sending communities, which increase relative deprivation and hence, migration aspirations among non-migrants. While pioneer migrants are often relatively well-off, such feedback mechanisms can make migration more accessible for poorer groups and lead to a diffusion of the migration experiences within and across communities (de Haas, 2010).

(11) Stayers. Considering the fact that mobility is becoming an iconic feature of the current era characterised by (given) huge disparities in wealth, social conditions and human rights, climate change and war conflicts, some scholars argue that the key challenge is to explain why most people do not migrate (Arango, 2000). The focus in migration studies is merely directed on migrants. More recently, it was pointed out that ‘stayers’ are worthy of the same attention. The situation is complex, and the motivation to move are of the same importance as the motivation to stay. In countries where migration has become a pattern strongly associated with social and material success, migrating can become the norm rather than the exception, and staying home may become associated with failure.

(12) Feminisation of migration. Recent trends reveal that migrants are increasingly differentiated in terms of age, educational achievements and sex (in fact, more and more migration studies point out the feminisation of migration trends) (Solokowicz & Lisichynsky, 2018, pp. 45–46). In 2017, 48.4% of international migrants were women.

(13) Forced migration – including refugee flows, asylum seekers, internal...
displacement, development-induced displacement – has increased considerably in volume and political significance since the end of the Cold War. It is thus becoming an integral part of global social transformation. Refugees, asylum and other forms of forced migration have become major themes of political debate in many countries. Typically, it is rural dwellers, ethnic minorities and indigenous people who suffer ‘in the national interest’, while elites and transnational companies benefit (Roy, 1999). A final form of forced migration is the trafficking of people across international boundaries for purposes of exploitation. The trafficking of women and children for the sex industry occurs all over the world. The distinction between forced migration and economic migration has become blurred as a result. Many migrants and asylum seekers have multiple reasons for mobility, and it is impossible to completely separate economic and human rights motivations (Castles, 2003).

(14) Climate change mobility. The impacts of climate change are likely to affect population distribution and mobility. It is likely that both extreme weather events (storms, floods, heat waves) and changes in mean temperatures, precipitation and sea level will in many cases contribute to increasing levels of mobility. Frequently cited figures estimate that by 2050, the number of people forced to move primarily because of climate change will range between 200 million (Myers, 2005) and 1 billion (Christian Aid, 2007). There is growing evidence suggesting that mobility, in conjunction with income diversification, is an important strategy to reduce vulnerability to environmental and non-environmental risks – including economic shocks and social marginalisation. While alarmist predictions of massive flows of refugees are not supported by past experiences of responses to droughts and extreme weather events, predictions for future migration flows are tentative at best (Tacoli, 2009, p. 515).

At the global level, it is often assumed that climate change-related migration will be across borders and from poor to rich countries. Nevertheless, there is so far little evidence that people who have already been exposed to environmental degradation actually do move in the ways and numbers predicted by the environmental refugees’ model. It also overlooks the fact that migration requires financial resources and social support, both of which may decline with climate change, which may thus result in fewer rather than more people being able to move (Tacoli, 2009, pp. 516–517). In addition, many people have to migrate because of environmental degradation, natural disasters and industrial accidents or pollution. In such cases, it is extremely hard to distinguish between environmental, economic and political factors, so that the label ‘environmental refugee’ is misleading and even damaging, since it can divert attention from complex causes (Black, 1998; Myers & Kent, 1995).

(15) Politicisation of migration. Employment insecurity, the high cost of living and often unsafe and insecure accommodation in urban centres arguably act as contributing factors to circular migration and overlap with environmental degradation in home areas in increasing people’s mobility. We observe economic reasons as a predominant force underlying migration in the world today, which is also connected to the growing politicisation of migration processes. International migration is increasingly affecting national policies, bilateral and regional relations, and influencing the domestic political discourse concerning public security policy (Klimek, 2015, pp. 38–39), but may also cause ‘situational nationalism’, increased radicalism and anti-migrant attitudes in recipient (or even potentially recipient) and destination countries. This, together with the deepening cultural diversity of migrants (especially in Europe), determines the anticipated migration patterns (Castles & Miller, 2003). Undoubtedly, migration in the coming years will strongly affect demographic changes (especially in the context of the ageing developed world). It will also increase the risk of tensions in the world, which is polarised from the developmental point of view.

(16) Securitisation of migration. Migration has become securitised. This makes states and societies consider migration as a matter that should be under control, since it is related to the security of the population and nationals of a given state. There are voices, however, that migration can and should be treated as an advantage rather than a threat, though it does not deny the security concerns that always accompany social phenomenon. The impact of culture and history on migration policies, and how identity politics shape a given country’s policies is discussed in this regard (Ahmed, 2017). ‘Nail’ (2015) supports the idea that all migrants have a positive impact on security and are thus a benefit, not a threat, for the host state. As they are not in their home and their labour is the only source for their activity, they are capable of solidarity and cooperation. Ahmed (2017) also stresses that the interconnection of migrants and security is rather populist and lacks any sort of empirical evidence. Koser (2011) supports the claims of Gebrewold (2008) and Swing (2013) that there is no clear evidence that migrants and asylum seekers and refugees in particular should be understood automatically as sources of crime, terrorism or epidemic diseases in the host states. (…) Thus, the labelling of migrants as a security threat solely due to their migrant status does not mean they are an actual threat. Enough evidence needs to be provided to support such claims; otherwise the effect on security will be rather counterproductive’ (Vargová, 2018, pp. 14–15).

22 Thai and Japanese gangsters collaborate to entice women into prostitution in Japan by claiming that they will get jobs as waitresses or entertainers. Victims of civil war and forced displacement in former Yugoslavia, Georgia or Azerbaijan are sold to brothels in Western Europe. Women in war zones are forced into sex-slavery by combatant forces or sold to international gangs. Although trafficking affects mainly women and children, there are also cases of men forced into debt bondage by trafficking gangs (Gallagher, 2002).

23 The case of Slovakia, where the (potential) influx of migrants after 2014 was over-communicated by leading politicians. The quasi-neutral call for securitisation of society in fact fostered the anti-migrant discourse which was implicitly nourished by fear from (potential) risk of terrorism after the influx of Muslims into the Slovak culturally conservative and religiously (almost) monochromatic scene. The newly constituted radical right-wing party KSNS (People’s Party Our Slovakia) benefitted from anti-migrant attitudes too.
Transnational migration. The transnational theory argues that the rapid improvements in transport and communications make it possible for migrants to maintain their links with co-ethnics in the place of origin and elsewhere, while also building communities in the place of residence. The result is multiple affiliations which question the dominance of the nation-state as the focus of social belonging. The under the label of the diaspora refugees and exiles have always fitted the model of the transnational community. However, it can be argued that such exile diasporas are taken on by new characteristics under the conditions of globalisation (Cohen, 1997; Van Hear, 2010). In all probability, only a minority of migrants belong to transnational communities, with most of them still fitting into earlier models of either temporary migration or permanent settlement (Castles, 2003).

It is also worth considering that those who try to stop migration are still focussed on the nation-state model. Considering the level of globalisation and importance of transnational networks, this model seems to be an old-fashioned relic of the 19th and 20th century era. In the scientific approach, migrants are seen as moving not between ‘container societies’, but rather within a ‘transnational social space’ (Faist, 2000), in which ‘global cities’ with dualistic economies form the key nodes. In such spaces, transnational communities are emerging as a new focus for social and cultural identity for both economic migrants (Portes, 1999; Vertovec, 2009) and forced migrants (Cohen, 1997).

According to the People Flow Report (May 2003), as a result of the globalisation process and the growth of transnational communities, established notions such as ‘citizenship’ and the ‘nation state’ are being redefined. In the future, it seems likely that a growing number of people will have more than one nationality, will identify with more than one culture and will divide their time between more than one country (Veenkamp et al., 2003, p. 47).

**CONCLUSION**

Today, the decision to migrate is rarely a consequence of only one of the above-mentioned factors. Contemporary concepts that explain the causes and directions of migration take into account their complex composition. The current trends of high mobility, which are linked to income diversification, will continue and intensify. Migration researchers need to take a holistic approach, linking their specific research topic to broader aspects of migration and its embeddedness in social relations at various spatial levels. A key level for analysis is that of transnational social transformation. However, understanding of local, national regional patterns of social and cultural relations and how they are affected by broader changes is equally important.

Various theoretical approaches have provided us with insights to explain the pattern of migration flows. The economic theory considers migration to be a reaction to the labour market and economic incentives. Cultural theories predict that migration flows will occur according to a centre-periphery pattern, while social network analysis assumes that migrants follow already established migration networks. Recent research (Hooghe et al., 2008) indicates that migration flows react to economic incentives, mainly with regard to the labour market, but also to cultural and colonial linkages. There is no indication that the importance of the colonial past is declining over time. The response of migration patterns to labour market shortages is shown to be highly efficient, while the analysis shows that immigrants are not attracted by high levels of social expenditure.

Mobility is becoming not only larger in scale and scope, but more complex in nature as well. The old paradigm of permanent migration settlement is progressively giving way to temporary and circular migration. The socially or ethnically homogenous nation states with a single culture have become confronted with an increasing degree of cultural diversity connected with international migration (Veenkamp et al., 2003, pp. 7, 31, 42).

In this regard, many scientists call for a radical change in perceptions of migration. The key conclusion of the People Flow Report and Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) is that the dominant reflex of governments, in reaction to ever-changing patterns of migration, is to develop ever-changing mechanisms of control. In this regard, the GCIM claims that, so far, the international community has failed to capitalise on the opportunities and to meet the challenges associated with international migration (Veenkamp, 2007, p. 38). Most migration management policies try to influence the volume, direction and types of population movement. Migration theory scientists, however, claim that policies might more usefully aim to accommodate changes in migration patterns that result from divergent reasons (environmental degradation, economic growth or crisis and other wider transformations), with mobility seen as part of the solution rather than the problem (Tacoli, 2009).

Post-modernity and transition towards post-industrial and knowledge-based societies are challenging also for social scientists who face problems not only with a reliable classification of migratory moves, but also with the proliferation of new forms of mobility and migration strategies. More and more migrants try to avoid long-term planning with the ability of flexible decisions and styles of life, with the fluid, translocal concept of home and ones’ (born-in) culture.

Migration has become a more frequent choice for adaptation. People make a personal choice of whether to move or stay. Their decisions profoundly affect the globe. At the macro-level, migration has the power to balance or unbalance the world economy and the labour market. At the mezzo-level, it constitutes networks and institutions with a transnational agenda, crossing the borders of existing nation-states. More importantly, at the micro-level of individuals and groups, it touches very intimate spheres of private lives, changing the patterns of ownership and sharing, family and partnership relations. In conclusion, there is more movement around the globe (flow and circulation of people, goods and information) with less predictable consequences. International migration thus represents one of the most challenging and important issues of the 21st century.
REFERENCES


2. The Policy of the European Union in the Field of Integration of Third-Country Nationals

INTRODUCTION

Even if the European Union has taken an increasingly important role on migration issues as from the Amsterdam treaty, the definition and implementation of integration policies remain largely in the hands of Member States. The EU, in accordance with the relevant provisions in the Treaty, can accompany, support and promote cooperation between the Member States.

This contribution will examine the EU policy of integration of third-country nationals, which does not concern EU mobile citizens, leaving one Member State to reside in another Member State even if, in some cases, challenges and obstacles to the integration of EU mobile citizens can be similar to those of third-country nationals.

Since the large influx of asylum seekers to the EU in 2015, there has been a renewal of interest for integration not only from national authorities, but also from civil society (NGOs, economic actors, trade unions, employers) and local and regional authorities.

The situation in the EU regarding migration and integration is nevertheless far from being homogeneous. It is therefore important to understand that the challenge of integration is not the same in all EU Member States, both because the size of the population of third-country nationals can vary greatly from one country to another, but also because the composition of this population can vary greatly as to reasons for migration, skill levels and age, which in turn has an influence on integration outcomes.

When examining integration issues, the mid- and long-term perspective from an economic and demographic point of view should always be taken into account: if integration measures can be considered as a cost in the short-term, they should be considered as an investment which can prove beneficial in the mid- and long-term or – in the best case – short-term if integration policies are effective. Given the demographic outlook at the EU level and the growing skills shortages in many sectors, putting in place appropriate migration and integration policies will become crucial to maintain the competitiveness of the EU economy in the coming years.

In this context, Member States have developed national integration policies which can focus on third-country nationals generally, or target only at refugees. Due to very different contexts, traditions and legislations, Member States have never expressed the intention to harmonise integration policies at the EU level. Nevertheless, in spite of the limited competence of the EU in this field, the recent interest for this issue has triggered a series of policy initiatives at the EU level to foster cooperation, promote good practices and support financially the implementation of measures on integration.

1. INTEGRATION OF THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS IN THE EU: IDENTIFYING THE CHALLENGES

1.1. Distribution of the third-country national population across Europe

Foreign-born people living in the EU-28 accounted for 10.7% of the total population with the share of people born outside the EU almost twice as high (6.9%) as that for people living in an EU-28 Member State other than the one where they were born (3.8%). According to the OECD & EU (2015), it is possible to classify countries of destination as follows:

**Long-standing destinations**
- with many recent and highly educated immigrants (LU, UK),
- with many settled low-educated immigrants (BE, FR, NL as well as traditionally AT and DE).

**Destinations with significant recent and humanitarian migration**
- DK, FI, SE as well as AT and DE due to high recent inflows of asylum seekers.

**New destination countries**
- with many recent, low educated immigrants (EL, IT, PT, ES),
- with many highly recent highly-educated immigrants (CY, IE, MT).

**Countries with small recent non-EU population**
- HR, CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, PL, SK, SI, BG, RO.

Some countries having a long tradition of immigration have a high share of people who are children of immigrants coming from other countries, either EU or non-EU – e.g. in 2014: FR (14%), SE and BE (11% each), AT and UK (9% each).

1 **In this contribution, we use the EU Member States’ codes according to the official Eurostat tutorial. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Tutorial:Country_codes_and_protocol_order (accessed on 15th March 2018).**
Figure 1 shows the percentages of non-EU-born and third-country nationals in the total populations of EU Member States in 2016. On the whole, third-country nationals represent 4.1% of the total EU population whereas those non-EU-born form 6.9%. The gap between the two values is mostly due to the acquisition of EU citizenship by third-country nationals.

Given these differences between EU Member States, it is therefore logical that the experience and traditions differ substantially across Europe.

1.2. Socio-economic situation is less favourable than for host-country nationals

On average, the socio-economic outcomes of third-country nationals are less favourable than the ones of host-country nationals. This can be easily explained by different factors, in particular the time required to learn the language and have one’s skills and qualifications recognised. This also includes the fact that migration has not always been a deliberate choice, particularly in the case of beneficiaries of international protection for whom the migration process could not be properly anticipated and prepared. Discrimination based on ethnicity and origin also plays a role in making integration in the labour market difficult for third-country nationals. According to several studies, employment is the most strongly affected factor. When looking at less favourable integration outcomes such as education attainment, employment rates and at-risk of poverty levels, it is possible to note substantial differences between EU Member States. Some of them demonstrably obtain better average results than others.

Nevertheless, one should be cautious at drawing conclusions as not all Member States deal with the same population and manifest the same patterns in terms of reasons for migration, skill levels or age. Integration outcomes of third-country nationals are strongly influenced by the composition of the third-country population of each Member State. A Member State, which would have a high share of refugees in its third-country national population, would likely present less favourable integration outcomes than another Member State, which would have a third-country population mostly composed of labour skilled migrants. Therefore, examining integration outcomes at the national level should always be made in the light of the specificities of third-country nationals of this Member State. In that respect, it must be recalled that 80% of the beneficiaries of international and subsidiary protection residing in the EU is concentrated in four countries (Germany, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom).

1.2.1. Education and training

Education and training, both formal and informal, are a crucial driver of integration.
Figure 2 clearly shows that in most Member States it holds true that the higher the qualification level, the better the employment prospect.

All studies – and in particular PISA – indicate that migrant children and children of immigrants have more difficulties than native children. Across the EU, about 18.1% of children with two native-born parents have difficulties in science, but this figure is considerably higher for pupils who had immigrated (around 35.8%) and even for ‘second-generation’ children (around 29.6%).

In addition, other studies indicate that when migrants are qualified, they face a large discount of their qualifications in the labour market. Among the tertiary educated third-country nationals in employment, about 41% were working in 2016 below their qualification level (i.e. in ISCO 4-9 occupations), a much higher share than among host-country nationals (22%).

Foreign qualifications acquired abroad have a much lower value in the labour market than domestic ones as migrants experience difficulties having their formal qualifications recognised in the EU.

Migrant women are a particularly under-utilised source of skills as 45.5% of third-country national women are overqualified for their job, compared to 36.4% of third-country national men (while for host-country nationals, over-qualified workers represent 22.6% for women and 20.3% for men).

There are many challenges to the integration of migrants into the education and training system. Nevertheless, all research on this topic points at the following aspects:

- adaptation to a new linguistic environment,
- difficulty for teachers and trainers to adapt to migrant needs and lack of resources to do so,
- low level of basic skills for children and students having been deprived of education and training during a long period of time,
- difficulty to assess skills and recognise qualifications,
- geographical and social segregation.

Of course, these less favourable outcomes in the area of education and training have effects on the capacity of third-country nationals to integrate in the labour market.

1.2.2. Labour market outcomes

Third-country migrants are considerably less active on the labour market than other groups. Employment rates among immigrants are relatively low, or on average 10.6 pp lower than those of native-born persons (Figure 3). The gap is about 20 pp in BE, FI, NL and SE, and above 15 pp in FR, AT and DK. Between 2008 and 2016, the employment challenge increased as the gap widened by 6 pp in the EU, with above average increases in HU, MT, EL, LV, NL, ES, IT, FI. In addition, the gap between non-EU-born women and their native-born counterparts is particularly high.

Labour market outcomes of migrants are influenced by many factors, in particular their individual characteristics (age, gender, education level acquired in the EU or abroad, professional experience, proficiency in host-country language).

Figure 2 Gaps in the employment rate between third-country nationals and native citizens by qualification level and selected EU country in 2014

| Employment rate of TCN, by qualification |

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| Gap compared to native citizen |

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2 ‘Second-generation’ students refer to students born in the country where they sat the PISA test but whose parents are foreign-born.

3 See OECD & EU (2014), in particular Chapter 8: ‘Migrants’ skills: Use, mismatch and labour market outcomes – A first exploration of the International Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC).’

4 In this contribution, the abbreviation ‘pp’ stands for percentage points.

5 While the employment gap is relatively low in countries such as ES, IT, and EL, integration challenges are nevertheless present, shown e.g. in poverty rates and early school leaving.
Figure 3 Employment rate of persons aged 20-64 by country of birth and EU country in 2016 and the change since 2008 (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Native born</th>
<th>Other EU-28 born</th>
<th>Non-EU born</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For DE there is no breakdown for non-EU-born persons by Eurostat, but if one looks at the gap between host-country nationals and third-country nationals, this is at 26.5 pp - i.e. the sixth highest in the EU.


National integration policies also play a role. Robust national integration programmes coupled with active labour market policies with specific schemes aiming at migrants’ integration in the labour market will facilitate integration in the labour market of third-country nationals. On the contrary, the absence of specific policies on integration or specific schemes for integration in the labour market of migrants (such as fast-track schemes) will delay their integration in the labour market. The general economic environment and labour market conditions play a role too. Finally, discrimination is also a factor which cannot be ignored when looking at this issue. Several reports have shown the existence of discriminatory practices towards third-country nationals regarding access to employment.6

12.3. Social exclusion and poverty

Non-EU-born persons are more likely to be vulnerable than native-born: on average in 2015, more than 40% of the non-EU-born were at risk of poverty or social exclusion (and more than 50% in Member States as EL, ES, BE), compared to about 22% of the native-born. Since they often tend to fill in less qualified occupations, migrants are overrepresented among the working poor. Working migrants dispose lower household income on average and face higher risks of falling into poverty than those who are native-born: 21.6% and 8.4%, respectively. In particular, gaps in in-work

poverty rates between native-born and non-EU-born persons exceeded 20 pp in EL, LU, CY and ES, while the gap was above 10 pp in IT, BE, SI, AT, DK, SE, FR, DE and UK.

1.3. The particular case of refugees

Since around 2013, an increasing share of migrants to the EU consisted of asylum seekers, a particularly vulnerable group. In 2015, 2016 and the first half of 2017, about 2.8 million third-country nationals applied for asylum (first time applications) in Europe. In this time period, close to 2.3 million first instance decisions were made, out of which close to 1.3 million (55%) resulted in protection.

The employment rate of refugees differs widely from one country to another as can be seen in Figure 4. Nevertheless, on average, refugees tend to be less employed than other third-country nationals or migrant workers/students or native-born persons (Figure 4; Figure 5).

These data confirm that the reasons for migration greatly influence the integration outcome. Investment in integration, education and language training prove beneficial in the mid- and long-term. Previous studies from the OECD show that, on average, refugees catch up with native-born persons after 15 years (see also Figure 6 based on Eurostat data).

These results are not surprising. Beneficiaries of international protection fleeing persecution or war are not able to prepare themselves for a new life in another country. The journey to their final destination is often chaotic and traumatizing, and – in most cases – they are not prepared to enter the labour market upon their arrival, unlike labour migrants.

Whatever their reason for migration, with proper early investment in education and training, as well as with the existence of opportunities for integration, all migrants can contribute positively to the host society both in the mid- and long-term, provided they can benefit from effective integration policies.
2. THE MID- AND LONG-TERM BROADER PERSPECTIVE ON INTEGRATION

A rational approach underlying the implementation of effective integration policy is not only based on the need to maintain social cohesion and to avoid that parts of the population feel marginalised and excluded. In the current European context of shrinking demography and skills shortages, integration is one of the solutions which can contribute to address skills shortages and to mitigate the decline of the working-age population.

A recent analysis carried out by the European Commission on the potential evolution of the labour force in the Union has highlighted the contribution of migration to mitigating the negative trends in EU’s labour force size development (Lutz et al., 2018). Thus, the scenario with double migration reduces the expected decrease of the labour force under the constant participation scenario by about 70%, as the projected size should reach 236.7 million workers in 2060. At the opposite end, with a projected size of 189.2 million workers in 2060, the decline intensifies for the scenario with no migration (Figure 7).

As outlined in the Commission report An Economic Take on the Refugee Crisis (European Commission, 2016), in the mid-to long-term, integration is a key factor. If well integrated, refugees (and other migrants) can contribute to greater flexibility in the labour market, help address demographic challenges, and improve fiscal sustainability. Integration needs to be seen as a long-term investment which calls for early intervention and implementing policies where the pay-off is not always immediate (Liebig & Huddleston, 2014). In that respect, the earlier and better the integration, the more likely it is that third-country nationals will make a positive contribution to growth and public finances in the medium-term. In particular, lowering barriers to facilitate the ‘employability’ of migrants is essential for their ability to get a regular job and to have a positive impact on growth and public finances in the medium-term, provided that migration is underpinned by effective integration policies put in place by Member States concerned.

3. THE EU POLICY IN THE FIELD OF INTEGRATION

3.1. Genesis and evolution of EU policy in the field of integration

With the Amsterdam Treaty that came into force in 1999, the European Union has acquired competences to adopt rules in different fields related to ‘visa, asylum, immigration and other policies related to the free movement of persons’. Nevertheless, the treaty did not mention the possibility for the EU to take initiatives in the field of integration of third-country nationals legally residing in the EU. This can be explained by several reasons. One of them is the existence of very different approaches between Member States regarding integration policies and the very wide gaps in experience and knowledge in this area.

In October 1999, within the Tampere European Council conclusions, integration was, however, explicitly mentioned. Paragraph 18 states: ‘The European Union must ensure fair treatment of third-country nationals who reside legally in the territory of its Member States. A more vigorous integration policy should aim at granting them rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens. It should also enhance non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural life and develop measures against racism and xenophobia.’

Integration was finally explicitly mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty ten years later, in 2009, Article 79.4 of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU mentioned integration for the first time: ‘The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.’

The drafting of this provision clearly demonstrates that if a competence is recognised by the EU in the field of integration of third-country nationals, this competence consists in ‘providing incentives and support’ to Member States. Therefore, the definition of integration policies obviously remains mostly in their hands. The exclusion of the possibility to harmonise integration policies at the EU level acknowledges the differences in approaches in this topic between Member States.

3.1.1. Policy-oriented documents adopted at the EU level

Following the Tampere declaration, in November 2004 the Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted The Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU. In June 2014 these principles were reaffirmed in Council conclusions. The comprehensive set of 11 principles starts with several assertions that integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents, and implies respect for the basic values of the EU. It further stresses the significance of employment, knowledge of the host society’s language and institutions, education and participation in the democratic process and equal access to public goods and services. It also recognised the key role of mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government.

In 2005, the Commission adopted the Common Agenda for Integration, a strategy document providing the framework for the implementation of EU integration policy. It contained a series of supportive EU mechanisms and instruments to promote integration and facilitate exchanges between integration actors.

The European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals was further adopted in July 2011. The Agenda, which covered the period 2011–2015, focused on increasing the economic, social, cultural and political participation of migrants and fighting discrimination, with an emphasis on local activities. It also explored pre-arrival measures and the role of countries of origin in integration. The multiplicity of funding opportunities that were made available is another major legacy of this period.

3.1.2. Concrete tools and forums developed at the EU level

To support the development of EU integration policies, several networks and
forums mostly dedicated to the exchange of best practices and information were created. In 2002, the National Contact Points on Integration were formed, gathering representatives of Member States in charge of integration. In 2003, the European Migration Network was established, with the main objective of producing reports and studies on migration-related topics.

Between 2005 and 2010, several European knowledge resources on immigrant integration were created by the Commission, in order to foster the exchange of information and good practices between integration stakeholders in all Member States. After the first edition in 2004, two editions of the European Handbook on Integration were published in 2007 and 2010. In 2010, a common set of integration indicators to better monitor policies across Europe was agreed at the Zaragoza Ministerial Conference.

In 2009, the European Web Site on Integration was launched. Conceived as a single entry point for resources on integration at the EU level, the website features news, good practices, funding opportunities and country fiches explaining national integration governance structures and evaluations of integration outcomes of all 28 Member States.

A platform for dialogue between civil society organisations and European institutions – the European Integration Forum – was created in this context in 2009, before it became the European Migration Forum in 2015.

3.13. Financial support

The first EU financial resources to specifically support integration measures became available in 2003 with the Preparatory Actions for integration of third-country nationals (INTI), which promoted activities at the local level, strengthened networks and the exchange of information and good practices between Member States, their regional and local authorities, and other stakeholders.

So did the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals (EIF), which ran between 2007 and 2013, before it was included in the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund – AMIF. The European network of cities for local integration policies – CLIP, which has been supported by the Eurofound Agency since 2007, is an example of a local level network on migrant integration initiated in this period.

The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), adopted in 2014 to run until 2020, is the current overarching financing instrument for migrant integration issues. It replaced the Integration Fund, the Refugee Fund and the Return Fund. 88% of its €3.137 million budget is earmarked for multiannual National Programmes, 20% of which are dedicated to integration activities. The remaining 12% are divided between EU activities and emergency assistance. A wide range of specific activities, such as accommodation services or awareness raising campaigns, can be funded through the call for proposals. In 2017, National Programmes of Member States were topped up with additional funding for a total amount of EUR 140 million.

3.14. Integration provisions in the legal migration acquis and the asylum acquis

In the legal migration acquis, the Family reunification directive and the Long-term residence directive stipulate that Member States may require compliance with integration ‘measures’ or ‘conditions’ for third-country nationals who want to come to the EU on the grounds of family reunification or who want to benefit from the long-term residence status. Nevertheless, these two directives do not define integration ‘measures’ and ‘conditions’. They also do not frame the conditions according to which they may be imposed, nor do they specify to what extent Member States are obliged to provide support for complying with them.

The asylum acquis contains provisions aiming at providing with provisions ensuring that applicants have access to housing, food, clothing, health care, education for minors and access to employment under certain conditions. The qualification directive contains provisions on access to employment (Article 26), access to education (Article 27), access to procedures for recognition of qualifications (Article 28), social welfare (Article 29), healthcare (Article 30), and to integration facilities (Article 34).

3.2. Current actions of the European Commission in the field of integration

Recent activities of the Commission have focused on the implementation of the Action Plan for the Integration of third-country nationals and on the labour market integration of third-country nationals.

3.2.1. Action plan on integration of third-country nationals – a comprehensive approach on integration activities at the EU level

In line with the European Agenda on Migration adopted in May 2015, which outlined immediate measures to be taken in response to the large influx of migrants in the Mediterranean and resulted in the adoption of EU emergency relocation and resettlement schemes in September 2015, the Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals was adopted on 6th June 2017 as the latest goals setting document published by the European Commission. It targets all third-country nationals legally residing in the EU, addressing also specific challenges faced by refugees and asylum seekers. The Action Plan provides a comprehensive framework to support Member States’ efforts in developing and

7 Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/ (accessed on 20th March 2018).

8 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13th December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted.


strengthening their integration policies, and describes concrete measures to be implemented by the Commission.

The Plan comprises actions across all policy areas relevant for integration:

- pre-departure and pre-arrival measures, including steps to prepare migrants and the local communities for the integration process,
- education, including actions to promote language training, the participation of migrant children to Early Childhood Education and Care, teacher training and civic education,
- employment and vocational training, including measures to promote early integration into the labour market and migrants’ entrepreneurship,
- access to basic services such as housing and healthcare,
- active participation and social inclusion, including actions to support exchanges with the receiving society, migrants’ participation in cultural life, and fighting discrimination.

The Plan also presents tools to strengthen coordination between the different actors working on integration at national, regional and local levels – for example, through the creation of a European Integration Network promoting mutual learning between Member States – and a more strategic approach concerning EU funding for integration.

The Action Plan also presents measures to strengthen policy cooperation between national, regional and local integration actors. Mandating the European Integration Network (the former National Contact Points on Integration) with a greater mutual learning role as well as the creation of an Urban Agenda Partnership focusing on the integration of third-country nationals and coordinated by the City of Amsterdam and the Commission are two good examples of increased coordination between respective EU Member States and other relevant stakeholders, including European cities.

### 3.2.2. Integration in the labour market

Since 2017, the Commission has focused strongly on integration in the labour market within its work on integration.

The *European Dialogue for Skills and Migration* was launched on 27th-28th January 2016 as a platform to promote exchanges between EU institutions, businesses and social partners on migration-related issues. Its first edition focused on skills shortages in specific sectors, the potential of labour migration, entrepreneurship among immigrants and integration.

The second edition of the Dialogue took place on 23rd May 2017 and focussed on the role of employers and social partners in the integration of refugees and other migrants in the labour market. The main objective was to mobilise employers and social partners for the integration of recently arrived migrants, and in particular – but not solely – refugees. On the day of the Dialogue the Commission launched the initiative ‘Employers together for Integration’ in order to give visibility to what employers are doing to promote integration and encourage others to follow the example.

On 20th December 2017, the Commission signed the *European Partnership for Integration* with EU-wide employers’ organisations and other social and economic partners to work more closely together to promote the integration of refugees in the labour market.

In the same vein, the European Commission financially supports many actions to promote integration in the labour market with the help of several Funds, notably the Asylum Migration Integration Fund, the Employment Social Fund and the Employment and Social Innovation Programme. Actions to promote migrant entrepreneurship have also been funded under the Cosme programme.

**CONCLUSION**

Migration and integration policies are closely interlinked. A successful migration policy, including a Common European Asylum Policy must be based on effective integration policies put in place at the national level. Even if Member States face very different challenges in terms of integration of third-country nationals, investing in integration is necessary – not only to ensure social cohesion, but also to address existing and future challenges pertaining to demographic and skills shortages. The EU, while having limited competences in this area, has a role to play in supporting Member States in their integration efforts through funding, but also by creating the conditions to an effective cooperation and exchanges, allowing thus the creation of a ‘level-playing field’ on integration issues at the European level.

### REFERENCES


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3. Integration Processes of Immigrants and Related Policies in Europe

INTRODUCTION

Europe has become a continent of immigration since World War 2 (Penninx, 2016; 2017), but this occurred at the same time that some European countries have defined themselves as non-immigration countries. Within the European Union, this has led to the paradoxical trend that ever more restrictive immigration policies for non-EU citizens go together with the promotion of movement across borders within an enlarged European Union. In EU policies, the latter movements of EU citizens are no longer called migration; but are now known as (internal EU) mobility. It is this particular background of migration and migration policies that has also determined to a great extent the content of discourses and policies on integration. It explains, for example, the absence of national integration policies in most of the North-West European countries up to the turn of the century, since migrants were considered ‘guest workers’ or other temporary sojourners whose integration was not aimed for. It also explains that when integration policies were seen as necessary after the turn of the century, these policies were primarily aimed at the cultural dimension of integration in order to assimilate the newcomers. It also explains why integration policies at the local, regional, national and European Union level differ in many aspects and sometimes contradict each other.

The message of this brief historical observation on migration and integration in Europe is that the concepts of migration and integration received different and specific meanings in the course of time, as well as within specific policy contexts and on different levels. For scientists and those who want to understand these phenomena – before trying to influence their course by making policies – this means that one cannot take these concepts for granted. We need well-defined analytical definitions of concepts – independent of policy definitions. We need such independent, scientific definitions to make a proper analysis of migration and integration processes themselves in the first place. And such an analysis, in its turn, is a precondition for the analysis of policies that are devised to influence these processes.

The key concepts of this contribution are therefore integration processes and policy processes that are related to integration processes. I shall focus in the first part on the concept of integration by introducing an open non-normative analytical definition and identifying the main dimensions, parties involved, levels of analysis, and other relevant factors such as time and generations. In the second part, I shall define integration policies, meaning the intentions and efforts of actors who steer integration processes towards wanted outcomes. Wherever possible, I will add specific notes where ‘information possibly matters’.

1 This text was prepared as a keynote for the International Conference ‘Information Matters: towards positive pathways of migrant’s integration’ within the DRIM project, held in Bratislava, 26th October 2017. The concept of integration and the analytical approach to integration policies have been developed by the author in earlier publications (Penninx, 2006; 2007); this text draws particularly from Penninx & García-Mascareñas (2016, pp. 11–29).

2 Swedish integration policies since 1975 and Dutch Ethnic Minorities Policies since the 1980s were exceptions to this rule.

1. THE STUDY OF INTEGRATION PROCESSES

1.1. Definition of the concept

The term integration refers to the process of the settlement of newcomers in a given society, to the interaction of these newcomers with the host society, and to the social change that follows immigration. From the moment immigrants arrive in a host society, they must secure a place for themselves. Seeking a place for themselves is a very literal task: migrants must find a home, a job and income, schools for their children, as well as access to health facilities. They must find a place in a social and cultural sense as well, since they have to establish cooperation and interaction with other individuals and groups. They also have to get to know and use institutions of the host society, and the latter needs to recognise and accept immigrants as political, economic and cultural actors. All of these elements are assumed to work in a two-way process, in which migrants adapt and change, but also the host society does not remain unaffected. The degree of the impact of newcomers on the society of settlement, however, depends, among other things, on the size and composition of the newcomer population as well as institutional arrangements brought into existence to accommodate immigrants’ political, social, and cultural needs.

All of the elements above, including several others, are part of my definition of integration as ‘the process of becoming an accepted part of society’. This elementary definition is intentionally...
open in two regards. First, it emphasises the process character of integration rather than defining an end situation. Second, in contrast to the normative models developed by political theorists, it does not specify beforehand the degree of, or even the particular requirements for acceptance by the receiving society. This makes the definition highly useful for empirical study of these processes. Measuring the degree of becoming an accepted part of society will allow us to capture the diversity of (stages of) the process. We do need to specify within this basic definition what should be measured; that is, what are the indicators of integration and where might we find them.

1.2. Three dimensions

The basic definition of integration encompasses three analytically distinct dimensions in which people may (or may not) become accepted parts of society: (i) the legal-political, (ii) the socio-economic, and (iii) the cultural-religious dimension. The legal-political dimension refers to residence and political rights and the ‘degree of integration’ has two parts: (i) the legal-political, and (ii) the institutional level, however, if employers base their recruitment of workers on stereotyped or prejudiced perceptions and procedures, the negative consequences for individual immigrants may be substantial, as may be the broader societal impact.

The socio-economic dimension refers to the social and economic position of residents, irrespective of their national citizenship. Within this dimension, the position of immigrants can be analysed by looking at their access to and participation in domains that are crucial for any resident. Do immigrants have equal access to institutional facilities for finding work, housing, education, and health care? Do they use these facilities? What is the outcome of immigrants’ participation compared to that of natives with the same or comparable qualifications? Since needs and aspirations in these domains are relatively universal (basic needs are largely independent of cultural factors), access to and participation of immigrants and natives in these areas can be measured comparatively. The outcomes, particularly when they are unequal, provide useful inputs for policies.

The cultural-religious dimension pertains to the domain of perceptions and practices of immigrants and the receiving society, as well as their reciprocal reactions to difference and diversity. If newcomers see themselves as different and are perceived by the receiving society as culturally or religiously different, they may aspire to acquire a recognised place in these respects. For their part, the receiving society may or may not accept cultural or religious diversity. Here again we find two extremes. At one extreme, new diversity may be rejected and immigrants are required to adapt and assimilate into monocultural and mono-religious societies. At the other extreme, ethnic identities, cultures, and world views may be accepted on an equal level in pluralistic societal systems. Between these two extremes, there are many in-between positions, such as accepting certain forms of diversity in the private realm but not, or only partly, in the public realm.

This third dimension, and the specific positions of immigrants and immigrant groups, is more difficult to measure, basically for two reasons. Firstly, it is less about objective differences and diversity (ethnic, cultural, and religious) than about perceptions and reciprocal normative evaluations of what is defined as different and the consequences of such categorisations. Categorisations may become stereotypes, prejudices, and ultimately part of immutable racist ideologies. Moreover, the basis of categorisations may change. In the guest worker period (1960–1975), for example, the fact that an increasing share of immigrant workers were Muslims, was not seen as relevant; they were primarily temporary workers. It was only from the 1990s and onwards that such migrants and their families were categorised as coming from Muslim countries and were primarily seen as Muslims. Secondly, categorisations and reciprocal perceptions manifest themselves differently at different levels (i.e., at the individual, collective, and institutional levels), and the consequences may also differ. If contacts between individuals are coloured by prejudice, interactions may be uncomfortable but may have a limited societal impact. At the institutional level, however, if employers base their recruitment of workers on stereotyped or prejudiced perceptions and procedures, the negative consequences for individual immigrants may be substantial, as may be the broader societal impact.

It is important to realise that these three dimensions are not fully independent of one another. The legal-political dimension may condition the socio-economic and cultural-religious dimensions (represented by arrows in Figure 1). From the perspective of individual immigrants, factors such as illegal residence, extended uncertainty by long-term dependence on charity or the state, and a lack of access to local and national political systems and decision-making processes have negative implications for opportunities and participation in the socioeconomic and political realms. From the perspective of the receiving society, exclusionary policies are an expression of a general perception of immigrants as outsiders, which inevitably adversely affects immigrants’ integration. The cultural-religious dimension (represented by another arrow in Figure 1) may similarly
impact the socioeconomic dimension. For example, negative perceptions of certain immigrants may lead to prejudice and discrimination by individuals, organisations, or institutions in the receiving society, and this may reduce immigrants’ opportunities — even if access is legally guaranteed — in domains such as housing, education, health care, and the labour market.

### 1.3. Two parties

Having defined the dimensions of the process of integration of newcomers into an established society and how to measure them, the next question is who are the relevant parties involved? Firstly, there are the immigrants themselves, with their varying characteristics, efforts, and degrees of adaptation (the left part of Figure 1). Secondly, we find the receiving society, with its characteristics and reactions to the newcomers (the right part of Figure 1). It is the interaction between the two; however, that determines the direction and the temporal outcomes of the integration process. However, these two ‘partners’ are fundamentally unequal in terms of power and resources. The receiving society, especially its institutional structure and reaction to newcomers, is far more decisive for the outcome of the process than the immigrants themselves are.

### 1.4. Three levels and indicators

Processes of immigrants’ integration take place and can be measured at different levels. The first level is that of individuals, both migrants and natives of the receiving society. For the first dimension, immigrants’ integration at the individual level can be measured in view of their legal status and political participation. For the second dimension, we can look at their socio-economic integration and position in the ‘hard’ domains of housing, work, education, and health. For the third dimension, we would measure their identification with a specific cultural-religious group and with the receiving society, as well as their cultural and religious practices and how these are valued. In our conceptual definition of integration, we should also measure the attitudes and behaviour (or acceptance) of native individuals towards newcomers and the consequences of these.

The second level is that of organisations. There are the organisations of immigrants, which mobilise resources and ambitions of the group. These organisations may be strong or weak; they may orient themselves primarily towards (certain aspects of participation in) the receiving society or to specific cultural and religious needs of the group. They may become an accepted part of civil society — and a potential partner for integration policies — or isolate themselves or be excluded by the host society. There are also organisations of the receiving society. Their extent of openness to newcomers, their perceptions of and behaviour towards individual immigrants and their organisations might be of crucial importance for immigrants’ integration. Research has shown, for example, that with the absence of governmental integration policy in Germany until 2002, NGOs, particularly trade unions and churches,
played a crucial role in the integration processes of guest workers and their families (Penninx & Roosblad, Eds., 2000; Marino et al., Eds., 2017).

The third level is that of institutions, understood as standardised, structured, and common ways of acting in a socio-cultural setting. Two kinds of institutions are of particular relevance. The first are the general public institutions of the receiving society in the three dimensions: institutional arrangements of the political system; institutional arrangements in the labour market, housing, education, and public health; and institutional arrangements for cultural and religious diversity. Laws, regulations, and executive organisations, but also unwritten rules and practices, are part of these institutions. Though general institutions are supposed to serve all citizens in an equal manner, they may impede access or equitable outcomes for immigrants. They may exclude immigrants formally, either completely – as does the political system of their cultural and religious background, or partially, as when social security and welfare systems offer only limited services to non-citizens. Yet, even if access for all residents is guaranteed by law, institutions may hamper access or equitable outcomes by virtue of their historically and culturally-determined ways of operating, for instance, by failing to take into account immigrants’ history, their cultural and religious backgrounds, or their language abilities. Thus, adequate functioning of general public institutions – and their potential to adapt to growing diversity – is of paramount importance. At this level, integration and exclusion are ‘mirror concepts’ (see Penninx, 2001).

The second type are institutions specifically ‘of and for’ immigrant groups, such as certain religious or cultural ones. Unlike general institutions, the value and validity of any group-specific institution is confined to those who voluntarily choose and adhere to them. Although their place is primarily in the private sphere, group-specific institutions may also manifest themselves in the public realm as civil society actors, as the history of churches, trade unions, cultural, leisure, and professional institutions in European cities and states shows. Some migrant-specific institutions may become accepted parts of society, equivalent to institutions of native groups. Others, however, might either isolate themselves or remain recognised or even excluded.

Different mechanisms operate at the individual, organisational, and institutional levels, but the outcomes at all of these levels are clearly interrelated. Institutional arrangements largely determine organisations’ opportunities and scope for action, and they may exert significant influence on how immigrant organisations develop and orient themselves. Institutions and organisations, in turn, together create the structure of opportunities and limitations for individuals. Conversely, individuals may mobilise to change the landscape of organisations and may even contribute to significant changes in general institutional arrangements. In view of the uneven distribution of power and resources noted above, such examples are scarce; however, they do exist.

1.5. Time and generations

The heuristic model, developed and explained above, may be used as a tool to describe and analyse the position of individual immigrants and groups of immigrants at a certain point in time. But an important element in the logic of integration processes is the time factor. Integration of newcomers is a long-term process by its very nature. This immediately becomes apparent if we look through the lens of newcomers. At the individual level, adult immigrants may adapt cognitively and adjust their behaviour when they learn how things are done, by whom, and so on. This part is relatively easy and pays off quickly. Information being made available may thus ‘matter a lot’. However, their adaptation in the aesthetic (relating to the five senses) and normative realms takes more time and is much less dependent on ‘information’. Feelings, likes, dislikes, and perceptions of good and evil remain rather persistent over a lifetime. This is a general rule for all human beings, but it becomes especially manifest in those who have changed their environment through migration (for an overview of these aspects of the adaptation process, see van Amersfoort, 1982, pp. 35ff.).

The situation of children of immigrants (often labelled as the second generation) generally differs in this respect. Although they do become familiar with the immigrant community and possibly its pre-migration background through their primary relations in family and immigrant community networks, they simultaneously become thoroughly acquainted with the culture and language of the society of settlement, not only through informal neighbourhood contacts starting in early childhood, but especially through their participation in mainstream institutions, particularly the education system. If such a double process of socialisation takes place under favourable conditions (in which policies can play an important role), these second-generation young people develop a way of life and lifestyle that integrates the roles, identities, and loyalties of these different worlds and situations. Because the ways of doing this are manifold, more and more differentiation develops within the original immigrant group. At the group level, this means that the litmus test for integration as an end result (being an accepted part of society) – and hence for the success or failure of policies in this field – lies in the situation of the second generation in the host society.

In principle, we can grasp the time factor by carrying out and comparing descriptive analyses of individuals and groups of immigrants at different points in time. In doing this, we should learn some lessons from previous historical comparative analyses. First, research indicates that integration processes are neither linear nor unidirectional. Although we have indicated before that the situation of migrants (first generation) differs significantly from that of their children and grandchildren, this does not imply that integration is the inevitable eventual outcome. On the contrary,
2. THE STUDY OF INTEGRATION POLICIES

The study of policies is fundamentally different from the study of integration processes. The essence of policies is the intention to guide and steer processes in the society, in our case, integration processes of immigrants. Explicit integration policies are part of a normative political process in which the issue of integration is formulated as a problem, the problem is given an underlying assumption of cause and possible remedies for it. This means looking at how the problem is actually defined and explained and at what is thought could and should be done about it. The problem definition takes into consideration how immigration is perceived: Is it seen as a problem or as opportunity? Who has the moral or legal right to be or become an immigrant? Who are the wanted immigrants, and who are the unwanted ones? For those immigrants already present in the host society, a basic question is whether they are seen as ‘foreigners’, as ‘temporary guests’, or as permanent members of society for whom the state accepts the same responsibilities as for native citizens, guaranteeing the same rights and providing the same facilities.

Once the problem has been defined, the next step is to consider what should be done. In some cases, a state or a city may choose to ignore immigrants’ presence and therefore avoid any special responsibility for them. This choice for a non-policy response should be understood as a policy in itself (see Hammar, Ed., 1985, pp. 277-278; Alexander, 2007, pp. 37ff.). In other cases, new policies may be formulated to cater for certain immigrants’ needs but under specific conditions due to the alleged temporary nature of their stay. Under this guest worker approach immigrants’ otherness may be “tolerated” and even encouraged, though their residence and rights may be curtailed in the long run. Finally, if immigrants are perceived as permanent residents, inclusion is the main response. This takes different forms, however. Coinciding with the model on integration policies proposed by Entzinger (2000), integration policies may differ significantly with regard to the three dimensions of immigrants’ integration identified earlier; that is, the legal-political dimension, the socio-economic dimension, and the cultural-religious dimension.

In view of the first dimension, legal recognition and political participation, policies may recognise immigrants as permanent foreign residents (the so-called ‘denizens’), thus incorporating them socially but limiting their political rights, or immigrants may be accepted as full citizens, thus removing all barriers for and even promoting naturalisation. In terms of equality, the socio-economic dimension, specific policy measures may be devised catering to immigrants’ interests and needs, or policies may merely address the common interests of citizens in general. Finally, in terms of diversity, the cultural-religious dimension, policies may be designed under two very different premises. The first is that integration demands the adaptation and learning of immigrants, but also significant changes in access to and the working of institutional structures of the host society. The second is that societal rules and structures, including underlying norms and values, should be taken as a given and immigrants should (voluntarily or even as a mandatory task) adapt to them.

Frames cannot always be analysed directly; they often have to be reconstructed from policy documents and political discourse. When a policy is defined, it generally includes an explicit formulation of the perceived problem and the desired outcome of the specific efforts encompassed by the policy. Thus, politically-debated statements in and about policy documents contain the essential elements of policy frames. The most important elements to be studied and compared are general assumptions and orientations about the causes of integration.
2.2. Policy measures

Policy documents may be closer to policy discourse than to policy practice. In this regard, it is fundamental to complement any study of policy frames with a concrete and detailed analysis of actual policy measures. This means looking at the programmes in place and again identifying in which of the three dimensions of integration they are to be categorised, what their main goals are, and who they target. As said before, the study of integration policies cannot be limited to an analysis of explicit integration policy measures. Programmes addressing the population as a whole, or specific socio-economic groups within it, regardless of whether they are of immigrant origin, as well as general institutional arrangements in areas such as education, health care, housing, and the labour market, may be as fundamental (or even more) in fostering (or not) the integration of immigrants, neither too related to immigrants or one-sided.

In this regard, the study of policy measures entails three difficulties: (i) we must go beyond integration policy measures in the strictest sense, which greatly expands the field of study; (ii) policy measures are seldom described in official documents and therefore are difficult to trace; and (iii) programmes often constitute a set of unwritten norms and practices which may vary across time and space. A way to overcome these difficulties is by conducting extensive fieldwork and, especially, interviews with the main actors involved: policymakers at the different administrative levels, practitioners and professionals in the different social areas, NGOs, and immigration organisations. When focusing on policy measures, it is also important to examine the budgets allocated in each programme in order to get a concrete picture of what actually is being done. Interestingly, policy frames and policy measures may differ significantly in their goals, the dimensions of integration addressed, target groups, actors involved, and resources available.

2.3. Governance

Once we have identified the main policy frames and policy measures, the next question concerns how integration policies are organised and implemented. Regarding organisation, two aspects are relevant. The first is whether the implementation of policies by civil servants and other actors is directly steered and controlled by politics or whether there is a relatively large gap between politics and policy. In highly politised contexts, what politicians say and what is actually being done may differ significantly. The second aspect of concern is the location of the initiating and coordinating force for migrant integration within the governmental administration: Is it centrally located and coordinated by a specific ministry or department (i.e., home affairs, social affairs, or employment)? Or is it peripherally organised across all of the areas relevant to integration policies? Such questions also apply to regional and local policies.

If we want to examine not only how policies are organised but also how they are formulated and implemented, we should shift the focus from government to governance. This means taking into account a wider range of actors, including other administrative levels such as regional and local governments; other institutions, agencies, and practitioners within the state apparatus; and other relevant stakeholders, such as politicians, NGOs, and private institutions.

The vertical dimension of integration policymaking, that is, the relationship between the national, regional and local levels, is of particular importance, since both municipalities and the EU level have become increasingly involved in the making of immigrant policies. This multiplicity of levels should be analysed in detail so as to understand how new tensions have come to the foreground, but also how new alliances and forms of cooperation (e.g., between the local and the EU level) have developed. Various key questions can be asked: Who is in charge of integration policies? How are the different levels coordinated? Do they respond to different political and social imperatives? Do they complement or contradict one another?

Also to be considered is the horizontal dimension of integration policymaking, meaning whether and how integration policies are implemented by the full range of relevant actors, from private institutions to NGOs, immigrant organisations, and professionals. The central question here is who is supposed to be a relevant actor in policies. With respect to immigrants, are individual immigrants seen as primary actors? Are their organisations and other collective and institutional resources regarded as relevant? Looking at the receiving society, who are the main actors involved, again at the individual, organisational, and institutional levels? Research on Southern Europe has shown that when governmental integration policies are absent, civil society actors (such as trade unions, NGOs, charities, and civil movement associations) may become of key importance in providing various services and offering political support for immigrants’ rights claims (Campomori, 2005; Zincone, 1998). At the same time, as noted by Caponio (2005), such mobilisation may produce a “crowding out” effect, wherein native associations mobilising on behalf of immigrants actually become the main recipients of municipal funding and partners in policymaking. Immigrants may thus be prevented from forming their own organisations.

2.4. Politics and time

In democratic societies, policies are part of a political system in which the majority makes the final decision. This brings an inherent danger of either a virtual absence of explicit integration policies and an avoidance of issues related to immigrants or one-sided patronising policies reflecting mainly majority interests and disregarding the needs and voices of immigrants. Whereas in some European countries policymakers have been able to craft...
policies ‘behind closed doors’ to extend political and social rights to migrants (Guiraudon, 2000), in others, anti-immigrant political parties have succeeded in vetoing liberal reforms and urging their governments to adopt more restrictive immigration and integration policies. An extreme case is Switzerland, where referendums can even overrule the supreme court and possibly mandate reform of the constitution, thus undermining the main tools that protect religious and ethnic minorities of immigrant origins against discrimination (D’Amato, 2011).

As integration policies are adopted and implemented in practice, another aspect of the logic of policymaking emerges. Although integration processes are long-term in nature – they take at least a generation – the political process in democratic societies requires that policies bear fruit within much shorter timeframes: the interim between elections. Such a policymaking context may lead politicians to make unrealistic promises that cannot be fulfilled in such a short period. This ‘democratic impatience’ in turn often produces disappointment and backlash effects (Vermeulen & Penninx, 2017).

To be able to study the processes of integration, I have presented a heuristic model for the non-normative, analytical study of integration processes. This model distinguishes among three dimensions (the legal-political, the socio-economic, and the cultural-religious one), two parties (the immigrants and the receiving society), and three levels (individuals, organisations, and institutions). I proposed to study integration as attempts to steer integration processes. To do so, I suggested taking into account policy frames (including their normative assumptions), concrete policy measures, and actors involved on different levels.

I suggest that this approach to the study of integration processes and the exercise of making explicit how policies can be studied is relevant both for researchers and for practitioners. For example, analysing information practices and campaigns as policies (their frames, aims, target groups, actors, etc.) will make clear where the provision of integration is located in the heuristic model of integration processes, which dimension is targeted, which actors are involved on what level and what form of interaction is involved. Systematic comparative analyses of these policies and practices in different countries and locations will then certainly shed more light on how particular immigrant cultures and migratory histories on the one hand, and general public institutions and immigrant policies on the other contribute (or not) to integration outcomes.

CONCLUSION

Migration and integration policies in Europe have developed uniquely in time and space, but are present everywhere, in great variety of content, on all levels from local ones to the EU. The concepts behind these policies are normative in nature (because policymaking is normative by definition), have developed in several directions, sometimes even contradictory.

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4. Reflection on Some Aspects of Slovakia's Approach to Migration

INTRODUCTION

For a proper projection of the country's approach to migration as a phenomenon at present, it is necessary to recall the period when Slovakia presided over the Council of the EU in the second half of 2016. The atmosphere of the domestic pre-election campaign were behind us, the images of the 2015 migration wave were gradually receding, while the processes related to the preparation of a new global frame for migrants and refugees had not yet been felt intensively. Attention was focused on the functional paralysis of the Schengen EU outer borders protection system and of the mechanisms of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The loss of mutual confidence between Member States as an immediate consequence of the situation was not linked directly to migration. Since the discussion on a solution for open issues had been stagnating for a long time, the 2016 Slovak Presidency submitted a compromise concept of 'effective solidarity' based on the idea that mutual assistance between Member States should depend on their possibilities and capacities. This proposal reflected exactly 'squaring the circle' standing in front of the EU Member States with different historical and socio-economical bases for handling this topic. And so as to not be the final contradiction, even though the Slovak proposal re-enacted the discussion, the Slovak Republic filed legal action against the Decision of the Council of the EU on obligatory migrant quotas\(^1\) at the European Court of Justice.

At this juncture, an important phase of a parallel process culminated in New York, which theoretically has an even more grave impact on migration not only in Europe. This was, however, still not the centre of attention for either domestic or most European political leaders. In September 2016, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which in fact meant the closure of the mission by Irish politician and entrepreneur P. Sutherland, who had been appointed to the office of UN Secretary-General Special Representative for Migration already in 2006. The main ambition of the adopted document was to initiate a process which would lead to the formation of a new global frame for migration and refugees in the form of special international agreements/compacts. This should be completed by the end of 2018.

The dynamics of the respective processes on the national, European and global levels is thus different, which in itself does not create conducive conditions to achieve the desired results.

1. TERMINOLOGY

Since there is a necessity to explain any terminology apparatus when beginning any serious analysis, let us make some comments in this respect without the ambition of their completeness. It is precisely the terminology and motion uncertainty that is the source of many misunderstandings in relation to migration.

In the history of Slovakia and Slovaks, migration has been connected largely with emigration to the USA at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Emigration in the course of the 20th century occurred in several waves of politically motivated departures, part of which can simply be ranked in the frame defined by the Geneva Convention (1951) on refugees. For obvious reasons, we do not rank into these migration movements the forceful deportation of the almost 70 thousand strong Jewish population of then Slovakia to the concentration camps of Auschwitz and Birkenau during WW2, although misleading information had been initially provided about their resettlement. This crime only added to the negative connotation of migration stemming from the fact that it is built on experiences from the period of war and shortly after.

After the Slovak Republic joined the EU in 2004, the situation partly repeated. A number of the country’s citizens — estimates are within 150–250 thousand — moved or commuted to other Member States in search for job opportunities. This move falls under the free movement of labour force, which is the result of integration processes in Europe, as well as Slovak membership in the EU. Nevertheless, migration in principle has a different quality based on the fulfilment of a number of preconditions by Slovakia as a country of origin. One of these was formed by the introduction of liberal economic rules. The introduction of a transition period by partners in the EU to facilitate their own preparation for the challenges related to the arrival of labour migrants from Slovakia served as a confirmation of the fact that the approach to migration is defined by the historical, as well as the economic context, of any country.

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\(^1\) Available at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/34bae462-e71e-9317-03aa75e71a1/language-en (accessed on 31st April 2018) — Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22nd September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece.
The opposite phenomenon, immigration, provides a significantly different picture. Again, we will examine the recent past only. We can speak about statistically important groups in two cases at the most. The resettlement of about 60 thousand ethnic Slovaks within the post-WW2 exchange of population between then Czechoslovakia and Hungary is not taken into consideration. Therefore, it is important to understand that the largest (80%) immigration group until 1993 represented the citizens of the Czech Republic. Afterwards, their share slowly receded in favour of third-country nationals, as it was in the case of immigrants from the former Yugoslav Republic in the aftermath of the civil war there in the early 1990s and the influx of about 12 thousand Ukrainians shortly after the fall of the new millennium. Regardless of the fact that in all listed cases, it was the arrival of migrants from the geographically and culturally close vicinity, immigration in the Slovak context was never conducted as a clearly defined state policy, creating necessary operational structures and mechanisms. This conclusion has relevance to the competencies within the EU.

There is a claim within the global discourse on migration that the predominant part of current migration movements happens in an organised manner, and thus legally. We are not going to challenge the relevance of this argument; however, the question therefore is why so much energy is devoted to the enforcement of the term regular/irregular as an opposite to the term legal/illegitimate. The argument that the labelling of migrants as illegal is pejorative, which can be noted in the report ‘Making Migration Work for All’ (UN, 2017), is not convincing. Despite the number and occurrence of such persons who disregard the existing rules because of a situation on the territory of any state is significant, ignorance to or the bypass of the legal order of a respective country is not acceptable as a way to identify their status.

The legal order of the Slovak Republic does not recognise this terminology, just like a number of other countries. The practical consequence of such an approach is wiping off differences between various categories of migrants, especially refugees and persons who migrate for labour purposes. The problem with this term used at the level of the EU has been solved by compromise. Thus, when the EU speaks about migration as a social phenomenon, the term legal/illegal migration is valid, whereas when debate is personified, the term regular/irregular migrant is applicable. For the purpose of this contribution, we will use the established terms that we are familiar with: legal vs. illegal migration and legal vs. illegal migrant.

In the passage devoted to the European dimension of migration, we will use various terms whose closer description is also necessary. While talking about relocations, these persons are already physically present in the territory of the EU and have been transferred within the EU from one country to another. Primarily, these are asylum applicants whose claim has not been processed yet. The fact that there is no valid practice of mutual recognition of asylum decisions between EU Member States is not important, and we mention it only for the purposes of a better description of the overall unclear situation.

Transfer is the resettlement of refugees (based on the Geneva Convention) originating in third countries. This means the transfer into the EU of refugees (not IDPs) registered by the UNHCR in the territory of third countries outside the EU (e.g. Turkey), who are transferred into any Member State.

Subsidiary protection3 is a special EU term which was created in order to facilitate protection of a wider circle of people than just persons defined by the Geneva Convention on refugees. In a number of cases, people who face the threats of conflicts run away without having any direct effect, and neither attacks nor threats aimed against specific persons.

Secondary movement of asylum seekers is the movement into another Member State of persons who are already under legal protection (asylum) in the territory of a specific EU Member State.

The term refugee used in this contribution complies with the standard definition according to the Geneva Convention (1951), since the legal order of the Slovak Republic does not recognise the term refugee.

Asylum seeker is the person under the various stages of the asylum or subsidiary protection granting process.

Despite all the terms listed above, there is a general rule that is applicable to the terminology used in the context of migration. It cannot cover the complexity and heterogeneity of migration and in a number of cases we can successfully question its content and meaning.

2. DOMESTIC MIGRATION ENVIRONMENT

According to statistical information as of 31st December 2017, there were 104,451 foreigners living in Slovakia, out of which 50,395 were from third countries or countries outside the EU. In the case of foreigners from third countries, this number represented roughly a 0.9% share of the Slovak population, though this share has been markedly rising (Figure 1). This fact serves to confirm that Slovakia is not a country of destination for migration from the wider area as yet and is positioned on migration routes as a transit country. It should also serve to those who refuse migration as an opposite to the term legal/illegitimate. The argument that the labelling of migrants as illegal is pejorative, which can be noted in the report ‘Making Migration Work for All’ (UN, 2017), is not convincing. Despite the number and occurrence of such persons who disregard the existing rules because of a situation on the territory of any state is significant, ignorance to or the bypass of the legal order of a respective country is not acceptable as a way to identify their status.

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as a reminder that Slovakia is not an isolated island and this tendency will only intensify.

The main element of migration to the Slovak Republic is the free movement of labour force within the EU (around 27,000 persons). According to data from the Central Office of Labour, Social Affairs and Family, labour migrants from third countries accounted for 22,300 persons as of 28th February 2018. Despite long-term structural unemployment in the Slovak Republic, the deficit of disposable labour force on the labour market has been gradually growing. On the short-term horizon, we can therefore expect that labour migration from third countries will become a dominating phenomenon.

The gradual rise of the importance of migration for the political and societal environment of Slovakia does not mean an absence of its basic concept, though this process only began in connection with the country’s entry into the EU. In the programme context, the Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic – Perspective until the Year 2020\(^6\) is, in terms of its content and wording, an essential, well-elaborated and timely document. What is missing in it is consistency while fulfilling specific action measures, and among others, the establishment of a migration office sheltering all aspects of migration. As the basic goals of migration policy, this document established the creation of conditions for legal migration, migrant integration, the strengthening of effectiveness of border control, participation in the formation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), and building up of global partnership with countries of origin and transit in the interest of strengthening mutual cooperation. When mentioning persons seeking international legal protection (asylum seekers) and integration into Slovak society, it is necessary to accentuate that in 2017 there were only 166 such applications while in 54 cases a positive decision of the competent state authorities was rendered.\(^7\) The low number of asylum applications confirms the previous observations on the position of Slovakia among destination countries for migrants.

The competences in the field of migration are set by Act No 575/2001 on the organisation of the Activities of the Government and on the Organisation of Central State Administration. Article 11 of this Act reads that the Ministry of the Interior is the central authority of the state and administration for the ‘protection and administration of state borders, ... entry in the territory of the Slovak Republic and stay of foreigners in its territory, ... issues of asylum seekers and de facto refugees...’. For the purposes of this contribution, we can formulate the thesis that the Competences Act defines the migration issue very narrowly and supports a sectored approach to the detriment of a comprehensive solution; therefore, it is necessary to think about amending this legal norm. Other laws, e.g. Act No 480/2002 on Asylum or Act No 404/2011 on the Residence of Aliens deal with specific aspects of migration.

Migration, or better said, work related to the persons who were granted asylum in Slovakia, is carried out to different extents by a range of other ministries. Primarily, it is the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family, which is responsible for a great deal of integration policy, the Ministry of Healthcare, and the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sports, or the Ministry of Justice. A potential holistic legal set-up of migration must therefore encompass the aspects that fall under the scope of justice, social affairs, health care and other dimensions as well. A limited form of co-ordination at the level of state authorities is represented by the existence and activities of the Managing Committee for Migration and Integration of Foreigners, established through the Migration Office of the Ministry of the Interior. The entry of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs into this area became necessary with respect to the...
processes at the global level that had been going on for a longer period of time outside the attention of political and public environments in Slovakia. In the meantime, the international situation has dramatically deteriorated and the growing importance of the issue and formulation of truly national positions has led the leadership of the ministry to the decision of establishing the special position of Ambassador at Large. His/her role is to collect and evaluate all significant facts and, on this basis, initiate political activities which properly project and propose political decisions on migration aimed at reaching a balanced position that reflects the basic interests of the Slovak Republic. Nevertheless, the positioning of this post within the state apparatus and its competences do not correspond to the complexity of migration and the growing importance of this issue.

While listing the basic facts, we cannot omit that an important partner of the state who deals with migration, especially the integration of asylum seekers into Slovak society, are non-governmental organisations. In addition, the Slovak Republic closely cooperates with a couple of international organisations (for instance, UNHCR, IOM) who manage in a unique way either the temporary stay of asylum seekers from other countries in the Ministry of Interior facilities or transfer between third countries (e.g. to the USA). In fact, these bodies partially substitute the activities attributed to the state, especially the provision of information and assistance to asylum seekers, which should not be a long-lasting situation.

We cannot omit public opinion either, although it is not clear whether the narrowed-down approach towards migration from the side of state authorities is the result of its questionable perception by the public or otherwise. Comprehensive social research would be of great value. The role is also played by the media and their presentation of this topic. The focus on security threats and sensations significantly affects the process of positions and the formation of opinions of all parties involved.

The characteristics of the domestic climate is not complete without stating that the migration approach offering opinions and positions of all stems from the societal and historical context and therefore would be extremely surprising if shortly after the completion of national and state emancipation close to the end of the last century, a policy of managed immigration would prevail. This is possibly one of the most important elements of inconsistency within the home environment, as well as a misunderstanding between the political representation of the country and external partners.

3. MIGRATION POLICY OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC IN THE EU ENVIRONMENT

In order for one to be familiar with the country’s approach to migration, it is necessary to have a closer look at the interaction between the Slovak and the EU approach. We will avoid existing differences in the historic development and the economic model of the EU Member States, even though they are fundamental for their positions to migration. Instead, we will focus on some legal and political aspects.

We can continue elaborating the thesis on the possible questioning of the relevance of any term used in the dispute on migration by applying it to the existing division of competences between the EU and its Member States. The European Commission (EC) considers as the basis for its activities the provision of Article No 79 (1) of the Treaty on Functioning of the EU (TFEU): ‘The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, as well as the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings.’ Immigration, which is in addition to fighting against illegal migration the subject of this provision, is incorporated by the founding treaties in the area of freedom, security and justice, which by Article No 4 of the TFEU falls into shared competences. This means competencies enforced by the EU and Member States on a more or less equal basis.

According to Article No 79 TFEU, the Union can for fulfilment of its goals in the area of common immigration policy (efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals, prevention and combat against illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings) take such measures whose aim is the harmonisation of Member States proceedings. It is worth mentioning that the harmonisation competence is limited, because according to the provision of Article No 79 (4) TFEU, it does not apply to the integration of migrants. The same applies to the right of the Member States to decide on the figures of third-country citizens allowed to come to their territory with the aim of searching for a job either as employees or as self-employed persons (Article No 79 (5) TFEU). This provision is very important, because the original objective of immigration policies from the early 1960s was the proper management of labour force entering the booming economies of West Europe.

The first change in dealing with migrants was brought about with the Temporary Protection Directive 2001 aimed at regulating the steadily growing flows of migrants. It coincided with the change of the migration nature, when original labour migration in European countries turned out to become family migration or family unification. During that time, this was of interest for a very narrow group of Member States, which even today allow a growing number of migrants (over 1 million per year) to settle legally. Launched in 2005, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), which focus almost exclusively on Africa, became the framework for the EU’s
external policy dialogue with countries where migration originates. These building blocks of the EU immigration policy confirm that this policy type was not, nor is still present, in all Member States and therefore, it is not appropriate to expect the same attitude of all Member States towards its consequences.

The European Agenda on Migration\(^9\) completely ends with the practice of respect to the limits of competencies described above and although it reacts to the appealing situation, it contains in addition to the measures of financial and humanitarian nature a projection of relocations or transfers as well. It is obvious that due to a lack of competencies, the EC tries to substitute by extensive explanation of the legal basis, we cannot ignore the strict requirements for legal residence of third country nationals in the Member States. Confronting this with the situation witnessed in 2015 and later on, it is clear that legality was not a matter of fact. And disrespect to the law cannot be the basis of any policy of the EU.

The solidarity principle as per Article No 80 TFEU serves as a way out of the differences between legal explanations. Since theorising on the notion of solidarity would be too abstract, we will focus on the practical ways of its demonstration. The idea of relocation quotas has been present for a long time and has been traditionally promoted by Mediterranean states. Until 2014, there was no chance since Germany was against it. What is even more disturbing in relation to the differences which have occurred lately is the fact that the new Member States, including the Slovak Republic, have always been an object, not a subject of the debate. It is precisely here that we have to search for the reasons of the present misunderstanding. Regardless of the series of related sensitivities (security worries, cultural differences...), there has been nothing offered to us to agree with such a proposal and to be able to sell it or explain it back home. Unfortunately, the working method of the EU did not change and the current shape of the CEAS recast is heading again towards a solution to – among others – Slovakia alone would pay expenses. What remains unanswered in this debate is the question about what is the best method to differentiate between asylum seekers with the chance of obtaining it and those who are not qualified for international protection. Another legitimate question is whether forcing a migrant into a country he does not want to be in a violation of their human rights? From Slovakia’s point of view, an additional disturbing point is a purposeful mixture of the tools and procedures for asylum policy and the tools for labour market policy.

It is complicated in real life to secure at any stage of mixed migration flows an exact distinction of those who deserve protection under international law through asylum and those who can simply be returned to the country of first arrival. While the peak of the 2015 migration to the EU predominantly had a humanitarian nature, migration flows, by reason from a longer-term view (during the period 2008–2016), shows an interestingly heterogeneous picture (Figure 2).

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\(^9\) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions \(\text{(COM (2015)) 240 final of 13th May 2015)}\).  
\(^{10}\) Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14th September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece.

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It is not without relevance in this debate that the political events of Libya’s disruption type have their high costs currently paid by the whole of Europe, though the degree of individual countries' responsibility for this significantly vary.

The very substance and problematic element of the CEAS reform is not the inability of first-entry countries to properly assess all asylum applications, as this burden has finally been managed by providing additional Member States capacities, but the suppression of migrants' secondary movement. This is the true reason for the concept of relocations and permanent responsibility for the applicant, to which the Slovak Republic is not in conformity with. A forced solution cannot be interpreted as a proof of solidarity. However, surprisingly, there is no debate on the possible different venues of it. Finally, an introduction of the obligatory quotas system and responsibility for applicants does not provide us with any prospect of decreasing the interest to travel to specific EU countries of destination.

Slovakia has demonstrated its solidarity by sending over 290 experts to the European Border Control Guard (EBCG) since 2015, with an additional 113 planned for the year 2018, and projects of Slovakia's development cooperation (EUR 6 million annually) can be mentioned as well, since they predominantly focus on migration and demonstration of solidarity. It may not be enough, but it definitely does not mean we are indifferent and unwilling to cooperate.

On the other hand, there is no debate within the European discourse on migration from Ukraine. As mentioned above, Slovakia absorbed about 12 thousand Ukrainians without requesting any proof of solidarity from other Member States. The number of Ukrainians absorbed by our neighbouring countries, especially Poland, is much larger.

We have time to find a consensual solution only until the end of June 2018. The way this debate is going on proves the emergence of the topic of Cohesion Funds and of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) within it. Tying up these processes (the asylum system reform and MFF negotiations) brings with it the threat of their mutual contamination. It leads to endangering policy goals totally different from asylum policy. This impact can further affect Member States in an unequal way, which is discriminatory in itself. Despite the existing differences, it is necessary to prevent an East-West divide of Europe. There is a great risk that this topic can significantly influence the forthcoming European Parliament elections as well.

4. PREPARATION OF A GLOBAL FRAMEWORK FOR MIGRATION AND REFUGEES

To complete the overall picture of Slovakia's approach to migration, it is necessary to know its parameters on the global scale as well. We may start with the standard argument that there is roughly 258 million people living in a country different from that of their birth (UN DESA, 2017). Approximately 10% of that figure is represented by refugees and asylum seekers. In spite of the ambitious sustainable development agenda (Agenda 2030) adopted by the UNGA, the signing of the global Climate Agreement in Paris, or the first global humanitarian summit that took place in Istanbul, reality confronts us with an accelerating growth of forcefully displaced people, the dramatic dynamics of climate change, or deepening economic imbalances among countries.

The process of preparation of global compacts for migration and for refugees became very opportune. Though an agreement was reached about a non-binding nature of these documents even before the start of inter-governmental negotiations, political commitments cannot be taken on easily. The very basis of the compact on migration is formed by the premise of migration's positive impacts on societal development. The embodiment of this approach became an ambition to expand the legal migration venues, thereby removing the reasons for illegal migration. This concept has found wide support among countries that for various reasons have an interest in the transit of large numbers of people between the states and continents and among various agencies and international bodies dealing with migrants and refugees.

The measures used are not always in line with laudable ambitions. The extensive and richly structured process of consultations has pointed to a number of serious problems and discrepancies. One of the major ones is that the given concept deliberately does not distinguish between persons deserving special...
attention and protection (refugees) and persons who migrate out of serious reasons, but belong definitely to the group of labour migrants. And do not forget, since we are in the domain of migration, we are speaking mostly about labour migration. The overall emphasis on migrants’ human rights was questioned due to a pressure for decriminalisation of any deeds connected with migration and surprising ignorance to the prerogatives of sovereign states or an effort (of some) to position migration as a human right. Negative connotation was attributed to the effort to introduce terminology which was not previously agreed on, and was understood by many as an attempt to recodify international law. Nevertheless, the final document agreed upon at the end of the inter-governmental negotiations has rightfully at its centre a human being. The principles around which it is built – international cooperation, national sovereignty, rule of law, sustainable development, human rights, gender differences, child sensitivity, entire government and society approaches – reflect the basic positions of the Slovak Republic as well. In view of all this, we can say that the processes on the country’s side, e.g. access to legal services for migrants, by which Slovakia is among a few countries in the world which do so, are over the average level.

There was a critical debate on the necessity to provide equal access to public services for all migrants, regardless of their status. The Slovak Republic provides social security, full health care and education to those persons whose stay in the country legally, while others receive emergency health care only. By doing so and knowing some additional limits in social protection, we can characterise Slovakia’s approach as systemic, but not comprehensive.

The global-scale discussion on migration is therefore vivid and sometimes strained. The Zero Draft of the final document introduced by the co-facilitators of the whole process, representatives of Switzerland and Mexico, brought much needed calm and removed various contradictions. Also noteworthy has been the shift from categorical statements contained in the UNSG Special Report published on 12th December 2017 (UN, 2017), which presented migration as a solution for global imbalances and imbalances between the states. Frequently used is the argument concerning the high contribution of migrants to economies of receiving countries (9.4% of GDP),

or about the impact of remittances on their home countries. Regardless of the way of calculating the number of migrants or the generated GDP, it is interesting that organisations like the OECD have always avoided any such calculations and maintain the position that if the economic impacts of migration can be measured, it is in the fiscal area and only in relation to the labour market dynamics. The partial positive impact of migration at the level of social transfers is negatively balanced by the need of strengthening of public institutions’ functions. If the fiscal impact of migration is measured, it does not exceed 0.5% of GDP on either a positive or negative scale (OECD, 2013, p. 128). Since the fiscal impact can be measured precisely, it gives a clearer picture of the possible contribution of migrants to the economies of hosting countries (for example, Figure 3). As the Brexit referendum demonstrated, even the original arguments on mutual advantageousness of migrant workers from the East-European EU Member States did not prevent an unexpected result of this popular vote.

It was therefore necessary to firmly stand on the ground and try to fulfil the ambition of co-facilitators and let the international migration ‘better unite then divide’. The Global Compact on Migration (UN, 2018) should thus represent a platform of ‘mutual understanding, shared responsibilities and unity on the purpose of migration’. The authors of the text replaced the one-sided positive interpretation of migration and the responsibility of receiving countries with a co-operative framework and acceptance of national sovereignty. From the group of problematic points of this document, a greater deal of reciprocity and responsibility of the countries of origin is necessary, while allowing the return and readmission of their citizens.

Figure 3 Differences in the average net fiscal contribution of immigrant versus native-born households, before and after adjustments for indirect taxes and public services, 2007-2009 average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Euros (PPP adjusted)</th>
<th>Differences in net contributions</th>
<th>Differences including education, indirect taxes and health</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


See MPI (2016, p. 1).
While trying to understand the migration context, it is important that attention is focused not only on the need for exact information on migrants themselves about their rights and duties as well, but at the same time, facilitate access to information on benefits and challenges related to migration for their own citizens. The provision of the right to information to people who consider leaving their country has a strong potential to prevent migration as such and, in particular, incorrect ideas about the living conditions in the country of destination. This is a significant change to the ongoing process of the migration debate burdened by one-sided information on its advantageous nature, as well as the most effective way to oppose the spreading of various conspiracy theories and negative projection of migration.

Within the overly optimistic narrative of the migration debate, it is necessary to clarify that shared responsibility entails the requirement to react to the legitimate worries of receiving communities related to migration, demographic, economic, social and environmental challenges faced by societies. Topics such as identity and cultural traditions are equally important compared to economic development. The summit on the financing of the sustainable development agenda in Addis Ababa (UN, 2015) brought through its focus on mobilisation of own resources, important changes in the current paradigm of development co-operation. It would be equally necessary that the future compact on migration sets as its goal to achieve the situation and possibility ‘for people to stay in their own country in security and dignity’ as a task for the international community.

The Slovak Republic faces an additional fundamental question. Should migration be an active tool for deliberate structural demographic change of the population, as the thesis of the document proposal goes, or one of the ways of settling national labour market deficit only? Do we know exactly what the solidarity content in the case of labour migrants is, and what the role of the domestic labour market is in this respect? If the labour market demand prevails over the available labour force, the whole issue is projected in an acceptable way. In view of the fact that the demand for labour force supply from third countries (outside EU) is growing in Slovakia, we cannot reject the respective recommendations in this process, despite the fact they react mostly to the expectations of countries for whom income generated by migration often represents a basic item of state finances. The experience of the Netherlands (WODC, 2017; CBS, 2018 among others), according to which migrants are not the answer to the needs of labour market demands, led us to keep from falling into the trap of overoptimistic interpretation of the possible positive migration effects.

While managing labour migration, it is necessary to provide fair recruitment conditions and decent jobs for migrants. The need to prevent unreliable employment agencies by bypassing the law of the respective countries while managing labour force from third countries, was a regular part of Slovakia’s intervention during the debate. This topic has become extremely acute for the country. It would be necessary to highlight the positions of the entrepreneurial sector as a major beneficiary and often the initiator for the movement of labour migrants. This discrepancy, just like the case of tax avoidance, for example, will be difficult to deal with.

The discussion on various topics has driven Slovakia’s attention to its domestic limits, since the country is not sufficiently ready for the handling of greater numbers of migrants, and all the activities in the practical implementation of the Integration Policy of the Slovak Republic, financed through the EU, are ending by 2020. In any case, the fact that the readmission policy measures form part of the document is also important.

12 The Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security’s Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) published a report in 2017 about the refugees who settled in the Netherlands in 1995 and 1999. According to the report, after 15 years, around 57% of the ‘status holders’ had a job for at least eight hours a week, compared to 70% of labour migrants and 80% of the native population. Likewise, according to the information by Statistics Netherlands (CBS), merely 4% of asylum seekers aged 18–64 who had been granted a residence permit in the Netherlands in 2014 had a job after eighteen months. One year plus, this share increased to 11%. As many as 90% of refugees of working age were benefit recipients after 18 months, and still 84% one year later (nearly 90% of Syrians and Eritreans). Generally, status holders are required to pass a civic integration exam within three years after obtaining the permit. By 1st October 2016, only 6% of them did so (with a lower percentage among Syrian and Eritrean refugees 5 and 4%, respectively).

With respect to refugees’ protection, there is already a clearly defined international legal framework (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, and the subsequent Protocol for it). The Global Compact for Refugees should lead to its further consolidation and strengthening. It should distribute the responsibilities among the states more justly and reduce the pressure on those countries to which a great number of refugees is heading.

The growing numbers of displaced people require a comprehensive response, the precondition of which is co-operation on global, regional as well as local levels. At the same time, it is part of the Slovak agenda to place special emphasis on the protection of women, children and other vulnerable groups. Attention must be paid not only to crisis situations themselves, but to their causes and the prevention of new forceful displacements as well. It will be necessary to constructively react to complaints from the small group of countries hosting a great deal of refugees, as well as to the demands for better burden and responsibility sharing.
The priority of the Slovak Republic in the course of the negotiations was to preserve the voluntary nature of all compact parts and not to create new categories of refugees or recognise the group-based asylum rights which are unknown in Slovak legislation. Attention was paid to the solution of migration drivers and to the links of these efforts to the ongoing process of the UN Reform in Preventive Diplomacy and other global initiatives in line with the Slovak position.

All these issues have been properly reflected in the final version of the document to be endorsed by the UN Member States at their meeting in Geneva on 4th July 2018 and to be submitted for final approval by the UNGA later this year.

CONCLUSION

We have to acknowledge that migration is such a complex issue that a few pages of the text simply cannot encompass all its aspects. The contribution nevertheless makes it clear that the picture of migration at separate levels significantly differs. Proposed solutions, by our understanding, should therefore take into consideration the local historical and economic contexts to the maximum extent possible.

The Slovak Republic prefers a comprehensive approach to international migration, and beyond the framework represented by the economic dimension merely, it also cares about the cultural, security and humanitarian issues. We strongly advocate for respect to standards stemming from humanitarian law. The standards of the country’s proceedings related to migration are reasonably high. This can be said despite the fact that a long way is ahead of us to set the parameters of Slovak migration policy in line with domestic as well as external expectations. More consistency is required in the implementation of the migration policy of the Slovak Republic until the year 2020, which is currently in place. It is important to initiate a factual debate which can change the dominant negative stereotypes connected to this topic, and to prevent the further accumulation of problems in the field of labour migration.

The assessment of the EU measures is even more complicated. The usage of a problematic legal basis and an extensive approach to its reasoning, the reform of the CEAS, which has the potential to negatively influence other, non-related, EU policies and thus burden Slovak membership by additional problems, are among the basic factors. There are positive impulses as well, e.g. some activities like the Erasmus+ Programme. It would be more than useful to develop it and design a global financial transfer mechanism that is able to sponsor the education of migrants, including tertiary education (Rapid Response Mechanism) as an effective migration policy tool.

We also have to pay attention to the process of the global framework for migration and refugees. We consider it irresponsible to have an inflation of the economic impacts of migration and we should replace them with a reliable and verifiable statistical analysis. Since today’s migration is predominantly about labour migration, there is a place among practical measures for the concept of ‘global skill partnerships’ leading to the patching together of the means of development for co-operation, technical assistance and qualification recognition through multilateral agreements (Clemens, 2017). Visible inclusion of the entrepreneurial sector into handling numerous migration issues is badly needed.

A closer look at the different contexts of Slovakia’s approach to migration may lead to the impression that we are moving against the mainstream. This is only partially true and is influenced by the fact that migration is a new phenomenon for us, where the applicable policies and processes are still under development. Patience is therefore necessary.

REFERENCES

Act No 480/2002 on Asylum and on amendment to some Acts.
Act No 404/2011 on the Residence of Aliens and on changes and amendments to some acts.
INTRODUCTION

At the time of the writing of this contribution, Canada seemed an increasingly rare country in that it continues to support high and growing levels of immigration when even formerly liberal countries are scaling back the number of immigrants and refugees that they admit. Two questions present themselves immediately: why does Canada continue with its policy of high immigration, and for how long can it sustain this position? Here we will look at this country’s approach to immigration and refugee protection over the past 50 years, at the social, political, and economic environments within which it developed this position, and ask whether this recent history represents anything approaching Canadian exceptionalism.

Canada is often regarded as one of the traditional settler societies along with Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. For each of these countries, their earlier phases of immigration were dominated by Europeans, and in the colonial period of Canada’s history, mostly by immigrants from the United Kingdom and France who settled the country to ensure economic benefits to their colonial powers. All four countries had previously been settled by migrants from Asia or the Pacific islands, and the history of relations between the European settlers and the aboriginal peoples of Canada has been fraught and at times violent. The aboriginal population of Canada now stands at approximately 5% of the total of 37 million this indicating the utter dominance of the country by immigrants and their descendants. For settler societies, immigration represents an act of nation-building, a building of the population to support claims to sovereignty, to build and grow an economy, to develop and sustain the institutions of the state, and the many other aspects of creating a functioning society. The country had been ruled by Britain until its independence in 1867, and settlers from Britain and other Europeans dominated the immigration flows until 1967, one hundred years after independence from Britain. 1967 marks a watershed year for Canadian immigration policy and its mechanisms of administration.

5. Immigration Policy in Canada – A Case of Exceptionalism?

1 SOME RECENT HISTORY

The social and political environments in Canada in 1967 and the years surrounding it were characterised by enormous pride in the country and the excitement of celebrating its 100th anniversary of independence. It was also a time of social upheaval in the neighbouring United States, particularly with respect to race relations. The U.S. civil rights movement was at its peak and was marred by violence and the assassination of one of its leaders, Martin Luther King, in 1968. Canada was largely free of these racial conflicts, but was nevertheless significantly affected by events south of the border. This was also a time of high political interest in matters of social justice and the human rights movement, Canada having passed its first Bill of Rights in 1960. Relations between French- and English-speaking Canadians were troubled, and the government adopted a formal policy of bilingualism and biculturalism intended to protect the linguistic rights of both groups. Rights were in the air, and this affected Canada’s immigration policy as well. For most of the twentieth century, Canadian immigration policy strongly favoured immigrants from Europe, which effectively meant a whites-only immigration programme. Witnessing the racial violence in the United States and learning much more about the overt, indeed, legislated discrimination against African Americans was a strong motivator to Canada to mark itself as different and to observe more strongly human rights as universal.

As many Canadians were fully aware of the human rights atrocities of World War 2, they were ready for a major shift in immigration policy.

Following WW2, Canada set as its principal objectives for immigration, economic prosperity, family reunification, and refugee protection. What changed in 1967 was an opening of the immigration programme to the entire world and an abandoning of its preference for European immigration. Instead, for those immigrants selected for their potential to contribute to the Canadian economy, the choice was made on the basis of their human capital characteristics: education and training; personal character; occupational demand; occupational skill; age; pre-arranged employment; the knowledge of French and English; the presence of a relative in Canada; and employment opportunities in their area of destination. The country of birth or origin was not among the selection criteria, nor was race, ethnicity, or religion. The expectation that the immigrant has a good command of English or French was not a reflection of a bias towards source countries where such skills were prevalent, but a practical matter of those two languages being the official languages of Canada and those used in the workplace. Without this linguistic competence, the capacity to contribute to the Canadian economy would be greatly diminished.


1 Relations between Canada and the United States, particularly with respect to race, were troubled, and the government adopted a formal policy of bilingualism and biculturalism intended to protect the linguistic rights of both groups. Rights were in the air, and this affected Canada’s immigration policy as well. For most of the twentieth century, Canadian immigration policy strongly favoured immigrants from Europe, which effectively meant a whites-only immigration programme. Witnessing the racial violence in the United States and learning much more about the overt, indeed, legislated discrimination against African Americans was a strong motivator to Canada to mark itself as different and to observe more strongly human rights as universal.

a points system, a system for which Canada became well-known in immigration policy circles. Potential immigrants who scored a set number of points for their human capital would be eligible for a visa that granted them and their immediate families the right to reside and work in the country permanently. The number of points required could be adjusted according to economic conditions, principally the labour market’s requirements for additional workers. Furthermore, the selection criteria themselves could be adjusted to take into account the evolution of the labour market and the outcomes of the immigrants who were admitted through the points system. The government began tracking these outcomes using various statistical databases and surveys, including the census, databases that grew in sophistication over time and allowed the system to be increasingly fine-tuned to the realities of the marketplace. What emerged in Canadian immigration policy was a melding of concern for human rights with the exigencies of the economy. This tying of the ideals to the pragmatics of the market led to a long-standing support of the immigration programme by the Canadian public (Hiebert, 2016), a theme to which we shall return.

The demographic changes that this policy decision produced have been dramatic for Canadian society. Table 1 indicates an increase in immigration from countries outside Europe and the United States following the policy change.

Figure 1 shows the relative change for source regions of immigrants settling in Canada from 1871 and with a projected development until 2036, while Figure 2 demonstrates the absolute number and proportion of foreign-born population in the country in the same period.

### Table 1: Growth of foreign-born population in Canada by selected region of birth, 1951–2011

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean and Bermuda</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>68,100</td>
<td>173,200</td>
<td>232,500</td>
<td>294,100</td>
<td>351,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South America</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>106,800</td>
<td>219,400</td>
<td>304,700</td>
<td>442,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Africa</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28,700</td>
<td>38,700</td>
<td>53,200</td>
<td>93,200</td>
<td>186,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>10,700</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>113,000</td>
<td>189,500</td>
<td>305,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Asia and Middle East</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25,200</td>
<td>63,200</td>
<td>151,100</td>
<td>285,600</td>
<td>456,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Asia</td>
<td>30,800</td>
<td>43,500</td>
<td>66,600</td>
<td>195,500</td>
<td>377,200</td>
<td>730,600</td>
<td>962,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13,100</td>
<td>152,200</td>
<td>312,000</td>
<td>469,100</td>
<td>729,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Asia</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>46,300</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>228,800</td>
<td>503,900</td>
<td>892,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>14,300</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>47,900</td>
<td>54,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada (2016).
The rise in non-European immigration to Canada has been dramatic and results from a combination of the policy change as well as the economic recovery of Europe following WW2. This is reflected in the growing diversity of the Canadian population, which stems from a combination in the expansion of the source countries and of the numbers of immigrants admitted to the country. Over 20% of the population today were born outside Canada, and roughly the same proportion is formed by the so-called visible minorities or non-whites. The 2016 census reported over 250 different ethnic groups represented in the Canadian population.

The immigrant population is not evenly distributed across the country but is concentrated first in cities and secondly in a small number of cities, most predominantly Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal (Hiebert, 2015). To illustrate, the 2016 census showed that roughly half of Toronto's population was born outside the country and that just over half were visible minorities (Table 2).

Some suburbs of Toronto approach 80% visible minority proportions. This holds true for the suburbs of Vancouver as well. The policy change of the late 1960s has had a massive influence on the make-up of Canada's population, specifically in its largest cities. Some might want to ask why Canada has done this to itself and how it is that the public continues to support this policy when in a great many countries in the world it is the opposite sentiment that prevails. The answer has to do with management.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of population</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>2,691,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total visible minority population</td>
<td>1,385,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>338,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>299,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>239,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>152,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>77,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>36,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asian</td>
<td>41,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Asian</td>
<td>60,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>41,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>13,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minority, not included elsewhere</td>
<td>36,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple visible minorities</td>
<td>47,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a visible minority</td>
<td>1,305,815</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada (2017c).

2. **MANAGED MIGRATION**

The United Nations Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration of 2018 represents what has come to be seen as the ideal in migration policy, the quest for managed migration. Managed migration represents not only border crossings that are fully legal and fully documented, but where the end result of the migration is benefits for both the migrant and for the destination society.

The migrants benefit from a higher quality of life, and the destination society will benefit from the migrants entering the workforce, supporting innovation, adding to the population, helping to create a more interesting culture, and so on. Canada has been fortunate in being able to manage migration as effectively as it has for the past 150 years, and for the past 50 years in an increasingly sophisticated and inclusive manner. There are many reasons for this good fortune, but the end result has been a more dynamic country with a larger and wealthier economy in which the vast majority of the public continues to support large-scale immigration. Very few countries in the world today share this good fortune, and some have come to regard Canada as an exception. I will look at the claims for Canadian exceptionalism later and will here look at some of the factors that might suggest such exceptionalism.

Being able to implement a robust system of managed migration is more than a matter of policy decision. Not all environments, political, social, or physical, permit robust migration management. If a country's geographical location is such that it is highly vulnerable to irregular migration, its ability to manage migration effectively will be less than that of a country that is more geographically isolated. Where migrants can relatively easily walk across a border instead of having to use commercial air or sea travel, their migration system will be less effective, all other things being equal. Commercial carriers must check for proper legal travel documentation, and although document forgery takes place, its scale is minor now given the increasingly effective security measures implemented in the documents themselves. Canada is quite geographically isolated. It is surrounded on three sides by large oceans; it is in the far north and has a climate that is often harsh; and, its neighbour to the south is the world's largest migration magnet, the United States. Far more migrants, both regular and irregular, prefer the U.S. as their destination over Canada simply because of the comparative ease of access from countries to its south, the large presence of family members and friends, and the power of the world's largest economy to offer employment. The proximity of the U.S. to Mexico and the rest of Latin America together with its massive economy have led to the sustained presence of well over ten million undocumented migrants, as well as the world's largest documented migrant stock. Canada gains a management advantage from its sharing a border with the United States, but the drawing power of the US for migrants also presents a challenge to Canada to attract the

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3 The 2016 census indicated that 21.9% of residents were born outside Canada.


world’s top talent. Although it has historically been less susceptible to irregular migration, Canada must make very strong offers to the migrants it seeks to attract and retain to overcome the competitive advantage that the US has.

Canada’s relative freedom from concerns over irregular migration puts it, however, in a position to be able to offer a highly attractive ‘immigration – integration – citizenship’ package to potential migrants. It is important to acknowledge that their high-volume immigration programme is possible only because of continuing high levels of public support. We have a virtuous circle here: the government is able to offer a programme of managed migration because the public supports the programme, and the public supports the programme because it is well-managed. Perhaps the most important aspect of the public’s support for the immigration programme is that, in general, it is managed in the interests of Canadians and perceived in that way. Were it not for the nation-building character of the programme, the intention that immigration betters the lives of Canadians, the public would not likely support an annual immigration intake nearly equal to 1% of the population. Over the past 20 years, the government set the annual immigration target at roughly 200,000 or more per year, with real figures demonstrated by Figure 3.

The most recent three-year immigration plan passed by the Parliament of Canada calls for levels of 310,000 for 2018 rising to 340,000 for 2020. These numbers reflect only those admitted to Canada with a permanent residency visa. Those who come to the country on a temporary visa for work, study, or tourism are not included. Out of those who enter as permanent residents, roughly 60% are in the broadly defined economic class, 30% are admitted for family reunification purposes, and 10% are admitted as refugees. (In 2016, however, with an exceptionally large intake of refugees from Syria, the percentages for family and refugee admissions were at roughly 25 and 20%, respectively.) For the purposes of public support, the most important immigration category is that of the economic immigrants, those immigrants who are admitted to Canada on a permanent basis in the expectation that they will make contributions to the economy as skilled employees, employers, or entrepreneurs (compare with Hiebert, 2016). There are three basic economic immigration programmes, Federal Skilled Worker Programme, Federal Skilled Trades Programme, and the Canadian Experience Class. Federal skilled workers are selected on the basis of their human capital determined through a points test in the following areas: language skills, education, experience, age, arranged employment in Canada, and adaptability. Those in the trades programme are selected on the basis of their formal training, qualifications, and experience, while those who enter through the Canadian Experience Class are those who first entered on a temporary work or study visa and meet other requirements to convert their immigration status from temporary to permanent (see more, e.g., in Hennebry & Preibisch, 2012; Hawthorne, 2015).

The selection criteria for the economic programmes are designed for two related purposes, to ease the integration of the immigrants into the Canadian economy and to ensure that Canada and Canadians benefit from their presence. The government is concerned that immigrants to Canada do well economically and socially; the option to leave is readily available, unlike 100 years ago, and the nation-building ambitions of the programme will be realised only if the majority of immigrants remain in the country. A great deal of research on immigrant integration outcomes has been done, especially over the past 25 years, much of it having been done by academic researchers through the Metropolis Project, by the internal research function of the immigration department, and by Statistics Canada using the census and special surveys. Among the statistical data tools available is the Immigration Database which provides a link between administrative immigration landing data and the annual tax returns filed by the immigrants. The entry data include the class of visa used by the immigrant and the tax returns provide an indication of the earnings of the immigrants. This is particularly valuable over time as it indicates not only the amount of money earned by the immigrants but the change over time and the rate which the immigrant catches up to the average of Canadian born workers. This can be done for all categories of migration entry visa and provides very helpful information that is used to adjust the selection criteria of the points system and the integration programmes on offer. Again, the overall aim is to enhance the lives of the immigrants to Canada and to Canadians who are to benefit from their presence.

Figure 3 Number of immigrants who landed in Canada annually, 1852–2014

Source: Statistics Canada (2016).


9 See more at: http://www.metropolis.net/.
The degree of success of the immigration programme is in part a result of the constant monitoring of the well-being of the immigrants through analyses of the data mentioned above and other sources in addition, many developed by Canadian academic researchers. The way that the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act is structured allows for quick adjustments and refinements to the selection system, allowing the system to be tailored over time to the needs of the economy and the degree of fit between the needs of the labour market in Canada and the human capital of the immigrants. This degree of fit is important because the Canadian system is one whereby it is largely the government that determines who is offered a skilled worker permanent residency visa and not the employer. Although employers have been given an increasing role in immigrant selection recently, it remains the government that principally selects skilled workers to the country. In this sense, the selection system represents a prediction regarding which prospective immigrants will do well in the Canadian economy. The effort to acquire and analyse data on the results is then put to use to fine-tune these predictions of economic success. To give just one example, extensive research on the relation between employment and income success and skills with Canada’s official languages determined changes to the points system regarding language skills upon entry. To simplify, the language requirements have become significantly stricter over time, and this has resulted in improved immigrant economic outcomes.

Note that this growing emphasis on language ability, as well as the concurrent emphasis on post-secondary education, reflects the changing nature of the Canadian economy. Prior to the 1960s, immigrants to Canada were able to find their place in the economy through lower-skilled occupations or in manufacturing. But with the gradual shift towards a knowledge-based economy, immigrant success has come to require a different set of skills (Reitz, 2005). The initial selection system of 1967 incorporated these changes and placed a premium on education. This premium continues today together with the emphasis on language, age, and considerations of adaptability to Canadian society, for example, through existing family connections or earlier experiences in the country, perhaps as a student or temporary worker. Interestingly, at one time, the points system downplayed any requirement that the prospective immigrant have an occupation that was currently in demand in the economy. There were at least two reasons for this: firstly, that any assessments of the occupations that needed more workers were inevitably outdated quickly and therefore inaccurate, and secondly, that the immigration department came to regard transferable skills as represented by the acquisition of higher education as what was most needed in a modern economy. Skilled immigrants were to be flexible given the rapidity of changes in the labour market, including the frequency with which people changed career paths. Neglecting the discipline of the degree attained in favour of simply the elevation of the degree—a premium was placed on postgraduate degrees—led in fact to a surplus of computer engineers in the early 1990s and a very disappointing level of unemployment and underemployment for skilled immigrants, a fact that was exacerbated by the slump in Canada’s high technology sector at that time. Canada has since returned to a selection system that includes considerations of occupations in demand.10 Determining which occupations are in demand is a more refined effort now, and involves work with provincial governments and the business sector. The point to note, however, is that the legal framework for immigrant selection is flexible and can be changed relatively easily to meet changes in the economic environment.

In keeping with the broad approach to immigration management as nation-building, the provincial level of government in Canada has acquired significantly greater responsibilities for selecting immigrants to the country. This is a constitutionally-sanctioned involvement, but one that has been more fully exploited by the provinces over the past 20 years with the introduction of the Provincial Nominee Programme which allows provinces to nominate a number of immigrants for federal approval to meet specific provincial labour or population needs (Akbari & MacDonald, 2014; Flynn & Bauder, 2015). The immigrants selected through the provincial nominee programme would need to agree to reside in that province for certain duration, a requirement that is not, however, legally enforceable owing to the freedom of movement provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but one that nevertheless has proved reasonably effective in bolstering provincial labour forces and populations. This is a serious matter for the parts of the country that are experiencing population stagnation if not outright decline. The point to note is that some Canadian provinces explicitly state that they need immigrants, a message that is broadly supported by the Canadian-born residents of those provinces.

Each year, the government of Canada tables an annual immigration plan to Parliament where it is debated in public and subjected to media scrutiny. Furthermore, each year, the government submits an annual report on immigration to detail the extent to which it delivered on the plan, a report that is also debated in public and discussed in the media.12 The public accountability that is represented by these annual plans and reports is another reason for the high degree of confidence that the Canadian public has in the immigration system. Through these reports, the government is able to explain to the public and to the media what its plans and accomplishments have been, how the immigration programme is intended to benefit Canadian society, and how the programme is being managed. This latter has become especially important recently as the number of immigrants granted permanent residency visas has grown and as the government has announced its plan to see these numbers continue.

continue to grow significantly. Again, it is only because of public confidence that the programme is able to remain as robust as it has become; the outcry in Europe and the United States against poorly managed immigration is ample evidence for the importance of public support. Without it, democratically-elected governments are unable to admit the migrants that their economies might need.

3. **Refugees and Asylum Seekers**

It is not only skilled economic migrants who come to Canada. Immigrants with talent to offer are uncontroversial in most countries so long as numbers are modest. Where the public controversies lie tends to be with refugees, asylum seekers, and undocumented migrants. The migration crisis in Europe has been largely over these groups of migrants whose flows have been seen as out of control by the citizens of numerous European countries. Where migration is seen as out of control, public support falters rapidly. The refugee and asylum system in Canada is carefully managed in order to preserve support not only for the intake of refugees and others needing the protection from persecution that Canada can offer, but for the entirety of the immigration programme. Where immigration programmes stand or fall is often determined by how the arrival of uninvited migrants is managed.

Canada has traditionally been one of the few signatories to the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees to resettle UNHCR refugees in large numbers. Although the numbers of formally resettled refugees are small in comparison to the total number of refugees in the world today—an estimated 26 million, Canada’s share of resettlement has been normally exceeded only by the United States and has been in tandem with Australia. No other countries have come close to the resettlement numbers of these three countries. Note that we are talking here about resettling refugees previously registered by the UNHCR. Asylum seekers are another matter altogether. The extraordinary flows of migrants to Europe in 2015–2016 were predominantly of asylum seekers from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and some from Sub-Saharan Africa. Clearly most of these people were refugees, but they did not arrive with that status having been previously determined by the UNHCR. The numbers arriving over a short time, over one million, were exceptionally high, and the ability of governments and the European Union administration to manage the flows was inadequate to the job. This migration crisis as it was called, together with a decades-long history of irregular flows across the Mediterranean Sea, brought about a collapse of public confidence in European governments and the subsequent rise of anti-immigration populist politics. Sadly, this anti-immigrant politics and public sentiments included a rise in xenophobia and discrimination against migrants.

As Europe struggled with the arrival of refugees, Canada continued its regular refugee programme and, in fact, expanded it temporarily to accommodate the pressing needs of Syrians. The Canadian election of 2015 was fought partly on the basis of the country’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis: not on how these refugees could be kept out of Canada, but on how many to bring to the country. It was the party that offered the largest number that won the election, such were the feelings of the Canadian public to the war in Syria and the refugees that this war created. Most refugees resettled to Canada come through either the Government Assisted Refugee Programme or the Privately Sponsored Refugee Program, the latter of which has received a great deal of attention with regard to the Syrian arrivals. Those who are admitted to Canada through the GAR programme are referred by UNHCR, who has previously established their refugee credentials, and offered a visa by the Canadian government who assumes responsibility for their settlement and financial support for a period of one year after arrival.

Privately sponsored refugees are selected by a non-governmental sponsor, usually a non-governmental organisation such as a church but also by individuals and groups of individuals, who assume the financial responsibility for one year for the settlement of the refugees they sponsor. The PSR programme was created in response to the crisis of Vietnamese refugees fleeing by boat in the late 1970s and was met with enthusiasm by the Canadian public who sponsored nearly 30,000 refugees at that time. Since then, over 200,000 privately sponsored refugees have been resettled in Canada (Hyndman et al., 2017), nearly 20,000 of them from Syria. The total number of Syrians resettled to Canada exceeds 45,000. The benefits of the PSR programme are tangible.

The total number of resettled refugees becomes larger as a result of the private sponsors shouldering the responsibilities, including financial, of resettlement; the refugees often receive a greater degree of attention from their private sponsors than the government programme is able to offer; and the public's enthusiastic response and desire to serve as private sponsors not only boosts confidence in the refugee programme, but in the entire immigration programme as well. With regard to the Syrian refugees, the demand for private sponsorship exceeded the administrative capacity of the government to process visas for the refugees. This level of commitment by the Canadian public has been of value not only to the Syrians in Canada and to the Canadian public, but it has brought the programme to the international forefront with the United Nations, urging other countries to adopt their own programmes of private sponsorship. The current initiative to establish a Global Compact for Refugees includes references to this Canadian programme.

Asylum seekers are managed entirely differently from UNHCR refugees. They are people who arrive at the Canadian border, either through regular transportation channels, or irregularly, and claim refugee status. Generally speaking, once these individuals make a formal claim for refugee status, they go through a well-established process of having their claims assessed by an independent Immigration and Refugee Board who decides whether they met the conditions of the 1951 Geneva Convention or other criteria that would allow them to remain.
in Canada on humanitarian grounds. Those who succeed receive a permanent residency visa, and those who do not are deported. When the numbers arriving and making asylum claims are modest, the system works well and is relatively unnoticed politically. But when the numbers arriving become historically large, the refugee determination system can become overloaded, which leads to a lengthy backlog of cases and people living in the country in a state of uncertainty about their long-term future. When large numbers of people arrive in a very short time, such as occurred in 2010 when nearly 500 Tamil asylum seekers arrived by boat on Canada’s west coast, significant public concern arose, largely over the charge that these asylum seekers were trying to ‘jump the queue’, in other words, were not acting fairly. The government took measures to deter future boats arrivals, many of them implemented overseas at the points of departure.

At the time of this writing, larger than average numbers are arriving by foot from the United States, perhaps spurred by the current administration’s harder line on immigration and asylum seeking, perhaps spurred by the Canadian government’s relatively open attitude towards refugees, as expressed through the support of the Prime Minister.15 These current arrivals are raising concerns amongst the public about the government having lost control of the border and concerns among the provincial governments over the costs associated with housing and otherwise supporting these asylum seekers. How the government will respond to this growing controversy will be important to not only its electoral fortunes for 2019, but for the future of the immigration plan to raise the number of immigrants to 340,000 per year by 2020. The public concern is also a sign that Canadians’ degree of generosity towards refugees and asylum seekers has its limits.

4. TEMPORARY WORKERS AND INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS

In 2016, nearly 300,000 people were granted temporary work visas in Canada, a number roughly equal to the number of immigrants granted permanent residence status. In addition, nearly 270,000 international students were admitted that same year. The total of temporary residency visas, then, represents considerably more than permanent residence admissions. Further 1.3 million visitors’ visas were granted for tourism, family visits, and business visits. Of those receiving either temporary worker or study visas, roughly 50,000 were offered permanent residency under the Canadian Experience Class. For some commentators, this amounts to a gradual adoption by Canada of a two-step immigration programme in which the country ‘tries out’ temporary residents for later permanency, but a permanency offered only to some at the higher skills end of the spectrum. The temporary worker programme is demand-based, and the number of visas issued varies according to the demand of employers who select the immigrants directly (for more information, see Beine & Coulombe, 2018; Hennebry & Preibisch, 2012). The higher numbers of recent years reflected the intensification of the economy of Western Canada, largely a result of the oil industry there, which has subsequently witnessed a contraction with lower petroleum prices worldwide.

International students have become highly sought after by Canadian universities as elsewhere, in part for the higher fees that they bring to university coffers. The government supports the universities’ interests by granting high numbers of study visas, but also in the hope of attracting these ‘designer immigrants’ to stay in Canada. With a Canadian university or college degree, a competence in the languages of the country and the beginnings of socialisation, including through part-time employment while studying, international students represent a relatively easy group to integrate into the workforce and society generally. The increased numbers of permanent residents to Canada coming through the Canadian Experience Class marks a significant shift from the government having sole responsibility for selecting skilled workers to the business community and the higher education system acquiring a considerable role (Flynn & Bauder, 2015). This is in addition to the growth in the role of provincial governments in managing immigrant selection through the Provincial Nominee agreements, the numbers of which are roughly 50,000 per year. As this is a zero-sum game, the federal government of Canada has been in the process of gradually relinquishing authority over immigrant selection to other Canadian institutions, although it does retain sole authority to grant the visas themselves. In addition to potentially increasing the effectiveness of the selection system by raising immigrant incomes and bolstering other integration indicators, this partial devolution of authority makes immigration yet more a national than a federal government project. This is well in keeping with the role of immigration in nation-building (Hiebert, 2016).

5. INTEGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

Canada’s immigration programme is a suite of policies and programmes extending from an application system that offers the prospective immigrant pre-arrival information and means to assess his or her own likelihood of being accepted, to initial admission, early settlement supports, longer term integration programmes, and finally, an offer of citizenship to those who wish to take advantage of this opportunity. The integration programme is a billion dollar per year expenditure, much of it devoted to language training, that assists newcomers to find housing, employment, education, and access to various health and social services (Guo, 2015). It is language training, however, that constitutes the bulk of the integration programme, such is the importance of knowing the official languages of the country to employment and to finding one’s place in society more broadly speaking. Language training is a form of remedial integration, integration designed to overcome deficiencies upon arrival. It is important to note that, although the principal applicant for a skilled worker visa must demonstrate a high degree of linguistic competence, the family members accompanying the principal applicant need not. Much of the language training, then, is for the spouses and children of immigrants, for refugees, and for those admitted for family reunification (parents and grandparents).

Immigrant integration is in Canada a key aspect of managing migration. Failure here harms the immigrants and may lead to their departure and a diminished reputation for Canada as a preferred destination. Integration failure is also harmful to Canadian society which wants to see immigrants become part of the social fabric of the country. Concerns in Europe over parallel societies and social cohesion are well-known in Canada, and the public wants to see a robust effort made on integration. The programme is situated within a policy environment that offers significant rights and protections to newcomers and members of the ethnic groups that form as a result of long-term immigration. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a constituent part of the Constitution Act of 1982, offers protections that apply as much to immigrants as they do to those born in the country. Of equal importance is the policy of multiculturalism that was inaugurated in 1970 and enshrined in legislation in the 1988 adoption of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. This Act encapsulates the history of Canada as a country of immigration and does so by acknowledging that multiculturalism is fundamental to the country’s history and, importantly, identity. In other words, the legislation states a denial that there is a historically privileged Canadian identity; the Canadian identity, rather, evolves as a result of immigration to the country. In contrast to nation states that value historical blood ties as a demarcation of national identity, the Canadian concept of multiculturalism is a radical idea that provides a foundation for immigrant integration. Integration in Canada is a matter of participation in society and the integration programme is largely designed to facilitate that participation (Bloemraad, 2006). Integration is not defined as a matter of an immigrant acquiring a new culture, that of the destination society. Concerns about immigration eroding a traditional national identity are expressed in some European countries that regard integration as a means of protecting their national identity rather than supporting an immigrant’s participation in his or her new society. The Canadian policy ‘acknowledges the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage’, but there are limits to these freedoms, for example those found in the criminal code of Canada. Acts that are prohibited by criminal law in Canada apply equally to immigrants and those born in Canada. In brief, multiculturalism, rather than being seen as a policy that divides citizens from immigrants, as has been urged in some European quarters, is directly a policy intended to enhance the integration of newcomers into Canada and to support their participation in society at large. The policy enjoys widespread support amongst Canadians (e.g. Hansen, 2017; Winter, 2015).

Earlier in this contribution, mention was made of the high concentrations of visible minorities in some areas of Toronto and Vancouver. These ethnic enclaves are robust communities with middle-class socio-economic conditions, and they are largely institutionally complete, providing not only services to residents, but also jobs and full careers, including professional careers. These enclaves might be seen as challenging the integration ambitions of Canadian society and its government policy makers. Traditionally, immigrant enclaves were places of comparative poverty and were often temporary places of residence for newcomers who would work diligently to leave the enclave for more comfortable surroundings (Hiebert, 2015; Troper, 2003). The modern middle-class enclave offers a different story, one whereby it is not only the first place of residence for the skilled and wealthier immigrants but an enduring place of residence, such as its attractions. If the modern enclave can offer such an attractive environment and lifestyle, it might be seen as a competitor to the societal mainstream as a locus for integration. Unlike some of the enclaves in Europe, which remain poor and subject to unrest by the immigrants who live there, the Canadian middle-class enclaves are highly functional and successful communities. They are not considered a problem by Canadian authorities at present, nor does the public see them as a threat. There was a brief time during which what were called ‘Asian malls’ were developing in the Toronto area, for example, with signage in only Mandarin or Cantonese. Some non-Chinese Toronto residents looked askance at this development, regarding it as a sign of integration failure. But the concern was short-lived and the Asian businesses prospered, often with non-Asian clientele. The success of the middle-class enclave, representing a competitor to the mainstream for integration, has been discussed in academic circles, but less so in society at large. For the time being, there seems not to be a perceived problem of social cohesion or integration failure; rather, these successful communities are regarded as benign if not a source of benefit to the cities in which they exist. There is no question of breaking up these enclaves, or of using urban planning protocols to diminish their presence. Given the protections offered by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Multiculturalism Act, should there come to be perceived a problem in these enclaves, the response will need to be a more competitive mainstream to encourage the immigrants to participate in it as they will continue to do in their own communities (see also in Hiebert, 2015).

The final component of Canada’s immigration package is the offer of citizenship. Although immigrants are accorded virtually all of the rights that are enjoyed by Canadians – essentially, only the right to vote and to hold a Canadian passport are excluded – the process of becoming a citizen of the country is given very high status and marks the last stage in the process of becoming a full member of society. Immigrants earn their citizenship status through residency, language ability, knowledge of the country, and a history of filing income tax returns for the years of residence. The residency requirement is a comparatively lenient three years out.

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18 This is not to suggest that all immigrant enclaves in Canada are places of such prosperity; many are not, and this is to be acknowledged as representing a significant problem for immigrant integration.
19 See https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/canadian-citizenship.html (accessed on 19th May 2018). These are the basic rules for straightforward cases. Some situations are more complex and there are many detailed rules in place to deal with them.
of the five previous to the filing of the application. Linguistic competence is required for the straightforward reason that it facilitates participation in the Canadian society. Nevertheless, the fundamentals of the monarchy, the political system, and the test and the preparatory guide are the guide and the test are about more knowledge requirement which is met by value laden, which has caused some minor controversy, particularly under the previous government which made explicit reference to some practices as not only against Canadian law, but as barbaric. Nevertheless, the fundamentals of the guide and the test are about more straightforward matters that the government expects to be well-understood by its citizens.

Acquiring citizenship in the Canadian context is a development in the life of an immigrant that is overtly celebrated through a citizenship ceremony. During this ceremony, new citizens are gathered to listen to speeches by officials, citizenship judges, and sometimes politicians who welcome the new citizens and applaud their decision to become Canadian. The new citizens are asked to swear and sign an oath of allegiance, but the overall atmosphere of the ceremony is celebratory. Often Canadian citizens attend, even to formally re-affirm their citizenship, and many find the process emotionally moving and a source of pride in their country.

The point of this symbolism is, again, to convey that Canada takes nation-building seriously, to convey to its immigrants that it not only welcomes them as workers but as full citizens. The offer of citizenship also, it is hoped, helps Canada retain the immigrants that it brings to the country. This is no small matter in this era of high mobility and competition for talent. Canada offers dual citizenship, something that many immigrants find appealing; but the offer of dual citizenship, at the same time, makes it easier for immigrants, even after acquiring Canadian citizenship, to return to their homeland. Although data are not firm – Canada does not collect exit data – it is estimated that there are over half a million Canadian citizens in China, immigrants from China who acquired Canadian citizenship but since returned. The country was surprised during the 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon that there were roughly 50,000 Canadians living in Lebanon. The government evacuated many of them, but controversy arose over the fact that many of these people were originally immigrants to Canada who, once acquiring Canadian citizenship, returned to their homeland. Many saw this as an act of exploitation of Canada’s generosity, an acquisition of citizenship to acquire a more valuable passport.

Many Canadians demanded that the government tighten the rules of naturalisation to increase the perceived value of Canadian citizenship by making it more difficult to acquire. The previous government did tighten the rules by increasing the residency requirement among other provisions, many changes of which have been rescinded by the current government. The percentage of immigrants who become naturalised Canadian citizens has traditionally been very high, well over 80%, the major exceptions being for Americans and those from countries that denied the possibility of dual citizenship. There are, however, indications recently that these percentages are slowly falling. Whether that is because of the tightened conditions, especially on language, or on fees charged, or because of the effects of transnationalism, is unclear as is the longevity of this recent trend.

The phenomena of multiple migration and what some term the new mobility raise questions about contemporary naturalisation, including what it is that motivates immigrants to become citizens. Traditional thinking had it that becoming a citizen was an expression of loyalty and commitment to a new society; the oath of allegiance was to solidify that loyalty. Transnational communities, whose members effectively live in more than one country simultaneously, indicate that, for some, citizenship has primarily instrumental value rather than being an expression of commitment to a country (Waters, 2003; Joppke, 2018). Attempts to ‘raise the value of Canadian citizenship’ were intended to counteract some of the effects of transnationalism, including return migration. It is doubtful that citizenship policy is going to bring an end to transnationalism and the high mobility that characterises contemporary society. But a re-thinking of the policy to take into account what appears to be a growing instrumentalism with regard to citizenship would put the policy of a firmer footing.

CONCLUSION: IS THERE CANADIAN EXCEPTIONALISM?

Some have argued that Canada is exceptional with regard to immigration (Bloemraad, 2012). Current policy suggests that Canada is indeed an outlier, particularly when compared with the United States and many European countries. Recent opinion polls also indicate that Canadians continue to support high levels of immigration and diversity as they have done for many decades. The spirit of multiculturalism seems alive and well as does the value of building a nation through immigration. There is a small but growing initiative to raise the

20 There are age limits to this requirement that exempt those over the age of 54 and under the age of 18.
22 These included such acts as female genital mutilation and honour killing. The current guide has rescinded this sort of language.
population of Canada, now at 37 million, to 100 million by the end of the century, is robust and sophisticated. A single ministry is responsible for immigration selection and visa processing, for refugee admissions, for immigrant and refugee integration and for citizenship. This allows a much more coherent policy package than would otherwise be the case. Overriding the immigration and refugee-related policies is the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act which is ultimately guided by the Constitution of Canada, its Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the Multiculturalism Policy that is situated as well within the framework of the Constitution. These legislative instruments, being traceable to the Constitution, are highly robust. In addition to federal government legislation, a role is played by provincial and territorial governments in immigrant selection and integration, and a major role is played by civil society organizations, particularly in delivering services to immigrants. Many of these organizations are run by immigrants themselves and serve their integration roles in formal partnerships with the federal government. Finally, there is the growing role played by the private sector and the education sector in immigrant selection (Flynn & Bauder, 2015).

One might plausibly argue that immigration is a whole of society effort in Canada, and because of this arrangement and the robustness of the institutional framework within which immigration is managed, its ability to retain public support is higher than in societies with weaker forms of migration management. Being in a country of immigrants, Canadians are inherently no different from others. But the history of migration well-managed in their interests, the luck of geography, and the overall competence of the migration management machine allows Canadians to have what these days are exceptional attitudes towards immigration and the diversity that it brings. Whether this endures depends primarily on governments continuing to earn the trust of the people.

REFERENCES


6. Borders or People? The UK Response to Human Trafficking in the Context of the Immigration System

INTRODUCTION

Since the issue of human trafficking (or ‘modern slavery’) came to the fore in human rights discourse in the UK, a tension has existed within Government: what must be the state’s priority to protect, people or borders? The UK Government agenda since 2010 has been to create an environment hostile to illegal immigrants; simultaneously, the Home Office has been developing policies with the intention of identifying and protecting victims of human trafficking (Anderson, 2012). The tension emerges when we consider that many, if not most, victims of human trafficking are also technically illegal immigrants. The UK Government has therefore set itself a somewhat complex task – to not only protect and support victims in navigating the necessary recovery directly resulting from their trafficking experience, but also to protect and support them in navigating the barriers of the immigration system that are produced by the Government itself.

Human trafficking is inextricably linked to movement. The nature of the crime of human trafficking means that the driving force of, and reaction to, migration is connected to the response to it, both in terms of policies and public perception (Raigrodski, 2015). Migration has therefore consistently been one of the frameworks for understanding trafficking identified by scholars (Lee, Ed., 2007, p. 7; Anderson & Andrijasevic, 2008). It is undoubtedly a multifaceted and complex phenomenon that can constitute a grave infringement of human rights. For this contribution, ‘human trafficking’ will be used, in line with the ‘Palermo’ definition; also because the context of migration relates specifically to understandings of human trafficking being intrinsically connected to movement. The particular legislative and policy context of the UK will be discussed, to demonstrate the particular tensions within the system.

1. THE COSMOPOLITAN AND COMMUNITARIAN DICHOTOMY

Immigration and the liberal democratic state is a conjunction that immediately raises a paradox: that of immigration control and liberal values (Hampshire, 2011). In order to perform border security there are a number of methods deemed necessary that if used in other circumstances (in other words, upon citizens of that state) would be considered a breach of liberal values in the extreme (Agamben, 1998). To take an even broader view, liberal democracies hold basic principles about universal human rights, the value of the individual and restraint of the state in its dealing with citizens. If one believes in such values, the question of whether these values extend beyond the borders of the state is of prime importance – what makes the life of the person who happened to be born within a particular border more valuable; more deserving of rights than the person who was not? In response to this paradox, a cleavage emerged within liberal thinking with two opposing narratives: that of communitarianism, and that of cosmopolitanism (Balch & Balabanova, 2010).

Cosmopolitanism has its roots in the classics, with its etymology supposedly traceable from Diogenes of Sinope in the 5th century BC, who declared himself to be a ‘citizen of the world’ (Balch, 2016). This mode of thinking rises above borders and looks to the commonalities of humanity over smaller scale kin, ethnic or cultural ties. The cosmopolitan viewpoint can then be traced to enlightenment philosophies, such as utilitarianism and the writings of Kant, with the argument made that there is a moral or ethical duty to allow outsiders to be well treated within states. Cosmopolitanism today vies for dominance with the often more widely accepted narrative of communitarianism, although it can still be traced to immigration policies that allow a significant number of migrants to enter their state (Carvalho, 2013), and particularly to policies that aim to safeguard the rights of refugees.

In contrast, communitarian liberals place the welfare of the immediate group, usually the citizens of a state,
above those outside of the state who may wish to enter. Communitarians argue that the duties that a liberal state has towards its citizens can only be carried out fully and effectively when there is control of borders. If a liberal democracy is based upon the consent of its citizens and their representation by election, it could be argued that this is eroded if the citizenry is an ever-changing group that is not tied to the spatial confines of the state (Zedner, 2010). Using Rousseau’s theory of the social contract, states also have a duty to protect the security of their citizens by means of threat of punishment should rules of society be transgressed (Gibney, 1999). If all people enter and leave at will, the state loses an element of control that enables it to theoretically protect the security of its members. Communitarian thinking is frequently reflected in the rhetoric of politicians, immigration policies and media reporting on immigration (Balch & Balabanova, 2016).

The dichotomy of the cosmopolitan and communitarian positions serves as one of the main paradigms for understanding immigration in connection with human trafficking. Research has identified that a large majority of trafficked people consented in the early stages of the trafficking process to being smuggled as they had a need or desire to enter the destination country (Uy, 2011; O’Connell Davidson, 2006; Kempadoo, 1998). Someone encountering this dilemma from a communitarian position could logically make the argument that if border controls were tighter, people being smuggled across borders would be disincentivised, or border patrols would catch people in a trafficking scenario and the trafficking process would be interrupted, therefore preventing the individual from being victimised or exploited. If, however, you were approaching the problem from a cosmopolitan perspective, you would reasonably make the argument that if there were no border controls, people who wished or needed to cross borders could do so easily without the assistance of traffickers, therefore they would not need to put themselves into a risky situation in order to travel.

2. SECURITISATION AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Securitisation is the political theory established by the Copenhagen School, most significantly by Buzan et al. (1998). Securitisation, it is argued, happens when an issue is framed as an ‘existential threat’; an issue that otherwise falls outside of what would traditionally have been considered a threat, such as foreign attack or civil unrest. This framing can happen for a number of reasons; however, once it is entrenched in the consciousness of a state, it is used to justify extraordinary policies to attempt to safeguard against this threat (Toğral, 2012).

The process of securitisation can be used as a method of understanding the reaction of the West to migration over the past several decades (Huysmans, 2000). The securitisation of migration has the potential to undermine the status quo within EU Member States. The securitisation of migration has been particularly apparent within the European Union. It has been suggested that one of the key reasons for this relates to the nature of the EU, particularly the free movement of people (Chou, 2008). As internal borders have been relaxed, states perceive themselves to be vulnerable, and therefore exceptional pressure mounts to make the external borders as secure as possible to mitigate for the lack of internal borders. This approach has produced the phrase ‘Fortress Europe’ – a description of the securitised, even militarised response of the EU to outside immigration (Vives, 2017). This fixation with the risks of migration can also be understood in the context of increased concern about terrorism, as was particularly evident in concerns about members of ISIS using refugee routes to enter Europe (Brady, 2017).

Gerard & Pickering (2014, p. 339) argue that the EU has used a multidimensional process to securitise migration. Firstly, by using policy to emphasise internal security, the idea that the states of the EU are inherently ‘at risk’ becomes normalised. Then, by emphasising the unique cultural identity of the EU (thereby its members), those individuals not originally of the EU become ‘the other’, something to be feared. Finally, by emphasising the crisis of the welfare state and blaming this on non-EU migrants, immigration is framed as an economic threat that has the potential to undermine the status quo within EU Member States.

Huysmans’ (2006) argument can be used to further understand the process by which this securitisation takes place, once the issue of migration is accepted as a security concern. Securitisation is absorbed into policy development and implementation – when considering policy regarding migration, the instruments relating to security are consulted and used above those relating to economics or human rights. Securitisation is then mobilised by perpetuating a discourse that exaggerates the problem of migration, using language that is fear inducing. Migration is by this point established as a security threat, therefore it is accepted that a security response is the only appropriate response.

If migration is conceptualised as a security issue for states and supra-national organisations such as the EU,
this generates particular problems in the context of human trafficking. As has been discussed, there are different frames of understanding that can be used when responding to the issue of human trafficking, one of the most prevalent being to see it in the context of organised crime (Lee, Ed., 2007, p. 5). This model has been criticised by some, as it tends to overlook the human rights and needs of the individuals who have been trafficked (Avdan, 2012), as well as the structural issues that facilitate and perpetuate human trafficking, such as economic inequality. However, within a securitised under-standing, it is difficult to anticipate any frame of reference for human trafficking other than a security-conscious organised crime focused paradigm, and indeed, this has largely dominated the response to human trafficking across many states (Lee, Ed., 2007).

The increased securitisation of borders also has the potential to alter behaviours, which could lead to an increase in human trafficking. By making regular migration criteria increasingly un-attainable, whilst militarising borders, individuals are potentially pushed into riskier movement behaviours (Miller & Baumeister, 2013). If the individual is desperate, particularly for economic or political reasons to enter another state, yet there is no way for them to regularly or irregularly cross the border, then they are significantly more likely to agree to be smuggled. This then has the potential to expose them to a risk of trafficking, such as being held in debt bondage upon arrival at the destination country.

Finally, through the process of securitisation, migration and migrants are viewed through a negative lens. As migration is linked to terrorism and seen as an existential threat for the state to overcome, migrants themselves become objects of fear (Musaro & Parmiggiani, 2017, p. 242). As a significant proportion of victims of human trafficking are also migrants, they therefore fall under this negative association that has the potential to negatively impact the response to them.

3. PERCEPTIONS OF MIGRATION IN GOVERNMENT, THE MEDIA AND SOCIETY

In analysing the scholarship on migration, there are several distinct areas that are noticeable when attempting to gain an understanding of perceptions of migration. These are either identified by the discourse, or are unknowingly demonstrated by the discourse itself.

What is quite clear is that generalisation exists in the literature on migration – both that which is identified and that which is exhibited. One such generalisation involves the understanding of migration for sex work. It is often assumed that all women who have migrated for sex work have been trafficked, and are referred to thus. Choi (2014) outlines this using the example of North Korean women in China, stating that it is often assumed that all women that have travelled to China from North Korea for sex work have been duped and exploited. Clearly, research in this area presents a number of challenges and trafficking figures that would be difficult to quantify, the issue, however, lies in the unempirical assumption being made.

Alongside wider generalisations about migrants, there is often an assumed homogeneity between them. Ghosh (2015) demonstrates an example of this by outlining how much of the work done relating to migration in rural communities in India assumes that migration is too risky to be attempted for all women in these communities. Ghosh argues that these women are perceived as naïve and unknowing, and migration itself as a negative and dangerous experience. This narrative of migration as dangerous, and migrants, particularly women, as unknowing and vulnerable is one which has been reflected in the dominant narratives of human trafficking (Agustin, 2006). This potentially contributes to the conflation of migration, particularly for sex work and human trafficking that exist (Joarder & Miller, 2013). There has been work done to resolve this conflation, some of which uses the idea of the continuum of migration-exploitation to explain the complexities that exist within migration (O’Connell Davidson, 2006).

It is also evident that migrants are ‘categorised’ into different types when perceived by others, and that within these categories there are good and bad types of migration (Casey, 2010). For example, a middle-aged British couple migrating from the UK to the south coast of Spain for retirement is seen as a positive type of migration (Sriskandarajah & Drew, 2006), a positively motivated move that would be considered aspirational in some demographics. However, a low-income female moving from Somalia to the UK would often be perceived as negative (from the Western standpoint), as having questionable motive and being detrimental to the destination country.

From this it has been theorised that both ‘race’, ethnicity and socio-economic position explain what is categorised as good or bad. Immigration in the UK was traditionally seen as problematic when the migrant was not Caucasian. Particularly from the 1960s to the 1980s, there was widespread concern about the influx of West Indian, Caribbean and Pakistani individuals and families (Mirza, 2016). This concern can be somewhat explained using the securitisation theory by Buzan et al. (1998, p. 121). There is a fear by the native population that their perceived unique characteristics will be subsumed by those settling into the country. At that time, this was felt more acutely because on a very basic level the newcomers looked different to them. However, the issues with these particular groups have somewhat abated as processes of cultural integration have occurred. Many of those that would have been horrified by Indian immigration in the 1970s would not be without their local ‘Indian’ takeaway restaurant that they consider to be acceptably part of ‘British’ culture. For example, the recent outcry at the deportations of ‘Windrush’ generation – West Indian and Caribbean migrants who arrived in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, and who are now
considered by most to be an important part of ‘British’ culture.\(^1\)

Through the 1990s, this original concern was replaced with concern about Eastern European immigrants who had gained access to the UK through EU freedom of movement, particularly Polish individuals who were travelling to Britain to look for work (Burell, Ed., 2016). When the borders of the EU were further extended in 2007, this was replaced in general perception as a concern about Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants. That this concern exists, when immigrants from, for example, France or the USA are not considered a problem, strongly suggests that ‘race’ or ethnicity is a key factor in understanding perceptions of immigration. However, as the particular ethnic group that is seen as problematic changes, there must be further explanation as to how the migration of particular groups is problematised.

An understanding of the perception of socioeconomic status is the other crucial factor in understanding how migrants are perceived. Casey (2010, p. 23) has argued that there is a particular class, denoted as ‘Gold Collar’ individuals who work at high levels in the commercial sector and are given a ‘free pass’, both in terms of immigration policy and public perception, to migrate around the globe as they wish. To use Casey’s analogy, ‘White Collar’ workers, whilst not perhaps having the same level of freedom as the very elite, are considered relatively unthreatening, although perhaps treated with a level of suspicion. A useful example for exploring this could perhaps be foreign doctors working in the UK. Although it has been identified that some people are less comfortable about being treated by a doctor from abroad (Robinson & Carey, 2000), the main concern is usually about problems with communication within the doctor-patient consultation rather than concern about threats to native British jobs and British society.

The group that is considered of the most concern within migrant labour are ‘blue collar’ workers, who are either unskilled or semi-skilled (Faini, 2007). When encountering or considering this group of migrants, debates about societal destabilisation and jobs being taken from native workers are incredibly common. The language used also becomes very negative, with words such as ‘swamped’ often used (Williamson, 2014, p. 74).

Finally, and following the pattern of the lower the socioeconomic position of the migrant, the more negative the perception of them, the group that causes the most concern are those classed as asylum seekers and refugees (Lynn & Lea, 2005). Although in many ways this group could be considered as having the ‘purest’ motives for migration, as they are predominantly seeking to secure safety for themselves and their families, they are perceived as being the least trustworthy and the largest cause for concern, and their motives are constantly called into question.

These understandings of the perceptions held regarding migrants are of significance for understanding the perceptions of victims of human trafficking. That well-off and ethnically similar migrants are considered to be the ‘best’ kind of migrant, it hardly seems surprising that the traditionally preferred narrative of human trafficking was of the young, white woman from a ‘nice’ family who was duped or kidnapped (perhaps whilst travelling) and sold into sexual slavery – a victim that would be easily understandable and sympathetic within this conceptualisation of migration (Wilson & O’Brien, 2016). However, research has shown that it is largely the ‘blue collar’ type of individual, who either comes from the developing world or the poorer parts of Central and Eastern Europe, that is most likely to be trafficked, as they often lack means to carry out their travel plans without having to rely on others, some of whom unfortunately have the aim of exploiting them. The key question therefore becomes whether or not this is likely to make both the wider society, and those dealing with people who have been trafficked, less sympathetic to them.

3.1. The media

The way in which the media portrays migration and migrants is an important part of understanding the relationship between perceptions of migration and perceptions of human trafficking. In order to assess this connection, it is necessary to frame the relationship between the media and migration generally. It is then possible to theorise the ways in which this relationship could impact upon the perception of victims of human trafficking.

As has been frequently noted, the British media has traditionally held a biased view of immigrants and immigration (Matthes & Beyer, 2017), which has tended to skew the information that is being reported upon to encourage an overblown perception of the scale of migration into the country whilst ignoring almost completely emigration from Britain. The focus has also traditionally been less upon the contribution to society or the economy of migrants and more on the concerns about the negative cultural effect of migrants and the ‘drain’ they have on public funds.

There has also been, across the majority of media outlets, a persistent framing of migration as a ‘problem to be solved’ (ibid.). As the media has a large role in shaping the perceptions of the wider public, this has the potential to influence societal and political views of migrants. This has often taken the form of associating migrants with criminality or as ‘benefit cheats’.

This negative framing of the ‘problem’ of migration (and migrants) is particularly evident when analysing the language used when referring to migrants, particularly in the more traditionally ‘right-wing’ popular press, such as the Daily Mail, The Sun, and The Express. In a study by Philo at el. (2013), the media coverage of migration was analysed.
It was shown that negative sources are overwhelmingly used over positive ones, and that in terms of language, whenever the term ‘asylum seeker’ was used, phrases such as ‘bogus asylum seeker’, ‘swarm’, ‘scamming’ and ‘cheats’ were used within a very high percentage of the articles surveyed, reinforcing the negative connotations of migration.

This has the potential to affect perceptions about, and the experiences of, victims of human trafficking in several ways, both directly and indirectly. Victims could potentially be directly affected as a general lack of understanding and negative framing of all migration places these individuals as a ‘problem’ to be dealt with within the wider ‘problem’ of migration. This can arguably be seen in the emphasis that is placed on repatriation of victims of human trafficking. An example of this can be found in the reporting of the increase in migration from Middle Eastern and North African countries that are under-going internal crises, such as Syria. After several incidents of drownings occurring as a result of people fleeing these areas in unsafe vessels, those who were organising these trips were frequently being referred to in the media as ‘traffickers’. This immediately created a definitional problem and the potential for misperception. For human trafficking to occur, there is a broad consensus that coercion must have taken place in some part of the process, and that there has been the intention to exploit the individual (Shoaps, 2013). In the case of those fleeing war-ravaged countries such as Syria, there is no evidence that this is the case – in fact, most of the testimony of the individuals that have utilised this means of travel is that they have voluntarily paid large amounts of money in order to be on those ships (Mandić, 2017).

Whilst this is not to say that those organising these crossings were acting in a scrupulous fashion, based on the available evidence it would seem that such scenarios fall into the category of smuggling rather than trafficking.

Although this may not seem to be an issue that should realistically be classed as refugees as trafficking victims is incidentally a potentially negative misrepresentation for them also, as if people are thought to have been trafficked, this places much of the responsibility onto the traffickers, and gives the apparent excuse to immediately repatriate such individuals, rather than engaging with their actual needs as refugees or addressing the difficulties within the state they have fled.2


The term ‘migrant’ is an umbrella term that covers differing groups, including economic or socially motivated migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees; and within that further differentiation can be found between regular and irregular migrants, and smuggled or trafficked migrants. Not only is an adequate understanding of which category a particular migrant or group of migrants fits into important in understanding the perspective and needs of the individual or group, but the position of the individual with regards to the state they have entered, and indeed international and domestic law, depends upon which group they are legitimately a member of.

Again, using the British media as an example, there are substantial sections that have either conflated or mislabelled different groups (Mandić, 2017). This has the effect that misperceptions about the treatment of particular groups are propagated. For example, many of the individuals from ‘Arab Spring’ countries such as Syria and Libya have been framed as economic migrants, however, if their situation is analysed, they would clearly fit into the category of refugees. States have very different obligations towards refugees and economic migrants; economic migrants have to apply for regular status through specific channels and can otherwise be deported. States often also have the right to attach conditions of pre-existing employment opportunities to be accepted.

However, under international law, it is accepted that refugees do not have such channels open to them, and therefore their irregular status cannot be held against them. There is also the obligation to provide a level of care for refugees (Schiff, 2018). Therefore, when migrants are mislabelled by media outlets, who then have provocative headlines about the ‘benefits’ these migrants are getting, they are often failing to adequately frame that the state is acting correctly under international law and these individuals are merely receiving what they are entitled to.

This failure to distinguish between groups of migrants has the potential to impact perceptions of victims of human trafficking. An example of this can be seen in the reporting of the increase in migration from Middle Eastern and North African countries that are undergoing internal crises, such as Syria. After several incidents of drownings occurring as a result of people fleeing these areas in unsafe vessels, those who were organising these trips were frequently being referred to in the media as ‘traffickers’. This immediately created a definitional problem and the potential for misperception. For human trafficking to occur, there is a broad
3.2. Policy perspectives

Hollifield & Wong (2015) identify three broad research questions that political science seeks to understand concerning migration:

- Can states control their borders and to what extent?
- What is the relationship between sovereignty and security and migration?
- What is the role of the state in the incorporation of migrants economically and politically?

The authors centralise the state as the unit of analysis. Prior to this framing, Freeman (1995) identified what he called the 'policy gap' – that although states appear to be under a significant degree of pressure to control migration, in terms of policy outputs states rarely take the steps necessary to vastly reduce migration. He argues that this can be explained by how democratic states function, with organised interests vying for influence with policymakers. He identifies four models for how organised interests work: interest groups, clientelist, entrepreneurial, and majoritarian. Applying these models to migration, Freeman argues that as there is a high intensity of benefit to a small number of people and the costs are spread across a large number of people less intensively, a clientelist model will develop; with groups that benefit, such as the construction industry or vegetable farming, going to great effort to lobby for lax immigration law. Boswell (2007) does, however, highlight that this argument overlooks institutional factors in policy-making and the legal frameworks that politicians have to work within.

As has been discussed, there is a link established within the thinking on migration between migration and criminality, and wider security threat. This framing of the issue of migration has translated into policy, particularly in the developed world, and is considered to be the dominant doctrine in forming policy relating to migration (Legomsky, 2007). From the 1990s, it also began to be reflected in policy, for example, within the EU, that there was an assumed link between terrorism and migration (Huysmans, 2000). This, somewhat unsurprisingly, was ossified as an accepted basis for policy making in the USA after the 9/11 terror attacks (Miller & Baumeister, 2013), with migration being brought under the control of the Department for Homeland Security, a clear indication that policy decisions were being made through the prism of feared criminality.

This policy doctrine creates a number of problems. As outlined by Silverman & Hajela (2015) and Balch (2016), the effect that is often seen is that otherwise liberal states affront their own values through their immigration policies. The example is used of detention centres. There is evidence that detention is harmful to those detained, yet it persists. This is only possible because threats to security or the fear of criminality are traditionally seen as higher concerns than human rights, particularly of non-citizens. Shin (2015) argues that this policy framework leads to ‘paternalistic’ and harmful policies. It is argued that the voice of the migrant is lost; therefore, inappropriate policies are developed. An example of this is clearly seen within human trafficking policy with regards to involuntary repatriation. Whether or not repatriation is best for the individual is often lost within the dominant policies that reflect the idea that migrants are inherently dangerous, therefore the aim is to remove them wherever possible.

Despite increasing globalisation occurring in numerous ways, migration policy is one of the few areas that moved against the flow of increasingly free movement of resources, and in fact borders have for the most part been tightened, with the occasional exception, such as the EU Schengen agreement. That this has happened, in light of previous discussion, is perhaps not surprising. However, it is an area of policy that has created debate within anti-trafficking discourses. The problem created is that opposing arguments are generated as to which policy is more successful in tackling human trafficking.

It has been argued that making borders more secure is the best policy, as it becomes easier to detect traffickers through stringent checks, as well as acting as a deterrent. Hernandez & Rudolph (2015) make this argument, including empirical data that demonstrates that this is the case. Interestingly, they also note through the same empirical study that prostitution laws of the receiving country have no effect on the trafficking of women for sexual exploitation to that country. Miller & Baumeister (2013) make the argument that the increasing use of biometrics and other technologies in border control make it increasingly difficult for people to ‘slip through the net’, therefore trafficking should eventually become almost impossible.

The other side to this argument is that it is the policy of tightening borders that leads to human trafficking. If borders did not exist, human trafficking between states would potentially cease to exist, as individuals could travel unimpeded wherever they wished, therefore would not need the ‘expertise’ of traffickers to cross borders, which is a common way for the process of trafficking to begin. This argument is made by Lijnders & Robinson (2013), who argue that it is border enforcement that creates opportunities for traffickers, as well as by Avdan (2012) who describes it as a ‘Catch-22’ situation; where states trying to combat trafficking in the only way they can envisage, border control, are inadvertently making the problem significantly worse. There is logic to both sides of the argument, and the discussion raises several issues. Firstly, that as ever in human trafficking research, the main problem faced is lack of reliable data. As human trafficking is covert, where there are no border controls, to say that this has led to less trafficking is essentially trying to ‘prove a negative’. There also needs to be consideration for the welfare of the wider migrant community; what is best for them whilst still taking into account the aim of combatting human trafficking.

The European Union provides a useful example of how many of these policies have been enacted over the past several decades. There has often been a dichotomy, or disassociation, between the EU’s stated principles of liberalism and internationalism and their policies on ‘external’ migration. Although many internal
borders have been dismantled, this has been coupled with a serious tightening of external ones, arguably as a result of states being warier due to giving up control over their own borders.

An example of this can be seen in the 1990 Convention to enact Schengen, which connected migration with terrorism, transnational crime and border control, creating the pathway to the ‘militarisation’ of the border where force, through the Frontex agency, became normalised, and migrants were treated as ‘the enemy’ (Avendaño & Fanning, 2013). It has been argued by Klepp (2010) that Frontex specifically contradicts the EU’s stated liberal aims. Similarly, the Dublin Convention, developed to respond to asylum seekers, had the stated aim of making things easier for asylum seekers to apply for asylum; however, it is considered to have made things more difficult for asylum seekers as states have more available criteria upon which to reject them (Huysmans, 2000).

This contradiction has not always been lost on the EU, though. Lutterbeck (2006) outlines how alternative narratives that promote a more liberal attitude to migrants tend to occur when there has been a spate of tragedies, such as drownings in the Mediterranean in 2004. This was similarly the case in 2015 with Syrian refugees that were travelling on unsafe vessels. This discourse seemed to have had little long-term effect in 2004; it remains to be seen what the long-term effect of the events of 2015 will have.

4 For example, EEC Council Regulation 1612/68 distinguished between the internal migration of EU citizens and non-EU citizens.

4. UK HUMAN TRAFFICKING POLICY

Currently in the UK, a person who is identified as a potential victim of human trafficking or modern slavery should be referred to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM). It is a non-statutory instrument that was put in place to meet obligations created by the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Human Trafficking, specifically concerned with victim identification. The individual will be referred into the NRM by a ‘first responder’, such as a Police officer. The referral will be assessed by one of two competent authorities, the UK Human Trafficking Centre (UKHTC), within the National Crime Agency (NCA) or the UKVI, the Home Office agency with responsibility for immigration and visa applications. Within several days the person should receive a ‘reasonable grounds’ decision, which entitles them to 45 days of support if positive, for ‘recovery and reflection’, at the end of which time they will receive a ‘conclusive grounds’ decision. Upon receiving a positive conclusive grounds decision, they are entitled to a further 45 days of accommodation and support. After this period ends, there currently exists a ‘cliff edge’ of mandated support – as specific support for the individual ends at this time (Human Trafficking Foundation, 2016). It is therefore left to the individual, often supported by one of a number of NGOs that have filled this space, to negotiate the standard welfare system with no further ‘special status’ as a victim of human trafficking.

In 2017, the NCA reported 5,145 victims of modern slavery in the UK, of which 4,325 were not from the UK. As the majority of these individuals have been brought into the country, or entered themselves illegally (Anderson, 2012), once the post-conclusive grounds prescribed 45-day period of support has ended, the individual is left in a precarious position. Even if they were in a position to work, assuming that they were physically and mentally able after their ordeal, if they were not an EU citizen, they would not have the right to work in the UK. This therefore places them in a vulnerable situation where ‘black market’ work may be their only option, which carries with it a risk of further exploitation or even re-trafficking. Assuming that the person was not able to work, or could not immediately find work, the person is left to navigate the benefit system as an irregular, or to some, illegal, migrant.

If the individual is an EU citizen, they have the right to access benefits in the UK if they have been working in the UK for at least three months – referred to as ‘exercising treaty rights’. This is a result of the 2014 Immigration Act, which removed the automatic right of EU citizens to claim benefits in the UK, thus creating a barrier to accessing eligible benefits for trafficking victims. If the person has been working in exploitative conditions in the UK for more than three months, under EU law this has to be considered ‘work’, therefore they are exercising treaty rights. However, this raises a number of problems. Firstly, they may not have been ‘working’ in the UK for that amount of time. Incidences of trafficking and forced labour are rarely straightforward, and this may be difficult to establish. Secondly, it is very likely that the work done was not regulated in any way, therefore there is unlikely to be any paperwork, such as payslips, that would normally be used when accessing benefits as an EU migrant in the UK. As a lack of ‘portability’ of conclusive grounds paperwork has been reported in the UK welfare system (Williams-Woods & Mellon, 2018), this can cause excessive complications and delays in accessing support. If the individual is not an EU citizen, they have a different set of circumstances to navigate. They will automatically be considered for discretionary leave to remain, however, the Home Office does not grant this purely on the basis of the person being a victim of trafficking – therefore many applications have been refused. The person can also apply for asylum, however, they are then in a situation that could be described as ‘trying to fit a square peg in a round hole’ – they are trying to use a system that was not designed for their situation, therefore proving that they are eligible for asylum can be very difficult (Mallon, 2014).

The Home Office has been shown to be failing in its obligations to protect victims of trafficking. This arguably arises from the Home Office’s ‘hostile’ environment agenda; the default position has appeared to be to repatriate victims of trafficking, even when it is potentially dangerous or damaging to their recovery (Askola, 2010). In many cases, the individual had initially desired to enter the UK

5 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, 16th May 2005, CETS 197, Article 10.

and it was this desire that was exploited. Simply removing them from the UK does not therefore deal with the underlying reasons that led to their initial migration. There are also many potential risks to returning to the country of origin. If the person cooperated with the UK authorities in a prosecution case, the individual may be at risk of retribution. They may be at a risk of ‘honour’ based violence, particularly for women that have been sexually exploited, compounded if they are returning with children that have been born as a result of their experience. Yet these factors have routinely been discounted in applications for discretionary leave to remain (Williams-Woods & Mellon, 2018).

In the case of PK (Ghana) vs Secretary of State for the Home Department (2018), the Home Office had been taken to the Court of Appeal over the refusal to provide discretionary leave to remain. Under Article 14 of the Council of Europe Convention, the state is required to consider the personal circumstances of the individual. The Home Office had attempted to argue that it was at their discretion to interpret whether or not it was ‘necessary’ for the individual to be awarded leave to remain; however, the court ruled that ‘necessary’ had to be taken in the context of the aims of the Convention, which was to protect and assist victims. The judge stated: ‘I consider, the provision does not give an open-ended discretion, but rather requires an assessment of whether it is necessary for the purposes of protection and assistance of the victim of trafficking (or one of the other objectives of the Convention) to allow him to remain in the country. In this case, the Secretary of State’s guidance neither requires nor prompts any such engagement. As a result, in my view, it does not reflect the requirements of Article 14(1)(a), and is unlawful.’

In 2015, the UK Modern Slavery Act came into effect, the result of a long campaign to create a law that criminalised the particular crime of human trafficking, or modern slavery. Prior to this, in prosecuting the crime of trafficking it was necessary for the Police and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to rely on prosecuting individual parts of what constituted having trafficked and exploited someone, which was problematic as, for example, even if a conviction was secured, the requisite sentences did not always match the severe nature of the crime committed. That such a bill was passed, and with the amount of publicity that it received was considered by some to be a triumph, to others it was long overdue.

Theresa May stated in 2016: ‘The first legislation of its kind in Europe, this act has delivered tough new penalties to put slave masters behind bars where they belong, with life sentences for the worst offenders. It has created a vital policing tool to stop anyone convicted of trafficking from travelling to a country where they are known to have exploited vulnerable people in the past.’

However, many agreed that gaps in the provision of protection for victims, one of which was guaranteeing leave to remain for identified victims of human trafficking, at least for a specified period, had not been addressed. Being granted leave to remain is only specifically mentioned as a requirement in relation to domestic workers, who entered the country on a visa that tied them to their employer, where their employer subsequently exploited them. In such cases, leave is to be granted, with certain conditions. It is interesting that those victims that have been specifically identified as having initially entered the country legally are singled out for special immigration status provision, perhaps reflecting a Governmental attitude of ‘rewarding’ those that are not ‘illegal immigrants’.

The wider theory of migration offers useful insights into the context of the response to human trafficking in the UK. It is repeatedly noticeable that there is potential for, and certainly some evidence of, trafficking victims being impacted by attitudes and policies that reflect, at root, a communitarian paradigm. The paradigms through which people interpret the world are particularly difficult to shift (Mehta, 2011); therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that creating an ideological space for ‘good’ migrants within a paradigm of ‘bad’ migrants has proven difficult. Leaving for now the problems created for migrants generally by this negative paradigm, the puzzle remains of how to create this ideological space for trafficking victims and how to ensure that their needs are met. As the first step, it would seem necessary that the Government take more responsibility for the precarious and vulnerable situation these individuals find themselves in, and commit to specifically addressing this problem. If protecting borders must remain the priority, more innovative ways must be contrived to attempt also to protect people.


REFERENCES


Before 2015, also due to the relatively low numbers of immigrants in Slovakia, the topic of foreign migration in its various contexts was rather marginal in terms of political and public interest, including its impact on political competition. After Europe was hit by a massive wave of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa in the summer of 2015, the issue of external migration has become a hot topic as well as a dominant, paramount issue with the potential to make a decisive impact on overall political development and public opinion. Moreover, it turned into an arena of political competition, with new elements in appeals to voters and interaction between various political actors. Migration also affected the relationship between CEE countries and EU institutions.

The year 2015 found Slovakia unprepared in view of public policy concepts and expert capacities. Nevertheless, the government and the political elite in general were ready to take a very strict position – the government rejected the relocation scheme which had been agreed upon by the EU Council in September 2015 (vis-à-vis the wave of refugees), producing an atmosphere of fear and threat. It should be noted though, that refugees in Slovakia were ‘ghostly’, phantom-like ‘others’, since they were practically non-existent in the country.

The polarisation of the debate on refugees was also connected to the parliamentary elections held on 5th March 2016. The situation did not settle down until the second half of 2016 when Slovakia first chaired the European Union Council and endeavoured to not broach this controversial topic but, quite on the contrary, sought to act consensually, as the ‘honest broker’. Moreover, instead of adopting the relocation scheme the government offered so-called ‘flexible solidarity’, i.e. assistance in protecting the EU’s external borders, as well as other forms of assistance in tackling the crises.

The key objective of the following study is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Slovak public opinion on migration and refugees, to identify which factors most strongly affect the overall rejection attitudes, and which population groups are more or less susceptible to anti-immigrant resentment. Although public perception is very closely related to the overall social climate and the current social debate, this contribution does not aim to explore any political and media discourse on this topic. When describing crucial narratives and images, we rely on several studies focused on those aspects of the crises (Chudžíková, 2016; Gažovičová, 2017; Žúborová & Borárosová, 2017).

As the key source of empirical data, we used ISSP data and the Work Orientations module, which was conducted in September – October 2015 (ISSP Slovakia, 2016). This means from the time when the peak of the migration’s debate was already over and the original radical tone alleviated. In the survey, the questions about migration and refugees were not part of the international comparative module, but were included by the Slovak research team. In addition, the study also uses other national- or EU-wide surveys that are relevant to our objective.

1. The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) survey, Work Orientations module, used in this study was funded by the Slovak Research and Development Agency (APVV-14-0527).

1. SLOVAK DEBATE ABOUT MIGRATION AND THE OTHERS

1.1. Slovakia opens up, but the pace is rather slow

After accession to the EU, the openness of post-Communist countries to the outside world increased dramatically. Larger numbers of non-European citizens began coming to these countries, some of them with the intention of staying longer (for work, study or permanent residence). The experience of the population with the co-existence with migrants from abroad was growing; however, in comparison with Western Europe, there were still relatively small numbers of migrants. Moreover, the CEE countries were considered by the vast majority of migrants coming from non-European countries as transit countries. This ‘explanation’ was repeatedly used by politicians as an argument or excuse for not accepting any refugees in 2015, thereby stimulating a justified critique called ‘hypocrisy’.3

In spite of the slowly growing numbers of migrants, migration and integration have been a marginal issue in Slovakia’s politics. In general, we could say that migration and integration policies have not been a priority for any government, partially due to the low numbers of immigrants, but partially also to the higher priorities set by the social and economic transformation and reforms. Slovakia was often criticised for lacking a comprehensive migration and integration policy (Gyárfášová et al., 2012; Bargerová, 2016). The first concept of the Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic with complex definitions of the intentions, principles, policies and tools of the migration policy was approved only in 2005. Additionally, Slovakia was one of the last EU Member States to adopt a ‘concept’ of integration in 2009; the subsequent strategic policy document The Integration Policy of the Slovak Republic was approved by the Government in 2014.4

However, although theoretical conceptions and frameworks existed, their appropriate implementation was insufficient. For example, according to MIPEX 2015, Slovakia lagged behind in integration policies, not only compared to the front-runners like the Nordic countries, the Netherlands or Portugal, but also to countries from the region.5 The critique aimed primarily at the barriers for labour market mobility and the slow naturalisation process. According to MIPEX experts, Slovakia is seen as the most critical case with the lowest and most inequitable naturalisation rates in Europe, keeping most non-EU citizens in a relatively insecure status with potentially negative side effects on their integration outcomes. Among the recommendations for public policies, higher effectiveness and simplification of bureaucratic procedures for making access to the labour market easier for immigrants has been mentioned in several studies as well (Filadelfiová et al., 2011).

1.2. Political and media debate around refugees

In the context of the 2015 migration flow, it is necessary to view two interrelated trends in domestic politics – both at the level of party politics and at the level of public debate: the radicalisation of the political mainstream, when moderate politicians begin using more radical vocabulary and start proposing radical measures, and secondly – the efforts of radical and extremist forces to move closer toward the mainstream or directly penetrate mainstream politics. The dividing line between standard mainstream moderate parties and radical extremist forces in this issue is becoming more and more unclear (Gyárfášová & Mesežníkov, 2017).

In Slovakia, the refugee issue was employed predominantly by the ruling party Smer-SD as the main subject of its campaign before parliamentary elections in March 2016. Smer-SD’s chairman and Prime Minister, Robert Fico, presented himself as the country’s main protector against external threats. He spoke about migrants from the Middle East and North Africa as a source of terrorist threat, thus provoking xenophobia among the public. His appeals were competing, not only with ‘mainstream’ nationalists from the Slovak National Party (SNS), but even with right-wing extremists from the People’s Party – Our Slovakia (LSNS). In this situation, opposition centre-right parties failed to present a plausible alternative policy on the migration issue which would allow them to keep and strengthen their ties with the electorate. However, at the end of the day, the radicalisation of the political discourse showed a counter-productive impact on Smer’s electoral outcome – compared to the 2012 election, it lost around 40% of voters, receiving 28% compared to 44% before. The beneficiaries of radicalisation were the rather extreme-right party LSNS and the radical party We Are Family (Sme Rodina), which entered the national parliament for the first time.6

Now, let us take a closer look at the ‘trajectories’ of the refugee issue. According to the discourse analyses during the respective period (summer 2015 – March 2016), it was the most publicised issue, peaking in September 2015. The discourse was highly polarised and was mostly represented by the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior. The only political representative (in addition to numerous NGOs) with a positive and human attitude and a humanitarian approach was the President of the Slovak Republic, Andrej Kiska. Based on a media discourse analysis, the authors argue: ‘Other political subjects were not able to create a relevant reference on this migration theme. At the end, the polarisation of society was resting on the shoulders of two representatives – the Prime Minister and the President’ (Žúborová & Borárosová, 2017, p. 9).

The analysis by these authors presented the development of the discourse from quotas to security risks in the autumn of 2015. The narrative was dominated by simplified linear causality: refugees = Muslims = terrorists. The securitisation of the migration crisis was

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3. The same argument was used by the government also in 2015, which raised justified critique: ‘So the hypocritical excuse that Slovakia is a transit country for asylum seekers does not hold firm. It is because Slovakia does not offer them realistic and fair prospects of a decent life and creates obstacles for them in every sphere starting with work, healthcare and education, so much so that most leave our country’ (Malangone, 2015).
5. MIPEX evaluated integration policies in 38 countries, Czech Republic and Hungary ranked at place 29th, Poland 32nd and Slovakia 34th (MIPEX, 2015).
6. For the political consequences of the migration crisis on Slovakia’s political developments see Mesežníkov (2016).
fully accomplished. It can be illustrated through a statement by Prime Minister Fico: ‘We protect Slovakia (…). There are security risks linked to the migration wave and it is my obligation to talk about them (...), I am accountable.’7

After the New Year’s night celebration in Cologne, Germany, where dozens of women were sexually harassed by gangs of men, including asylum seekers, and several incidents occurred, there was a shift in the securitisation logics: migrants = sexual harassment = danger. According to the discourse analyses, the bottom line message of several issues was ‘Slovakia is not responsible’ (Zuborová & Borárosová, 2017, pp. 10–12), which can be interpreted as an additional appeal saying the problem of the EU (or more specifically of Germany) does not matter to us and as an indirect excuse for rejecting any kind of involvement or solidarity. In this regard, Gažovičová pointed to the fact that the political discourse in Slovakia questioned the entitlement of refugees to humanitarian help because once they leave the neighbouring countries of war zones, they become economic migrants and have no right to seek asylum (Gažovičová, 2017).

In addition, a strong security threat framing cultural otherness has come to the forefront: ‘…migration began to have another context. The media coverage was related to the inability to integrate migrants because of their cultural and religious differences. In other words, «otherness» developed into another dominant discourse that resonated in print media’ (Zuborová & Borárosová, 2017, p. 13). In this context, Prime Minister Fico made international headlines with a strong Islamophobic statement: ‘…we would never make a decision that could lead to the creation of a compact Muslim community with all the risks we see today in some European cities, ...different cultural traditions and values would bring security risks’.8

In summary, the migration crisis dominated the public, political and media discourse between summer 2015 and spring 2016. The key political actors were the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior. The framing was overwhelmingly characterised by either an immediate security threat (terrorism and any kind of violence). The cultural otherness of the migrants was presented also as a cultural danger, a threat to ‘our’ traditional values and ‘our’ identity. Other voices were secondary in the overall debate. In a broader investigation of the new patterns of securitisation, Kazharski and Tabosa say that the politicians (not only in Slovakia but in all of the Visegrad Four countries) ‘have been using speech acts to securitise migration and processes in different sectors: as a threat to national and regional security, as a threat to the state’s sovereignty and its ability to decide upon immigration policies, as a threat to the national economy and as a threat to «us» in terms of identity’ (Kazharski & Tabosa, 2018, p. 78).

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2. CULTURAL CLOSENESS VS. OPENNESS IN SLOVAKIA

2.1. Context and conceptualisation

When analysing the public perceptions of refugees, we draw from the wider concept of the in-group and out-group construction, or ‘we’ vs. ‘they’ collective identity. The core of each social identity is the fact that groups are perceived as something specific and they perceive themselves as such. ‘Our’ identity is equal to ‘we’, whereas they represent different identities that define our identity. An indispensable complement of identity is a distinction from the others: who we are and how we are dependent on who we are not. The essence of the collective identity lies in the shared sense of ‘my – our’, and this feeling, at the same time, separates ‘us’ from ‘the others’.

Social interaction between actors (individuals or groups) can only occur after actors begin to perceive each other and distinguish themselves as social objects. One presumption is that they themselves admit or are attributed to their ‘identity’ – identity, equality or similarity on the one hand, and on the other, distinction and individuality that makes it possible to distinguish one collective from another (Kiliánová, 2009, p. 18).

In nationalistic appeals, ‘others’ mean an external threat to cultural homogeneity, to cultural and national identity. Following this line, the concept of nativism is very useful for further elaboration because: ‘Nativism entails a combination of nationalism and xenophobia, i.e. an ideology that holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group («the nation») and that non-native (or «alien») elements, whether persons or ideas, are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state’ (Mudde, 2011, p. 12). Mudde wondered ‘if the concept of nativism is to «travel» to the Eastern part of the European continent, since in post-Communist Europe mass immigration has so far remained a fairly marginal concern...’ (Mudde, 2007, p. 31). After the 2015 refugee crisis, it is evident that the answer is ‘yes’; nativism is an applicable and useful theory also in the CEEC – it conceptualises the xenophobic stances which go beyond the traditional animosity towards autochthonous minorities.

In the political discourse on refugees, the construction of ‘them’ was associated with cultural inaccuracy and danger. We also rely on the assumption that ‘the political discourse on minority groups (including migrants and refugees) contributes to the formation of inter-group relations in society and, more specifically, to the problems of these relations leading to the formation of marginalisation and exclusion’ (Chudžíková, 2016, p. 95).

The way in which individual views in society are represented and which are supposed to dominate depends on many circumstances. In particular, long-term cultural-value anchorages as well as current discourse and disputes that lead to individual preferences are essential.

The discourse on migrants is based on the historically conditioned closeness of Slovak society, on the mistrust of others. The recent ‘Zeitgeist’ of other democratic societies, which elevate the identity of politics to the very centre of political
competition as well as domestic political discourse, strengthened anti-immigrant sentiments even more. The politicians’ statements gave the public strong justification as they would be saying – it is legitimate to hate the others.

2.2. Which orientation prevails?

Slovak society has been characterised by cultural closeness for decades. Though some regions are ethnically mixed and the majority of society lives with traditional minorities (mainly the Hungarians and the Roma), contact with new minorities – migrants – was until recently very limited. In recent years, the interaction with other cultures has increased; however, as several public opinion polls have shown, the perception of foreigners has remained very ambivalent. For example, an extensive survey in 2009 showed evidence of this. Based on its findings, the author of the study concludes: ‘Foreigners living in Slovakia are perceived very stereotypically, the perception is based on very rigid prejudices against the «otherness», which can be changed only slowly and with difficulty’ (Vaščeka, 2009, p. 105).

The inclination to the nativist perception is also confirmed by the fact that most Slovaks see their country ethnocentrically. The statement that ‘Slovakia is a country for the Slovaks and so it should stay’ was agreed by 68% of the respondents. Such a public view undoubtedly reflects the overall set of political elites that implement ethnocentric perceptions either by symbolic steps or by real policies. The authors of the 2012 survey predictably wrote: ‘Ethnocentric perceptions of society can be an insubordination to support right-wing extremism. If extremist movements base their rhetoric on the inequalities of different groups of the population and the limitation of their rights, they may be afraid that in certain circumstances they may find support from the public, especially in a situation where the public’s sensitivity to minority rights is minimal’ (Gallová-Kriglerová & Kadlečíková, 2012, p. 10).

These results show that the attitudes towards migrants at the time of the refugee crisis were built on already existing prejudices and nativist biases. The survey of the Institute for Public Affairs from July 2017 offered a more complex approach to exploring openness vs. closeness. Respondents received nine stimuli with a focus on cultural values and political orientations that reflect the current public debate in Slovakia.

Thus, the overall picture revealed that the Slovak public is more oriented towards the protection or defence of national sovereignty and religion rather than on multicultural openness and support for cultural diversity (Table 1).

What factors explain the diversity of the respondents’ opinions? Statistical analysis has shown that there are three determining components – apart from an affinity towards authoritarianism, it is the factor of cultural closeness and accentuation of national sovereignty as well as the factor of cultural openness and integration. The closeness factor is saturated with three variables, namely ‘protecting Christianity from Islam’, ‘preserving the national sovereignty of the SR in the EU’ and ‘pan-Slavic solidarity, unity of Slavic nations’. The openness consists of two variables – ‘deepening European integration’ and ‘multiculturalism, openness to ethnic minorities, promotion of cultural diversity’. This has been confirmed, like in other democratic societies, also in Slovakia, where the attitudes and opinions on the dimensions of cultural closeness vs. openness represent a clear-cut dividing line.

Cultural closeness and openness vary significantly among the supporters of political parties. SaS adherents are the most distant to closeness, and the closest to openness. The LSNS voters are clear outliers – far from the openness factor and praising of the values which saturate closeness instead (Table 2).

Table 1 To what extent do you feel closeness or rather distance from the following political values, streams or directions? (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Cultural closeness, protection of national sovereignty</th>
<th>Multiculturalism, cultural openness, deeper integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SaS</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most-Hid</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average for SK population</td>
<td><strong>5.08</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.92</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sme Rodina</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLANO</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>3.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smer-SD</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>3.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDH</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>4.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSNS</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The respondents evaluated closeness vs. distance on a 7-point scale, for analytical purposes it was reduced to three points: closeness (1, 2, 3) – centre (4) – distance (5, 6, 7). The complement to 100% is formed by responses ‘neither, nor’ and ‘I do not know’. Source: Bútorová & Gyárňášová (2017).
2.3. Rising social distance from others

A classic way of measuring social distance to the others is the so-called Bogardus cumulative scale, but the most common way is to apply only one level of the scale – whom you would not want to be your neighbour. For Bogardus, social distance is a function of affective distance between the members of two groups, the centre of attention is on the feeling reactions of persons toward other persons and toward groups of people, means social distance is essentially a measure of how much or how little sympathy the members of a group feel toward another group (Bogardus, 1947).

In Slovakia, this methodological tool is quite frequently used in sociological surveys. We had the opportunity to compare the results from 2008 and 2017, which showed several warning shifts – a large proportion of the population moved towards more xenophobic perceptions of different social groups (Table 3). This negative trend affected, to a greater or lesser extent, the attitude of the majority to 13 out of the 15 minorities surveyed. A positive change may be seen only in the case of Ukrainians, blacks and Asians decreased, but not to the immigrants or Muslims, who were the most securitised ‘others’ in the political and media debate.

As the analysis showed, social distance towards the others is spread equally among social groups. The only differentiating factor is education: with growing education, the distance to LGBTI as well as Ukrainians, blacks and Asians decreases, but not to the immigrants or Muslims, who were the most securitised ‘others’ in the political and media debate.

The findings presented point out that Slovakia has long had a distinctive social distance towards national minorities, foreigners and, in general, against any otherness. It is based on prejudices and concerns that often result from a lack of information or personal experience. This potential was reinforced by the recent discourse on immigrants, which lacked a stronger voice in favour of openness and inclusion. It is precisely such attitudes of openness and respect for cultural differences that can be a fertile ground for extremist tendencies.

Table 3 Imagine that the following person(s) belonging to the following groups would move into your neighbourhood. Would you mind them as neighbours? (% of responses ‘yes, I would mind’)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Different minority groups</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extremist*</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma family</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim family</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family of refugees from the less developed country</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gay couple</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesbian couple</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bisexual</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian family</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-American family</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish family</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian family</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term unemployed</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual with mental disability</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian family</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual with physical disability</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3. PUBLIC OPINION ON REFUGEES

On the refugee topic, politicians ‘jumped’ on this wave of majority opinion, while strengthening xenophobic and anti-otherness attitudes. Surveys in early September 2015 signalled that the willingness to accept refugees is low in Slovakia. According to a survey conducted by the agency 2Muse for the Citizens’ Initiative Call for Humanity, only 18% of respondents said that Slovakia would become a new home country for refugees. However, at least some signs of solidarity and humanity could be found – even though two thirds of respondents opposed the introduction of mandatory quotas for redistribution of refugees to European Union countries, each second respondent agreed to help refugees at least in the form of temporary shelter.

Opposing attitudes deepened by the end of 2015 – 70% of people in Slovakia feared the arrival of refugees. The most important reason for the fears of refugees is the expectation that their arrival would increase crime and the danger of attacks by Islamist extremists. Somewhat less common were concerns about their lack of adaptability and the costs associated with their adoption (IS SAS, 2015).

The ISSP survey was conducted in the autumn of 2016 – at times when the urgency of the problem was diminishing, but given the strong sustainability of public opinion, we can see longer-term embeddedness of attitudes and cultural orientations (ISSP Slovakia, 2016).

What are the reasons of fear from migrants? Respondents could select two out of eight which they saw as the most

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9 Emory S. Bogardus (1882–1973) was a prominent American sociologist; he founded one of the first sociology departments at an American university, at the University of Southern California in 1915 and became well-known thanks to his methodological innovations.

10 Available at: https://dennikn.sk/blog/242136/co-si-myslia-ludia-o-utecencoch-vysledky-prieskumu-verejnej-mienky/ (accessed on 23rd April 2018).
limited and the idea of what the emergency case means is rather vague (Table 5).

In summarising Table 6, we document an agreement with four statements which represent different dimensions of refugees’ public perception. About half of the public expressed their fear from being personally affected by the refugees’ arrival; the much general statement – they will take jobs away – has a slightly higher agreement. The reports often used by the politicians – they do not want to come to Slovakia anyway and that help is not necessary because most refugees are economic migrants – are apparently reflected in the public opinion.

Differences according to demographics are minimal; however, we see that the personal worries and feelings of being threatened are more widespread among people with lower education vis-à-vis those with a university degree; also, the age cohort 18–29 years old are less afraid than the older age cohorts, and the same pattern could be observed with urban vs. rural areas of residence. However, similarly to earlier surveys on this issue, we can see the most relevant differences when it comes to political preferences. There are different clusters – in general, personal concerns have a lower representation than a general idea – they will take jobs and do not help – have even higher representation. Thus, in general terms, it is less about the feeling of personal social threat. Most of the formula is significantly different from Most-Híd supporters – the feeling of personal threat is more widespread than the general idea – they take away jobs. In view of help, extreme right-wing supporters differ most – up to 95% of potential voters of the LSNS share the opinion that we should not help refugees (Table 7).

### Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees will increase the crime rate</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A great part of the refugees will not want to adapt to our way of life</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The danger of attacks by Islam extremists will increase</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees and their admission will cost the state too much money</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are too many refugees coming and they will change our society and</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the culture to their image</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many refugees are religiously intolerant</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees could spread dangerous diseases</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many refugees promote the subordinated position of women in the society</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISSP Slovakia (2016).

### Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Definitely agree</th>
<th>Rather agree</th>
<th>Rather disagree</th>
<th>Definitely disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. To what extent do you agree with the statement: Refugees will take</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jobs away from domestic people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Are you personally afraid of the arrival of foreigners in Europe or</td>
<td>Very much afraid</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Do you think that these refugees would like to come also to Slovakia?</td>
<td>They definitely would not want to come</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. During the last period, many refugees have come to Europe. How should</td>
<td>Not to help at all</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeans deal with them?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISSP Slovakia (2016).

### Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement A–D, only positive responses (in %)</th>
<th>55.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Agreement with the statement: Refugees will take jobs away from</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domestic people (definitely/rather agree)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Are you personally afraid of the arrival of foreigners in Europe or</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not? (I am very much/rather afraid)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. They do not want to come to Slovakia (at all/rather)</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. We should not help refugees at all or only in emergency cases (Not</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to help at all/help only in emergency cases)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISSP Slovakia (2016).

### 4. SLOVAKIA IN EU COMPARISONS

The final empirical section looks at the Slovak public in a comparative perspective. We utilise two data sources:

a) Special Eurobarometer focused profoundly on immigration and integration (EC, 2018), conducted on representative samples of population in 28 EU Member States in the autumn of 2017;
b) a survey focused specifically on youth, conducted in 2016 in six EU countries – Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (Kucharczyk et al., Eds., 2017).

As for the Eurobarometer data, we focus on two aspects: (1) estimates of number of migrants in the respective country; (2) feeling un/comfortable having a migrant as a friend/work colleague/neighbor/doctor/family member (including partner)/manager.
What is the share of non-EU born migrants in Slovakia? People usually overestimate the proportion of immigrants in their countries, but Slovaks overestimate it more than anybody else. On the EU28 average, 29% respondents do not know what proportion of their country’s population consists of immigrants (i.e. persons born outside of the EU), 21% suggest it lies between 0% and 6% of the population, 16% say that it lies between 6% and 12%, and similar proportions say it is between 12% and 25% (17%) or above 25% (17%). It is worth noting that, on average, at the EU level the share of immigrants (defined as non-EU born persons) in the population is around 7% but differs largely across the Member States (EC, 2018, pp. 6–7). It means in 19 of the 28 Member States the estimated proportion of the population who are immigrants is at least twice the size of their actual proportion. In some countries, however, the ratio of overestimation is much higher: in Romania, Bulgaria and Poland, the estimated proportion of immigrants is over eight times greater than the actual figure (EC, 2018, p. 7). It shows that the political discourse was successful in persuading the public that the large number of immigrants is reality.

In relation to the second aspect of comparison based on the Eurobarometer data, we can see that over a half of Europeans feel comfortable with immigrants, but again – the numbers fluctuate widely across countries. Over half (57%) of respondents say that they would be comfortable having any type of social relations with immigrants (manager, work colleague, neighbour, doctor, family member (including partner), friend), just over a third (34%) feel uncomfortable with at least one of these types of social relations, 15% feel uncomfortable with only one or two of these relations, while 19% feel uncomfortable with three or more types of social relations. Countries with above-average comfortable public are Spain (83%), Sweden (83%), Ireland (80%), the Netherlands and Portugal (both 79%). At the other end of the scale, Bulgaria (15%) and Hungary (17%) stand out with the lowest proportions of respondents who would feel comfortable with immigrants, with less than one in five giving this answer for at least one of the social relation explored, in Slovakia the number was under the average but not critically – 41% said they would feel comfortable with all social relations (EC, 2018, pp. 10–11), which indicates a more open, more positive attitude than documented by national surveys.

Many more differences are to be found in the opinions of young people from six countries concerning their attitudes towards migration and migrants. Generally, youth from the Visegrad countries are much more sceptical of any benefits immigration might have for their country than their peers from Austria and, even more so, Germany. Only every fourth respondent of all those surveyed believes that immigrants contribute to their country’s economic growth and general prosperity. The German youth, who have the largest experience with immigrants, were the most likely to see the positive effects of immigration (42%). They were followed by the Austrians (32%) and the Poles (26%) who gave a positive response twice as often as the Slovaks (13%) and nearly three times more often than the Hungarians (9%). The above attitudes towards immigration are in line with the general rejection of refugees by the young citizens of the Visegrad countries.

Table 7 Distribution of responses to statements A, B, D in different social environments (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average for Slovak population</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>73.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18–29</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>66.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–39</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–49</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–59</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>76.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational (without graduation)</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school (with graduation)</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting intention*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smer–SD</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SaS</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OĽANO</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNSNS</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>95.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most-Híd</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large town</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small/mid-sized town</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural village</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Note: * = only adherents of those seven political parties which are represented in the national parliament. Source: ISSP Slovakia (2016).
Even when asked if their country should provide safe haven to refugees from areas of military conflict or to victims of political persecution in accordance with internationally agreed rules and standards, only in Germany and Austria did a majority respond in the affirmative (73% and 61%, respectively). The highest resistance was expressed by the Slovaks (73%) and Poles (73%); however, they were all too closely followed by the Hungarians (72%) and Czechs (70%) (Kucharczyk et al., 2017).

The lack of solidarity among young people indicates a worrying lack of responsibility and a selfish, inward looking mentality. Similarly to other findings, these opinions also reflect the overall social atmosphere. Why should we think that our youth would be different than the rest of society?

CONCLUSION

The study presents the findings from several surveys focused on the public perception of migrants and refugees in Slovakia. The key conclusions show that:

(1) Anti-refugee attitudes articulated around the crisis were not something completely new that would not have existed before. Slovak society demonstrated an inclination toward cultural closeness and social distance to the ‘others’ even before; the period after the refugee crisis has not accelerated and strengthened inclination toward cultural closeness and social distance to the ‘others’ even before; the migration debate is not present in the public and political debate, xenophobic prejudices and stereotypes disappear, or at least get weaker on the basis of personal experience with the respective minority.

(2) The political discourse related to the crisis was ‘surfing’ on the wave of the mainstream public opinion and accelerated and strengthened inclination toward xenophobic attitudes;

(3) Anti-immigrant attitudes were more motivated by a general, diffused fear than targeted personalised concerns about their own jobs;

(4) Negative attitudes were widespread across different social environments; however, the deepest differences were according to party preferences;

(5) The securitised political discourse was efficient since the public was convinced that the number of migrants in the country is several times higher than in reality; the crisis was ‘surfing’ on the wave of the mainstream public opinion and accelerated and strengthened inclination toward xenophobic attitudes;

The comparison of youth’s opinions in the Visegrad Four countries on the one hand and Austria and Germany on the other documented that there is a more general Central-European anti-migration pattern – young people in Austria and Germany show higher solidarity and more openness also for the positive aspects of immigration for receiving societies. This would imply the validity of the so-called contact hypothesis, which means that prejudices and stereotypes disappear, or at least get weaker on the basis of personal experience with the respective minority.

The period after the refugee crisis has not brought any major changes so far. Even if the migration debate is not present in the public and political debate, xenophobic attitudes are a sleeping potentiality which can be woken up. The recent debate still goes in the direction of certain social chauvinism stressing that Slovaks are entitled to their own emigration and to social benefits in other EU countries (the debate about the plans of the Austrian government to cut family benefits for workers whose children live abroad), whereas the other coming to their own country are not supported. It is the responsibility of national politicians to explain patiently that being part of the European community is a two-way path.

REFERENCES


8. Enabling Integration through Access to Information: An Overview of Information Services for Migrants in the Danube Region and Beyond

INTRODUCTION

‘Giving vulnerable people the right information at the right time is a form of empowerment. It enables people to make the decisions most appropriate for themselves and their families, and can mean the difference between being a victim or a survivor’, writes Jonathan Walker, the editor of the 2005 World Disasters Report (see Internews, 2013). The process of diversification of migration and its globalisation, coupled with the increasing number of people applying for international protection, has certainly brought about access to information. For this reason, this text first outlines some insight into the barriers that migrants may face when accessing a wide array of services. Not being informed or being misinformed can mean the difference between being informed or being misinformed also negatively impacts their autonomy and causes disempowerment, stress and even psychological trauma. How, when and by whom such crucial information to migrants should be provided are questions that are increasingly being addressed in policy as well as in research endeavours.

For this reason, this text first outlines the importance of access to information from the perspective of fundamental human rights. Next, it presents some insight into the barriers that impede migrants’ access to information. Drawing on research endeavours in media as well as in migration studies, the ambivalent potential of digital technologies in providing migrants with information is presented. Arguing for a nuanced approach to their role, we maintain that these technologies have fundamentally transformed the ways in which migrants both access as well as use information. Then, by drawing on recent refugee movements that have put access to information at the core of policy efforts once more; particularities that refugees face when accessing different types of information, are discussed. The current socio-political trends in providing migrants with information are assessed given the example of the project DRIM – Danube Region Information Platform for Economic Integration of Migrants which particularly focuses on the Danube region as a contextual starting point for studying migration trends and policies. In the concluding section of this text, some cues for a more nuanced study of the topic of migrants’ access to information are provided.

1. ACCESS TO INFORMATION AS A BASIC HUMAN RIGHT

When talking about human rights, the right to information is often not among the first rights that come to one’s mind. But if we understand human rights as ‘those resources and circumstances necessary for living a minimally good life’ (Nickel, 2006), then the right and access to information cannot be omitted: without information, our capacity to ensure for ourselves ‘a minimally good life’ is severely diminished. For this reason, some consider this right even a precondition for ensuring other rights – if one has no knowledge on the scope of human rights regarding health or work, for example, one cannot determine whether his or her rights have been respected (Mathiesen, 2013). Moreover, access to information empowers people to use, protect and benefit from their rights.

In terms of the protection of rights, the utmost importance of safeguarding the right to information was recognised relatively early on. The right to information as an integral part of the right of freedom of expression was enshrined by Resolution 59 by the UN General Assembly in 1946 and further defined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights two years later, in 1948. While these documents put more emphasis on the freedom of speech, many international treaties have since considerably extended the interpretation of this right. The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), held in two phases in 2003 and 2005, highlighted universal access to information as a cornerstone of the inclusive knowledge society. The UNESCO most recently explicitly connected the access to information with people’s empowerment (Maputo Declaration in 2010) and good governance (Dakar Declaration in 2005) (see UNESCO, 2015). In 2015, the UNESCO even proclaimed 28th September as the ‘International Day for the Universal Access to Information’. In justification for such a proclamation, the UNESCO emphasised that ‘access to information is the right to seek, access and receive information from public bodies and private bodies performing a public function and the duty of the State to
provide such information’ (UNESCO, 2015). Moreover, the document paves the way for the creation of an ‘international law’ targeting specifically access to information by citing the ever-growing need of the public for transparency in public affairs (UNESCO, 2015).

Similarly, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) highlighted access to information as a key aspect of promoting public trust in governments at the 2010 Central Asia Media Conference. It also called for governments to adopt new technologies and e-government services in order to facilitate wider access to information (OSCE, 2011). Clearly, the interpretation of Article 19 has in the last 60 years moved towards recognising the role of states and organisations in ensuring people can access and receive information that affect their livelihoods and well-being. One could claim that this right’s correlative duties are moving from a merely negative (e.g. the right to information should not be infringed) to a more positive understanding (e.g. requiring states and others to assist individuals in accessing information). This seems especially pertinent in information societies where the existence of a ‘digital divide’ can exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and exclusions and further limit access to information for selected disadvantaged groups.

1 The digital divide refers to a gap in access, usage and knowledge to utilise information and communication technologies between individuals, households, businesses, and geographical areas at different socio-economic levels (Mattoo et al., 2015).

In the European Union (EU), digital inclusion was established as a strategic policy goal for the EU in 2006 with the Riga Declaration on inclusion. The Declaration specifically mentions migrants among its priorities: promoting cultural diversity by improving the possibilities for economic and social participation and integration, creativity and entrepreneurship of immigrants and minorities by stimulating their participation in the information society (Codagnone & Kluzer, 2011). Following this, a study was commissioned by EU’s DG Information Society and Media on economic and social participation and integration of migrants and ethnic minorities in the EU in 2011. The study suggested that digital inclusion measures and integration measures should primarily aim to contribute to the structural dimensions of migrant integration (employment, education, social interactions and participation). It has also found that migrants have higher or similar levels of ICT use and skills than the general population, and that ICT skills are generally higher among the recently arrived migrants than among the more settled ones. Most importantly, the research found that Internet adoption, after verification of age and education, is positively related to both employability and integration (Codagnone & Kluzer, 2011).

In order for ICT technologies to be productive in the integration of migrants, the role of the state is crucial. The delivery of public services must be organised in a way that harnesses the high levels of ICT taken up among migrants and at the same time checks for groups that may exhibit inequalities in digital access (e.g. older migrants, less educated, unemployed). In this sense, the public sector must respond to the growing diversity of its users and develop an awareness of the different needs for the different groups of residents (Benton et al., 2015).

What are some of the most common barriers migrants face in accessing information and services in the countries of settlement? While research in this area is scarce, the most pervasive aspect is language accessibility. This is particularly true for many newly arrived migrants as well as for some who have been in a country for a while. Language proficiency is a prerequisite for accessing information; without information one does not possess knowledge on duties and/or possibilities of improving his/her status. As shown in an inquiry by the local public authority in the UK (PIT, 2017), limited language proficiency can even prevent users from improving language ability since they are not able to receive information on the existence or eligibility of language courses designed specifically for them as a part of integration measures.

Apart from learning a new language, migrants need to secure a livelihood and sufficient living conditions not only for themselves, but also for their family members. Here, a lack of language proficiency causes major problems regarding fair and equal access to services, especially in the area of housing and health, as well as children’s education. The recommendations by the Migration Policy Institute (Benton et al., 2015) highlighted that providing translation and interpretation services is a critical first step in allowing people with limited language proficiency to access healthcare, employment, education and other services. Despite this, local and national governments seem to have a more reserved approach toward wide-scale interpreting. Implementing translation and interpretation services may be very costly and their organisation can present significant challenges to public authorities. Furthermore, as Benton et al. (2015) observed, ‘many European policymakers fear that providing translations across public services will disadvantage people from learning the host-country language and show preference for migrants’. In 2013, for example, Eric Pickles, then UK Communities Secretary called on local authorities to stop translating documents for migrants and described this measure as too expensive and actually encouraging segregation (Benton et al., 2015).

Moreover, the difficulties in accessing information that are connected to language barriers do not pertain only to the problems associated with limited proficiency. They are heavily exacerbated by the prevailing mode of expression that public authorities and other actors use in official or semi-official documents. The sentence structure, archaic or misleading words, phrases and forms, syntax problems, unclear passive voice, nominalisation and other details have a strong influence on the quality of information. While quality of information has different aspects – including accuracy, completeness, currency and comprehensibility (Fox et al., 1994), the last aspect puts emphasis...
on the format and mode of the written text. Many governments have recognised this problem and the need of public service users – not only from vulnerable groups, but rather from the general public – to comprehend what is written in laws, regulations and documents without intermediaries (e.g. lawyers and law practitioners). Sweden, for example, began implementing policies for ‘plain Swedish’ thirty years ago and today all national laws go through linguistic and law experts checking for unclear meaning or complex wording (Hadryan, 2009). Similarly, the UK government has adopted the ‘plain English approach’ through the central government information portal GOV.UK. According to them, all content on this platform not only needs to follow the rules of ‘plain English’, but also has to take into account the fact that they are writing for anybody who is living in the UK or is coming to the UK for business, leisure, work, study, etc. In their words, ‘there is no excuse for putting unnecessary complicated writing in the way of people’s understanding’ (GOV.UK, 2016). While such approaches demand time, resources and patience, documents that are more accessible and easier to understand increase trust in public services and civic participation.

Another identified barrier is a lack of awareness among public officials about the inequalities that migrants may face when accessing information or services (Benton et al., 2015). This comes in several forms; they may take information for granted and thus disseminate only partial or incomplete information, or they can offer information that is not accurate or up-to-date.

When meeting a person with limited language ability, they may not consider plans for more successful exchange – e.g. a plan for more contact time or arrange for interpretation services in advance. In this regard, the findings of the project IMPACIM point to the problem migrants in the UK face. These concern particularly the delivery of clear and accurate information by service providers, serious delays as well as refusal of services to migrants (IMPACIM, 2013). A report by Violeta Prokofjeva on the delivery of information to migrants in the Czech Republic is also very illuminating. Through participant observation, her research highlighted many barriers, among them also the delivery of fragmented or contradicting information as well as the cases of taking information for granted by naming various institutions by their colloquial names (Prokofjeva, 2008).

Lastly, as already noted, migrants are often not aware of services for implementing their rights or benefiting from their position. Governments often organise various services specifically for migrants, but information on these services does not reach the intended audiences (PIT, 2017). Interestingly, research on the most appropriate channels for reaching these groups is extremely scarce and authorities are compelled to use common sense when and if making promotional activities to reach various groups of migrants.

In short, while migrants need ‘a clear roadmap to guide them between various services which will support their transition in the new environment’ (Kyrieri, 2011), they rather face hurdles and barriers related to language proficiency and the delivery of information that may impede and slow down the process of their integration. At the same time, they alienate the users from public authorities by effectively excluding migrants as partners in their integration.

2. NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR AND WITH MIGRANTS

It has been previously established that the use of ICT technology can positively contribute to the integration and employability of migrants. As part of the previously mentioned research, EU bodies were interested in the spread and use of the ICT among migrants as early as in 2008. Diminescu’s ground-breaking work on the notion of the ‘connected migrant’ in 2008 and Bernal’s study on Eritrean refugees in cyberspace were among the first to embody this research subject (Smets, 2017). A systematic overview of the use of ICT was made in 27 EU countries and has given a clearer picture of the EU’s ICT landscape addressing migrants’ needs (Kluzer et al., 2008). The study found that, at that time, only in four countries of the EU were there no existing ICT tools that targeted migrants: Cyprus, Estonia, Poland and Slovenia. According to the study, there were three broad drivers of these initiatives: 18% of initiatives aimed to address digital access and literacy gaps (Internet access improvement of digital skills), 27% exploited ICT to empower migrants and minorities in terms of their self-representation and communication capacities, intra-community as well as between communities (fostering intercultural competence and dialogue, diaspora media), and 26% used ICT to improve the activities of those individuals supporting migrants through the delivery of various types of information and services (inclusive e-government). The study also found that a majority of the initiatives (50%) were carried out by the public sector, 30% by the private sector and the rest (20%) was supported by EU funds. Public funds were crucial for the creation and sustainability of ICT services for migrants in the EU (Kluzer et al., 2008).

What has changed in the EU in the last ten years in the field of ICT addressing migrants? Today, as Smets (2017) argues, in the EU ‘the study of migration has increasingly become a study of technologies’, having its reflection in the topics of border technologies, mediated migrant activism and the use of technologies for migrant integration. The rise of Wi-Fi and smartphone technology has only made the adoption of ICT even more pertinent for the integration into the new environment. Despite this, our knowledge of the ICT landscape in migrants’ lives has not expanded significantly. Currently, no EU-wide study on the existence of digital support measures for migrants that would allow us to evaluate the improvements in this area through a more longitudinal approach is in progress. Digital support measures are heavily dependent on human resources (ICT specialists, migration specialists, lawyers, mediators, translators, content providers) as well as financial resources (state’s budget or other public funds and/or EU funds). Because of this limitation, the sustainability of these initiatives can be a challenge requiring strong support from decision-makers and politics. On the other hand, many new initiatives appeared using new technologies like...
Among new developments there is also the existence of apps, information portals and websites that are locally oriented and deliver specific news for resident migrants. This reflects a growing role of cities and local level governments in the process of integration on the one hand and the delivery of services on the other. Amid enhanced movements and mobility, regional and local governments are increasingly assuming responsibilities previously administered by national governments as well as adopting a much more pragmatic approach towards migration than national governments (DPADM/UNDESA, 2017).

Moreover, with the spread of networked societies and social network technologies, migrants themselves are stepping up as important providers of digital support initiatives. Numerous Facebook groups, YouTube subscription groups, weblogs etc. have appeared, providing information and support to more targeted audiences or ‘communities of interest’ (Boyd & Ellison, 2008) – co-nationals, asylum seekers, migrant artists etc. Some recent research shows that this more networked approach also has a certain dark side to it. While the information circulating within a network or group does not come from any authority and is thus potentially more democratic, quicker and may offer resistance to the increasingly restrictive migration regimes, these characteristics make it more vulnerable to false information and could give rise to unrealistic aspirations (Dekker & Engbersen, 2014).

Lastly, the fast development in the field of ICT may considerably expand the role of digital support services. Machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) enable the processing of more data and also greatly enhance the interactive character of ICT. Technologies such as chatbots, peer-to-peer technology and machine translations services could potentially offer support tailored to the needs of individual migrants, using fewer public resources than before.²

3. PARTICULARITIES IN ACCESS TO INFORMATION FOR REFUGEES

In the last few years, when refugees moved through a ‘barb-wired corridor’ towards destination Europe on the so-called ‘Balkan route’ and/or settled in the neighbouring countries of the main conflict zones, the issue of forced and mass migrations once again came to the forefront of public and political discussions at both the European and global level (Zavratnik & Cukut Krilić, 2018). In such a state of humanitarian emergency, providing refugees with not only physical necessities, but also proper and reliable information on their rights and entitlements, was recognised as having utmost importance. The Refugee Convention in Article 35 recognises the need for well-structured and timely information about refugees (Gillespie et al., 2018). Different legislative documents address separate items relevant to migrants’ access to information: the Reception Conditions Directive addresses information on reception conditions and on possible special needs; the Asylum Procedure Directive deals with information on procedural steps, legal assistance and services of an interpreter to submit an asylum case to the authorities; the Dublin Regulation defines information on the Dublin system, on transfer rights of minors and procedural steps and the Return Directive provides for information on return decisions including legal remedies and information on rights and obligations when in detention (ENNHRI, 2017). Also, in line with Article 21 of the Reception Conditions Directive, it has been argued by different organisations that information for refugees is to be provided via different channels, such as, for instance, oral information, supporting brochures in easy to read language and on displays/notice boards (ENNHRI, 2017).

It is therefore not a surprise that the refugees’ use of media and communication technologies has recently become a major topic of research, as well as an essential element of policy and aid programmes for refugees (Smets, 2017). This interest has surfaced earlier both in media and migration studies, as we describe in the previous sections of this text, but the focus of earlier research was primarily on migrants and their descendants who have settled in a country, such as for instance, Turks in Germany, North Africans in France, or Mexicans in the US (Smets, 2017). Such an interest is reflected in thematic reports by major international organisations, such as the UNHCR, that recognised the right to such information as a vital element of the everyday lives and integration of refugees. In August 2013, the UNHCR recognised the need for not only emergency response activities, but also for comprehensive and proactive strategies focussing on outreach to out-of-camp refugees as well (Internews, 2013). Nevertheless, the Internews report from 2013 entitled Syrian Refugees and the Information Gap identified a fundamental lack of trust and/or understanding on the part of the refugees about what they were being told, and by whom this information was being conveyed (Internews, 2013). This comes as no surprise, since many refugees come from countries, where mistrust of both the media and state public officials in general prevail. Media oppression, long histories of internet censorship and tracking of IP addresses are the cause of a lack of internet use and particularly a general state of suspicion toward internet use and news.

The fact that many refugees still have family members and friends in their home countries and that many of them are fighters, makes it even more difficult for them to disclose information to national and international organisations, for instance, to the UNHCR, for fear they will endanger not only themselves but also their family members who have been ‘left behind’ (Internews, 2013). In addition, the lack of transparency in legal procedures relating to asylum at the European level and the lack of information on the progress of individual cases deepens the mistrust towards

² Currently, the most eagerly expected service is the app Bureaucrazy made by refugees from Syria living in Germany. The app should support users to navigate among the complex bureaucratic procedures, including pre-filling bureaucratic forms and enabling a multilingual translation interface. See more at: https://www.bureaucrazy.de.
all the institutions involved in refugee reception. It also undermines their faith in the credibility of such information (Internews, 2017). Refugees travelling the dangerous routes across continents have various levels of connectivity as well as access to information and often rely completely on traffickers or smugglers to facilitate their journeys. Cell phones are often taken from them and attempts to access the internet or other means of communication can be met with violent recourse from traffickers and/or smugglers. Furthermore, they often have no other means of accessing critical services and information, while traffickers have extensive coordination of regional information networks that frequently include corrupt officials (Internews, 2017). Such issues in both providing and disclosing information call for strategies designed not only to provide refugees with information about services available to them, but also ‘information about information’ in the form of very simple messages and/or stories (Internews, 2013). On the other hand, as Gillespie et al. (2018) have persuasively demonstrated, due to the repression that for instance Syrian refugees face in their country of origin, they actually replicate particular subversive smartphone practices when planning their journeys. These strategies involve, for example, protecting their digital identities and information about migration routes using closed Facebook groups and encrypted platforms such as WhatsApp. In this way, it could be argued that with every new technology comes a ‘dialectical tension between the possibilities for benefit and harm for refugees’ (Gillespie et al., 2018, p. 9).

Another reason why refugees are reluctant to report to authorities, even in matters of medical emergencies and protection, is that especially for individuals in transit, seeking help for such concerns might slow them down or enter them into the system (Internews, 2017). The survey of Internews among Syrian refugees in Lebanon pointed out the general atmosphere of rumours, half-truths and misinformation that compounds their vulnerability with feelings of confusion and frustration as well. The study has also found a significant reliance on mobile phones for exchanging information, adding to the previous primary source of information, word-of mouth (Internews, 2013). Further indication of the importance of the digital revolution, the UNHCR, in its 2016 report on the importance of internet and mobile connectivity in improving refugee well-being, notes that the digital revolution is transforming the world, however, refugees are being left behind in these developments. According to the 2016 data, almost 65 million forcibly displaced refugees and internally displaced persons are living without reliable internet and mobile connectivity (UNHCR, 2016). Such a state of digital non-connectivity not only impedes them in accessing basic services such as health and education, but also restricts their ability to organise and empower themselves in the path to self-reliance while compounding their psycho-social trauma (UNHCR, 2016; Internews, 2017).

The most comprehensive global assessment of the issue to date (Global UNHCR Staff Connectivity Survey 2015) by the UNHCR (2016) has also pointed to the significantly lower availability of digital technologies for refugees living in rural areas. As many as 20% of refugees in rural areas lived in areas with no connectivity. The study also found that refugees often spend a considerable proportion of their disposable income on staying connected and that connectivity is often prioritised over items such as education, clothing and health care. Cost could therefore be viewed, according to the report, as the main obstacle to refugee connectivity, making not only refugee empowerment, but also humanitarian action more difficult.

The second largest barrier to refugee connectivity was found to be low levels of language (low level of English knowledge) as well as digital literacy. Mobile broadband was found to be cheaper and more widely available than fixed or satellite broadband, although fixed-line broadband can be of great importance for providing targeted services in places like classrooms and community centres. The survey has also pointed to differences in technology use across different refugee sub-groups with women, the elderly and less educated persons being less likely to have access to mobile phones and the internet. This finding indicates the importance of social and cultural norms that dictate both access and non-access to particular types of technology and is in no way limited only to the refugee population. The existence of ‘connectivity managers’ who purchase phones for the whole household and control access to technologies particularly for women was also identified in the survey (UNHCR, 2016; see also International Rescue Committee, 2017). This finding is quite in line with the observation by Smets (2017), who, based on his observations among the Syrian refugees in Turkey, argues that implicit power dynamics related to media use could be observed in being granted particular status in the refugee community based on the ownership of particular devices, such as laptops and smartphones. Smets also notes a particular gender dimension to these power dynamics, as control over ownership and use was mostly performed by men. In the words of Gillespie et al. (2018, p. 2), ‘digital infrastructures are implicated in complex operations of power, control and inequality’. However, such digital infrastructures are not only ‘ubiquitous, but also embedded in entangled with a range of other structures (financial, legal, military), systems (policing and border controls), and socio-technical arrangements’ (Gillespie et al., 2018, p. 5).

A major research project named Mapping Refugee Media Journeys: Smartphones and Social Networks has in this regard examined the extent of information precarity, referring to a state in which ‘access to news as well as personal information is insecure, unstable and unpredictable’ (Wall et al., 2015, p. 242). The project has forcibly demonstrated that the use of smartphones by refugees on their journeys to Europe was characterised by a dire lack of relevant, reliable and timely news and information (see also Gillespie et al., 2018). As Wall et al. (2015) also noted in their study of Syrian refugees in Jordan, such a condition of instability in accessing information, leaves them more vulnerable to misinformation, stereotyping and rumours.

In 2017, the International Rescue Committee reviewed the use of Service.info
Affected Populations in Urban Areas

A pilot project in Lebanon conceived in 2014 to address a gap in information provision and the issue of coordination and responsiveness among different service providers and the subsequent Refugee.info (a follow-up of the Service. info platform, developed in 2015, aimed to meet the need for reliable information and internet connectivity at a wider level, based on the location in which the refugee is located) platforms in its report Using ICT to Facilitate Access to Information and Accountability to Affected Populations in Urban Areas (International Rescue Committee, 2017). In the report, it is noted that traditional approaches to aid assistance are often not well-equipped for urban contexts. Namely, in urban areas, crisis affected populations are usually widely distributed across diverse communities with high population density. The key lesson learned in the transition from the Service.info to the Refugees.info platform was that for information to be relevant, it also needed to be updated, timely and adaptable for changing contexts. Such a real-time information exchange was facilitated also by relying on social media (International Rescue Committee, 2017).

In the United States as well as in Europe, a heated political debate has also recently ignited over the issue of ownership of cell phones by refugees. Migrants, who used the latest achievements of modern technologies and were perceived as having substantial economic means, were generally not perceived as refugees, since they did not fit the gendered stereotype of refugees as passive, helpless, and economically deprived individuals, a stereotype generally conflated into a single category—women and children (Zavratnik & Cukut Krilić, 2016). In such discussions, it was argued that access to a phone indicates financial means that are largely at odds with a refugee status. In opposition to such a perception, digital rights activists argued that access to information, and thus the cell phone enabling such access, is a basic human right (de Merode, 2016).

4. PROJECT DRIM: PROVIDING INFORMATION SERVICES FOR MIGRANTS ACROSS THE DANUBE REGION

The DRIM project—the long title goes Danube Region Information Platform for Economic Integration of Migrants3—has the main goal of providing individuals who are considering moving or are already residing in one of the involved countries with a transnational informational web platform on various aspects of life in the new countries (arrival and stay, education, work, health, everyday life and learning local language) (Figure 1). This platform encompasses eight countries (Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia, Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Germany and Serbia) and is available in the national language, English, plus the three languages most relevant for particular countries. Such a choice of languages was designed to better adapt to the needs of individuals across different national socio-political contexts.

The idea for this project stemmed from the project Info Point for Foreigners, which was implemented between 2010 and 2015 by the Employment Service of Slovenia and financed by the European Social Fund (ESF). In light of the ongoing economic crisis at the time, and the frequent violations of rights and infringements of work legislation, the main objective of this project was to promote the employability, education and social inclusion of migrant workers and their families. This was to be achieved through an easy to understand format of information, provided, if possible, in the mother tongue of migrants or a language they understand. In this respect, a project’s good practice was to employ migrants for the provision of information in the mother tongues of end users. Besides visits by migrants to Info Point’s website, its employees also made frequent visits to companies where migrants were working or to dormitories where they were accommodated (Modrijan & Bofulin, 2017). In this respect, Info Point was able to provide its users not only with interaction in a language they could understand, but also with flexibility in reaching out to migrants as the main target group.

Info Point for Foreigners was precedence, since it was the first comprehensive information service for migrants in Slovenia. It offered multilingual support to a wide variety of migrant profiles. Throughout the duration of the project, the total number of recorded Info Point contacts with users reached 121,406, which included 8,860 visits by users to its stationary location. Through its varied activities and a user-centred approach, Info Point for Foreigners provided a benchmark in migrant integration measures in Slovenia (Modrijan & Bofulin, 2017).

In 2013, cooperation with the Slovenian Migration Institute at the Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts led to the creation of Smerokaz (Signpost), a print catalogue of educational programmes and measures and other services intended for migrants and their family members in order to facilitate their integration into the labour market in Slovenia (Figure 2). After Info Point for Foreigners ceased to operate in 2015, the idea for the creation of a transnational information platform addressing various aspects of information necessary for migrants in ‘new societies’ emerged.

In accordance with the European Strategy for the Danube region, of which a small part is also devoted to the demographic problems in the Danube region (under the 9th priority area which is defined as investment in people and skills), the DRiM project was thus developed under the call for projects of the Danube Transnational Programme. The project is focused particularly on improving cross-sector policy coordination to address demographic and migratory challenges in the region by improving migrants’ access to information.

Since the 1950s, the region has been characterised by several historical turning points that affected countries within the region to different extents. The region was affected by wars, post-war transformations, the construction and breakdown of socialist regimes and its multinational economic spaces, the dissolution of federations and changes in political regimes from state socialism to capitalism. Recently, the countries also experienced accession or pre-accession arrangements to the greater economic and political sphere of the European Union. The changes in the political economies influenced the socio-demographic development in most of the countries of the region (especially Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania) by creating more possibilities for the free movement of the population, which subsequently altered the number and direction of migration flows (Fassmann et al. 2014; 2018).

In the region, increasing international movements have been occurring since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the growing globalisation of economic activity. In addition to these trends, demographic and economic imbalances within the region have tended to encourage the movements of workers from economies where they are in surplus to those where they are most in need. These demographic and migratory trends indicate very different patterns and pictures for different countries, therefore, the area can be described both as heterogeneous as well as interdependent (Melegh, 2012; Fassmann et al., 2014; Savić & Dakić, 2016). In this respect, the recent events related to refugees arriving in new destination countries, for instance, Croatia and Serbia, were no historical novelty within the region, which has faced mutually interconnected migration flows for a long time (e.g. refugee flows during the wars of the former Yugoslavia, the guest worker regimes of Austria and Germany, internal migration within the former Yugoslav republics, etc.).
These historical legacies also affect current demographic, economic and political trends in countries of the Danube region. In addition, the region is one of the most linguistically, ethnically, religiously and culturally diverse areas in Europe. While some countries in the region have experienced high out-migration (e.g. Serbia, Croatia), others have been considered traditional immigration countries (Austria and Germany), while others are transitioning from emigration to immigration countries as well (e.g. Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic) (Melegh, 2012; Fassmann et al., 2014; Savić & Đakić, 2016). In these countries, the number of international migrants has increased in the last decade and furthermore, they are experiencing an increasing diversification of migration.

To a certain extent, it seems that information services available to migrants generally reflect these migration-related trends. Germany, for example, after the unfavourable experiences with the guest worker regimes in which access to information and integration efforts were not among the priorities of migration policies, provides information in numerous apps and informational platforms, and does this in several languages. In the so-called new immigration countries, such as Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, there is generally less information available and this information is provided in fewer languages. Another issue is the sporadic appearance and the outdated nature of information that is available to the end users.

It seems that the events surrounding the latest so-called refugee crisis in the European Union posed the question of the need for information in a completely new manner also in countries that did not have such significant experience with international immigration before. In the experience within DRIM, such was the case of Serbia and Croatia. In these countries, although they received thousands of refugees during the wars in the former Yugoslav republics, the new arrivals during the latest so-called refugee crisis posed new questions for the migration policy agenda/stakeholders. During these events, it was demonstrated that generally a poor understanding of the legal processes ahead of them as well as various misconceptions about legal, asylum and other arrangements in countries they were trying to enter, significantly hampered the refugees’ access to a fair, just and timely asylum procedure, including their possibilities for integration in new countries.

CONCLUSION

Migrants have complex information needs about their ever-changing situation, which require a dynamic response with engagement from all implicated stakeholders (Internews, 2017). The provision of information is not a one-size-fits-all service; this is why there needs to be significant effort made to establish a coordination mechanism for communication and engagement, set up feedback loops, and integrate the ever-changing information needs of migrants into design of such information provision (Internews, 2017). In this respect, we deem it of utmost importance to conduct extensive and in-depth research into the issue of how migrants actually access information they need. Based on our review of the available research evidence, the question of when, in which form and for which migrants, certain information is valuable and usable, is significantly underexplored.

Also, given the unprecedented development of digital technologies that aid migrants in both accessing and using information, it is vital to link the fields of migration studies and studies of digital technologies backed by long-term ethnographic/anthropological approach to the issue. Mixed and mobile methods, such as content and discourse analysis, multi-sided interviews with refugees and policy document analysis are among the possible methods in assessing digital provisions for refugees (Gillespie et al., 2018). In this context, Witteborn (in Smets, 2017, p. 4) argues for an ‘ethnography of the locally meaningful communication practices, stemming from the perspective of (forced [parenthesis added by the authors]) migrants’.

In this sense, we could avoid the technological determinism that prevails at the EU policy level and would be better equipped to expose the ambivalent and contradictory ways (Gillespie et al., 2018, p. 9) in which technologies are used by migrants. The focus on creating viable business models, pragmatic strategic solutions that achieve social and economic impact, and the sustainability of primarily technological solutions within these models, largely overlooks the complex question of how diverse individuals both access and use information. The current institutional and policy fragmentation of different services and means of information available to migrants further hampers these endeavours. In this respect, multi-faceted partnerships with the technology and communication sectors ensuring that refugees and migrants benefit from the digital revolution (UNHCR, 2016) are necessary, however, they are clearly insufficient in addressing complex individual information needs.

Additionally, the establishment of a unique platform for the provision of information regarding legal procedures, services, and other relevant information for migrants, covering issues including, but not limited to, legal procedures and access to services, seems of utmost importance. Such a platform would be designed by working with all relevant stakeholders in order to maintain an up-to-date resource for both migrants and those who work on migration issues. However, the difficulties of building up a transnational platform should be further explored both analytically as well as empirically. Based on our review of the available research evidence, the platform would only be used if groundwork is done to gain trust from migrant communities. For example, audio and video content are necessary to address the information needs of migrants who cannot read, or for whom there is no information available in their dialect/language (Internews, 2017). To do this, hiring migrants from different countries of origin to participate in the operation of the platform would appear to be a sensible idea.

Next, a regional approach to information coordination should be adopted that prioritises two-way communication, where migrant communities receive timely, coherent and useful information via preferred communication channels and are also able to provide feedback or complaints (Internews, 2013). Also, the potential of the media should not be neglected: as much
as the mass media have tended to exacerbate anti-immigrant sentiment, the potential also exists for local media initiatives to facilitate meaningful engagement between migrants and the host community, deconstruct and debunk common myths about the so-called refugee/migration crisis and contribute to integration efforts. This is particularly important since there is an almost complete lack of broadcast content designed to offer migrants/refugees local, practical, accurate, up-to-date information in their own languages about their rights and entitlements, changes in policies, eligibility criteria and available services (Internews, 2017).

Also, there are asymmetries in the access to labour market and other information that migrants need depending on the skills level of the migrants willing to move to another country (IOM, 2013). Highly skilled migration candidates have more personal resources than their less-skilled counterparts – notably in terms of language knowledge, IT literacy and general education – and social and professional networks that they can use to get information on the immigration procedures as well as for getting in contact with employers abroad (IOM, 2013). The quality of information is especially important for asylum seekers/refugees when there is a need for a comprehensive and fair assessment. In particular, persons seeking international protection need precise information regarding their situation. The only way that a person can exercise their rights is if the information on these rights is provided clearly, timely and accurately (ENNHR, 2017). Given the overview of policy and research studies conducted in this area, there is still quite a long way ahead in achieving this goal.

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INTRODUCTION

Urban centres in Europe are characterised by immigration, and the social integration of migrants from different countries is a continuous challenge. However, the wave of refugees since 2015 has led to new challenges. The newly-arrived group of migrants has different and diverse backgrounds compared to earlier migrants.

Taking the City of Munich as an example, this contribution explains the challenges local authorities face in ‘getting the right information to the right person at the right time via the right medium’. To begin with, a study of self-employed migrants (44 qualitative interviews) assesses their need for information brokers on the one hand, while fulfilling a sovereign mission which requires legally binding information on the other hand.

Immigration is common in Europe’s urban centres, and the social integration of migrants from different countries is a continuous challenge. However, the wave of refugees since 2015 has led to new challenges: new arrivals come from different and far more diverse backgrounds than earlier migrants.

European major cities can be described as diverse and distinctive. And this is how they will stay, since they attract and welcome newcomers and potential new residents from all over the world. European cities are the venues of integration, growth and job creation. Many third-country residents and beneficiaries of international protection choose to live, study, work and set up business here. A recent study of major European cities showed that cities contribute to the effective integration of migrants and refugees in the labour market mostly by assuming direct or shared responsibility, or by providing complementary services. They often adopt a cross-sectoral approach to the integration and inclusion of refugees and asylum seekers. Another key finding is that they address integration in the labour market through both horizontal and vertical forms of coordination. This approach complements wider coordination and dialogue among public authorities, social partners and civil society organisations. Cities are also in the front line of identifying the main barriers to implementing integration policy measures – barriers such as a lack of (the right) information, lack of education or professional experience, legal status or/and local knowledge of local or national labour systems. It is here, in the cities, that local policy approaches first shifted from ‘integrate first, work later’ to ‘integration through work’.

Other studies conducted in Europe indicate that immigration is associated with a positive contribution to public finances and welfare in the host Member States, depending on the migrant’s level of skills and the duration of their integration in the labour market (although benefits ensue for all highly skilled and low-skilled people in the host society) (Eurostat, 2018). Where integration is successful, this maximises the opportunities created by migrants. At the same time, the data show another side of migration: a growing socioeconomic gap between people with a migration background and the general community (Grubanov-Boskovic et al., 2017).

Several conclusions can be drawn from the above insights. The active involvement of people with a migration background in the labour market seems to be hindered by interconnected factors (European Commission, 2018, p. 8) such as:

- limited knowledge of the host-country language;
- obstacles to the official recognition of skills and qualifications;
- uncertainty about legal status and other institutional barriers;
- all kinds of discrimination, including that on the housing market;
- lack of access to quality education, leading to poor educational outcomes that are exacerbated by issues such as school segregation.

Different mindsets often bring challenges in understanding the kind of process-oriented information that is often demanded by complex administrative procedures. Even the broadest and most extensive information is still useless if the recipient’s powers of comprehension have no frame of reference for the knowledge transmitted. Finally, people with a migration background cannot be addressed as a homogenous group. Their broad diversity creates individual needs, including those of children and women, which demands individualised solutions. The active participation of people with a migration background is a good way to ensure equal involvement in design, actions and projects.

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1 The term ‘people with migrant background’ refers to: third-country nationals, applicants for and beneficiaries of international protection, stateless people, people with undetermined nationality and EU citizens with a migration background. Mobile EU citizens are not included.

2 The report is based on the findings of a survey of Eurocities (2017, pp. 4–5).

3 European Commission (2016).

4 FRA (2017); OECD (2010).
1. MIGRATION: MUNICH HAS A LOT TO OFFER... AND TO GAIN

Munich is a city that has been growing continually for many years. This population growth is being driven above all by the arrival of people from abroad. Today, 44% of Munich residents have a migration background, while 29% are foreign nationals representing 180 countries (Figure 1).

The Bavarian capital is thus one of the cities whose populations have the highest proportion of foreign nationals in Germany. Inward migration is the lifeblood of this city, allowing it to develop its own uniquely positive dynamism. The resultant cultural and economic diversity is indeed perceived as a positive business factor, and the entrepreneurial endeavours of people of foreign descent play an important role in the local economy.

Beyond the purely economic benefits which migrants and their businesses contribute to flourishing urban development, migrants also constitute a powerful factor of integration in an urban society characterised by solidarity and openness.

Figure 2 indicates that the German regions with the highest concentration of foreign workers are also the ones with job vacancies and a shortage of qualified staff (Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, Bavaria) (OECD, 2017, p. 38).

Since September 2015, the number of refugees arriving in Munich – mostly from countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Eritrea – has risen hugely. In March 2016, 11,000 refugees of a total of 69 different nationalities were housed in accommodation in Munich. At present, 74% of all refugees arriving in Munich come from Afghanistan, Syria, Nigeria, Iraq and Pakistan.

As of 31st December 2016, the proportion of foreigners in Berlin was 16.7% (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2018, p. 6).

Landeshauptstadt München (2016, p. 3).
2. INFORMATION FOR MIGRANTS IN MUNICH: THE MORE, THE BETTER?

Munich is a cosmopolitan city that keeps a wealth of information, advice and support services available to its visitors and new residents. The aim is to help these people to quickly feel at home in the city. The offerings of local government flank a very broad spectrum of volunteer and social welfare institutions, as well as individual locals with a commitment to serve.

The local government website points visitors to the most important authorities and volunteer organisations across a variety of departments in Munich (the Intercultural Team, the Migration Advisory Council, the Educational Advice Centre, etc.). Information is also supplied about cultural facilities, individual projects and external organisations and associations (see http://www.muenchen.de/themen/migration.html). This condensed summary does not cover all the offerings available in and around the city. In principle, no website can be expected to keep up with the dynamic development of support services. What is conspicuous, however, is that even this wide array of information is available only in the German language.

Although so much information and so many offers of support are presented, both the local administration and its non-profit partners (welfare associations, volunteer organisations, chambers, etc.) repeatedly find that new arrivals from abroad in particular are seldom aware of, or make use of, these resources. If they do hear about them, that usually happens too late. Another factor is that, on account of experience in their home countries, many migrants simply do not expect such support services to be provided. Most individuals source their information within their own ethnic communities and in their circle of close acquaintances, which in some cases leads to incorrect information being passed on (Schütt, 2015).

Discussions with experts show that support and integration services in Munich, provided by the local government, are scarcely known even among refugees. It is a fact that, since the summer of 2015, the composition of the refugees arriving here has changed in terms of their countries of origin. Prior to this period, most new arrivals came from European countries. Now, many people come to Munich from non-European regions. They make up a very heterogeneous group in terms of residence status, level of education and vocational training, and language skills. That clearly sets them apart from refugees welcomed in years past. Many of today’s new arrivals are partly illiterate or functionally illiterate persons with little or no knowledge of the Latin script system and with primary schooling at best.

With a view to integration in the Munich labour market, there is a considerable need to improve candidates’ qualifications. It is equally clear that the information material used hitherto is not always useful to the new target groups, either in terms of the languages used or in terms of the content provided. Yet not even the supervisors of the shared accommodation are fully aware of everything that is available to refugees from Munich’s local government and its partners. That is partly because many aspects have been in state of constant flux since 2015. Alongside existing offerings, training and education tools and measures specially tailored to the needs of refugees have been and still are being adapted or developed from scratch. Language courses are being ramped up to cope with more people, quality levels are being adjusted and new premises are being added.

At many links in this chain, the need to make support and information offerings better known to migrants in Munich is readily apparent. There are also many indications that the communication channels used to deliver information up to (mostly written language with little visualisation) need to be improved.

3. ‘OLD’ AND NEW CHALLENGES – REAL-LIFE EXAMPLES

This section takes two real-life examples of ‘old’ and new challenges to provision of relevant information to migrants – new because of the influx of refugees since 2015 – and suggests possible solutions. The first example outlines a study of migrant-run companies in Munich.7 For the purposes of this contribution, our discussion of the many and varied findings focuses on the information needs of the target group.

7 The findings summarised here are based on a survey of migrant-run companies commissioned by the City of Munich’s Department of Labor and Economic Development (Schütt, 2015).

3.1. The variety of migrant-run companies in Munich

Migrant-run companies are a key focus of political strategies and measures, for a number of reasons. Entrepreneurs with a migration background cover a broad spectrum of business activities that enrich the economy and exert a powerful influence on the dynamism and internationality of Munich’s business community. Migrant-run businesses also widen the range of goods and services on offer and encourage competition on the local and regional markets.

Self-employment is one possible form of gainful employment for people of foreign descent in cases where they find it difficult to become integrated in the primary labour market. At the same time, migrant-run companies act as a kind of ‘hidden reserve’ of vocational training positions for young people, many of whom themselves have a migration background.

The entrepreneurial spectrum covered by migrants in Munich is kaleidoscopic in its rich diversity. However, the numbers alone give only a vague idea of the employment and training potential harboured by the companies they run.

Cultural diversity is an omnipresent feature of the Bavarian capital. It is reflected in international restaurants and food stores, in the foreign-sounding names of general practitioners, lawyers, insurance agents, master craftsmen and so on. Statistical records of business registrations8 do not document the whole
spectrum, however, as they merely distinguish between Germans and non-German nationals. Nor does the number of registrations and de-registrations say anything about the ranks of self-employed migrants. Another consideration is that freelance activities in the liberal professions (doctors, architects and legal professionals, for example) are excluded from these statistics. Given these restrictions, the following data on the development of self-employment among foreign nationals reflect only part of the business spectrum serviced by migrants living in Munich.

A total of 16,937 new businesses were registered in Munich in 2016 (in 2013 = 20,179). Of these, 10,201 (60%) were registered by German nationals and 6,736 (40%) by foreign nationals. The overall trend in new business registrations has been in decline in recent years – Figure 3. This trend is attributable primarily to a shrinking number of registrations among foreign nationals, for two main reasons:

- The labour market offers more and more salaried employment opportunities in Munich;
- Self-employment of foreigners mainly from Romania and Bulgaria has declined significantly. This is associated with the complete freedom of movement for workers from those countries within the EU.

![Figure 3](image.png)

**Figure 3** New business registrations in Munich during the period 2013–2016

Source: Landeshauptstadt München (2017b).

### 3.1.1. Study design and implementation

An exploratory, qualitative study was conducted (Kromrey, 2000, p. 67). Cases were selected so as not to produce a statistically representative sample, but to identify as broad as possible a spectrum of migrant-run companies based on the following parameters: industries, countries of origin, level of qualifications, age and gender. A total of 44 migrant-run entrepreneurs from all parts of Munich were surveyed in the course of the study.

The resultant balanced sample covers countries of origin with cultural differences. In particular, those nationalities that account for the largest number of new business start-ups (Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Turkey) are well represented. The comparatively high level of education and qualifications is typical of the educational status of migrants who have recently entered Germany, who account for 95% of the sample. The pronounced presence of sole proprietors and micro-enterprises is also typical of migrant-run company structures. The spectrum ranges from ‘traditional’ food stores and snack bars to ethnic specialists, skilled craft firms and even a social media PR agency.

The tool used to gather relevant data was a guided, problem-centric interview (Witzel, 2000). This interview method is especially suitable because, on the one hand, dimensions and categories familiar from relevant literature can be incorporated in the guidance. On the other hand, open questions and the flexibility of the tools leave sufficient freedom to gather data on connections and correlations that are new or hitherto comparatively unresearched. The study addressed aspects of the social background of the entrepreneurs and their biographical experience, since these factors are of tremendous importance to educational development of the specific structures of thought, perception and action in each case. The key dimensions of the guided interview were information about the company itself, the industry, the markets it serves, the given business model, the reasons for starting the business, challenges and obstacles faced by the company, knowledge about and use of support offerings and networks, the willingness to take on trainees, and other forward-looking perspectives. At the same time, important socio-demographic data were collated in a set of standardised questions. Based on the interviews conducted, individual cases were analysed on the basis of qualitative content analysis according to Mayring (2000) and linked to empirically-based typification (Kelle & Kluge, 1999).

For contrastivity of cases with the aim of ‘theoretical saturation’, see Strübing (2008, p. 33); Schütt (2016, p. 116); Breuer (2009, pp. 57–58).
3.1.2. Findings of the study

This section outlines the key findings of the study. It begins with a very brief description of typology developed for migrant-run companies. Structural, cultural and individual factors of influence are then outlined, thus complementing the typology and are of importance to the self-employment of migrants. Lastly, we discuss the findings in light of the question: What information is important for which groups, and how can existing offerings be improved?

Types of migrant-run companies

Typical motivations, key contextual conditions and actual lines of business were used to classify migrant-run companies. Special attention was also paid to how significant (if at all) the entrepreneur’s migration background was to the start-up process. This approach allowed two groups of companies to be identified (see Figure 4).

a) For one group, self-employment was primarily a form of gainful economic activity, a way to make a living. There are few restrictions on the business lines represented in this group, even though, in practice, they often relate to the entrepreneur’s past career experience (‘self-employment as a way to make a living’).

The following classifications were assigned to this group (Figure 4, left side):

- ‘Pioneering start-ups’ that tap completely new lines of business;
- ‘Bridge start-ups’, whose business models seek to provide offerings especially tailored to certain ethnic groups or members of a given cultural group;
- ‘Jink start-ups’, which are an option chosen by individuals to avoid either unemployment or unfavourable working conditions. A subset of this classification is formed by what is known as ‘anchor start-ups’, which are new businesses launched by people for whom self-employment is the only viable way to enter the German labour market.

b) In the second group, self-employment is the outcome of the entrepreneur’s consideration of how exactly he or she wants to work and in what line of business. For this group of individuals, the freedom to independently determine how you work and what you do is of central importance to the decision to go self-employed (‘self-employment as a form of self-determination’). This group could be broken down into the following subsets (Figure 4, right side):

- ‘Vision-realising start-ups’, which are guided entirely by intrinsic motivations;
- ‘Opportunity-driven start-ups’: Some of this group of individuals needed an exogenous stimulus before they finally took the plunge and realised their dream of self-employment.

The findings of the study make it clear that we cannot speak of migrant entrepreneurs as a single, homogeneous group or entity. Munich-based companies led by self-employed persons with a migration background naturally include ‘traditional’ migrant-run businesses in snack catering, food retail and the provision of basic services, for example. There are also self-employed individuals who seek to get by in Munich as day labourers. Yet the bigger picture of migrant entrepreneurs is much more varied and nuanced than the one that is commonly perceived. While some tradespeople tailor their offerings specifically to certain ethnic groups (e.g. retailers and providers of personal and consulting services), a large proportion of migrant entrepreneurs do not focus on any particular ethnic group. The majority of self-employed migrants are well to very well educated, with nearly two thirds of them possessing certificates of higher education.

Structural, cultural and individual factors of influence

What important factors of influence do migrant entrepreneurs typically have to deal with? This section discusses selected challenges that cannot be assigned to individual types of start-ups, but were frequently mentioned in all relevant contexts.

Structural challenges exist on two levels: One is the challenge of understanding various systems (e.g. the legal, educational and insurance systems), how they work and how tasks and assignments are split between public institutions and authorities.

On the other hand, loans and subsidies are seldom used as funding options, and little is known about consulting and advisory services, since most migrant entrepreneurs are simply unaware of them. On all these levels, it would seem sensible, when designing additional support services for new migrants, to pay
more attention to the way different countries of origin shape individuals’ cultural understanding and their attitude toward public institutions.

Alongside the challenges relating to migrant entrepreneurs’ dealings with institutions and their efforts to understand and apply rules and regulations, a series of demands are also placed on their individual skills and abilities. These factors are critical to the success of start-up projects as well. The central and most important skill is seen by most respondent companies to be a good to very good command of German. The transnational skills of migrant entrepreneurs constitute a more-or-less consciously used resource. Especially in pioneering and bridge start-ups, it is apparent that transnational skills account for a substantial part of the overall business model (for consultants, insurance and financial service providers, lawyers and personal service providers). The survey also clearly showed that some entrepreneurs lack vital qualifications, especially with regard to important strategic and administrative management tasks. Self-employment is more than just working independently and earning your living in a certain way: As a rule, running your own company also involves working long hours, accepting that the line between working life and private life becomes blurred, and experiencing fewer opportunities to find relaxation and regeneration.

**Analysis of the study findings – Shaping openness and diversity**

The study provides an insight into the structures given to migrants’ business activities in Munich. Most self-employed migrants are highly qualified, create jobs and make a significant contribution to employment in Munich. Looking inside the migrant-run company ‘black box’ reveals a varied picture that has little to do with common stereotypes. One point was highlighted very emphatically: There is no such thing as a ‘standard’ migrant-run company. Entrepreneurs with a migration background possess a variety of qualifications and can draw on a variety of resources. Based on selected key findings of the study, the following section focuses on the topic of who needs what information at what time.

a) **Tapping vocational training potential:**

Lack of information about the German dual training system.

Migrant-run companies are certainly willing to provide young people with vocational instruction. However, analysis of the interviews conducted shows that the majority of respondents generally equate ‘vocational training’ with ‘internships’. Although the German vocational education system has been lauded as a recipe for success to avoid youth unemployment, especially in the context of the recent economic crisis, few of the respondent entrepreneurs seem to be familiar with what this system entails and how it works. To encourage more migrant-run entrepreneurs to offer vocational training opportunities, formal barriers such as certificates of qualification to provide training are not the only obstacles that must be overcome. There is clearly a more fundamental need to cultivate a better understanding of the dual (sandwich course) training system, which involves both on-the-job practical aspects and theoretical tuition at vocational schools, and to inform and explain the contractual and legal structure of this form of education.

b) **Adapting information strategies for existing services.**

The Point of Single Contact (PSC) made available to entrepreneurs by the City of Munich provides a great deal of useful guidance and orientation to those companies that come for advice. However, few of the respondent entrepreneurs knew about the Point of Single Contact service – or had not known about it at the time when they would have needed it. Since entrepreneurs who have only recently arrived in Germany often do not assume that any such services and assistance will even be available, the existing information strategy should be adapted. To enable the target group to make better use of these offerings, additional multipliers from the local administration and the various communities – be they associations or consulates – could be actively involved. Existing offerings and network structures should also be examined to see where intercultural barriers may still exist.

c) **Lowering barriers to the communication of key systemic knowledge.**

As a general rule, it would be useful for new arrivals from other countries to receive an easy-to-understand visualisation of the relevant systems and the logic behind them (including graphical elements), and to make this information available both in the form of a brochure and online.

d) **Distinguishing between the provision of basic knowledge and specific expertise.**

Although entrepreneurs with a migration background constitute a very heterogeneous group, two widespread tendencies can nevertheless be identified with regard to the support and service offerings they need:

- **Expert knowledge:** One group tends to have a more ad-hoc need for industry-specific or management-specific expertise. These entrepreneurs tend to need help gaining access to industry-specific networks, relevant specialists or interbranch organisations etc. The municipality is needed as a navigator to find the right people or the right communities;
- **Basic knowledge:** Another group finds itself still at ‘square one’ in a variety of areas. Many of these individuals lack an adequate command of German and are initially preoccupied with questions about the various systems and business requirements. This group would benefit from services that provide basic knowledge in an intensive form. Here, an information pack is required in a variety of languages which gives graphical support to explain ‘systems’ and ‘how things work’ (legal, social security, unemployment insurance, health insurance, education etc.).

The findings of the study make it clear that migrant-run companies and entrepreneurs with a migration background have to deal with all the ‘normal’ difficulties that all entrepreneurs face, but that they are also confronted with a series of specific challenges. The City of Munich’s decision to make its support and advisory services more sensitive to intercultural needs and more accessible to residents with a migration background is manifestly the right one, and a very important one.
Solution approaches

a) Munich Business Startup Office (MEB)
In light of the insights gained from this and other studies, the management objectives for the Munich Business Startup Office (Münchner Existenzgründerbüro – MEB) have now been expanded with a view to the target group comprising migrant entrepreneurs:
- To raise awareness of the MEB among female migrants, this group should be addressed specifically via multipliers;
- The advice provided must be aligned with the needs of migrants. To this end, the consultants are being given intercultural training and are learning about the specific needs of self-employed women. They are also acquiring knowledge of German laws governing aliens.

To measure the success of these steps, two new performance indicators have been added to the existing ones:
- More migrants are making use of advice and information events;
- Migrants are very satisfied with the advice and information events.

The evaluation results are listed in Table 1.12

Table 1 Use of the offerings of the Munich Business Startup Office (MEB) in 2015–2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Target value in %</th>
<th>2015 in %</th>
<th>2016 in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of migrants taking advice (overall)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of migrants attending information events</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Satisfaction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of migrants who took advice (overall; grade 1 or 2)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of migrants attending information events (overall; grade 1 or 2)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Landeshauptstadt München (2017b).

More migrants took advantage of the MEB’s offers of advice in the wake of the above steps (+7%). The proportion of migrants who attended information events also increased (+5%). Above all, the proportion of women with a migration background rose sharply (in 2015 – 42%; in 2016 – 58%).

The respondents claimed to be very satisfied with the offerings of the MEB. In particular, the satisfaction ratings given by migrants with regard to the information events were significantly better (rising from 75 to 97% overall, and from 68 to 98% for women). This finding indicates that continually adjusting both the structure and the content of information events based on customer feedback is an extremely useful practice.

b) ‘From practitioners for practitioners’
The existing series of free training courses entitled ‘From practitioners for practitioners’ supplies entrepreneurs with a migration background with valuable knowledge. The instructors are all practitioners in the fields in which they teach. The offerings have been given a clearer focus on teaching basic knowledge (basic tax issues, costing, language courses) and specific expertise (such as public procurement procedures in German and the EU, health management etc.).13

c) Information
The Department of Labor and Economic Development has developed a brochure containing wide-ranging information about working and living in Munich (Landeshauptstadt München, 2017a). Migrants from Southeast Europe are its initial target group. The first edition is in German, and other languages will follow in 2018.

To ensure that this information genuinely reaches the target group, very close contact is being maintained with organisations and institutions which advise and support potential candidates for self-employment (embassies, chambers, the Migration and Labour Information Centre run by the German Platform for NGOs (Arbeiterwohlfahrt – AWO), the German Trade Union Confederation etc.).

3.2. New challenges: user-oriented information for refugees
There are plenty of service offerings for refugees in Munich, but it is hard for individuals to find the right one (see Section 2). This section outlines the ‘Open City’ project, whose aim is to develop ways to help refugees find their way around in Munich. The project focuses on participation, encouraging refugees and the people who care for them to play an active part in the process as early as possible. In local government settings, it is still more common to solicit feedback from experts, organisations and associations rather than from the actual target groups, especially where language barriers exist or certain groups are difficult to reach.

12 Participation was voluntary and anonymous. A total of 455 feedback forms were completed in 2015; a total of 695 questionnaires were analysed in 2016.
13 Available at: https://www.muenchen.de/rathaus/Stadtverwaltung/Referat-fuer-Arbeit-und-Wirtschaft/Arbeitsmarktpolitik/Kompetenzentwicklung/Dialogreihe.html (accessed on 29th April 2018).
The project adopts an agile methodology, with implementation taking the form of a design thinking process. The outcome is the prototype for a digital map. The Open City project targets a number of goals:

• One is to provide orientation to refugees, their socio-educational supervisors and other supervisors, with the aim of outlining the role of local government and the support and integration services it offers;
• Another aim is to communicate the perception of the world and our patterns of orientation – not knowing whether this view provides valuable orientation for new arrivals in Munich.

3.2.1. Agile methods and design thinking processes

Terms such as agility and agile methods have become common parlance today, primarily in the IT industry. Before sketching how agile methods could be applied specifically to local administrations, it is worth briefly exploring the history and principles of agile approaches.

The development of what we now know as agile methods has its origins in the field of software engineering in the 1990s. To this day, software production processes often correspond to the following trajectory: You first decide what the product should be able to do and define this in a set of performance specifications. The software engineers then withdraw into isolation – and engineer to their heart’s content. At the end of the development process, most of which is devoid of further communication with the customer – the finished product is unveiled. At this point, it (often) becomes apparent that adjustments are needed. This may be because certain requirements have changed on the customer’s side in the course of the process, or because some specifications were not formulated clearly enough, or simply because the two sides did not share the same understanding of what the job actually entailed. In many cases, this leads to substantially higher development cost, suboptimal outcomes that, in the worst cases, are of no use whatsoever. Both the software engineers and the customer are left deeply dissatisfied. For this reason, the software engineering community took a long, hard look at its own production processes in the early 1990s – an exercise which prompted the formulation of an ‘Agile Manifesto’ in 2001. This manifesto defined 12 criteria for good software development. Some of the most important points are:

• Iterative development cycles – regular, early delivery of a working version of the software (every four weeks, as a rule) – is imperative to keep the users continuously involved, allow them to work with the software and communicate feedback and change requests;
• Top priority must be given to the customer being satisfied with the software;
• Software that works is more important than extensive documentation;
• Experts in the field (i.e. the customers) and developers should work together daily.

The fundamental principles of agile software engineering can be mapped onto any processes in which a product is to be developed to meet specific needs for a customer. One key term in the context of these principles is usability, meaning that the outcome must above all be of genuine use to the users. And that is precisely where we return to the Open City project: Whatever is ‘produced’, it must first and foremost be of use to refugees to give them valuable orientation in this city. How do we learn what is a useful description of a (social) space from the perspective of the target group? By involving the latter at as early a stage of the development process as possible, and by focusing solely on their needs.

Above all, a change of perspective is needed. The question is not: ‘What do we already have and how can we present it in as clear a form as possible?’ but ‘What do refugees need and what interests them?’.

3.2.2. Creative development processes with design thinking

The design thinking method is used very widely. This section briefly describes the method and explains why it is especially well suited to this project and its objectives. Design thinking is a creative problem-solving concept that was devised by David Kelley, Terry Winograd and Larry Leifer at Stanford University (Johansson-Sköldberg et al., eds., 2013). Design thinking works on the premise that interdisciplinary teams in particular have the capability to deliver genuine innovations. For this reason, a design thinking process gathers as many different experiences, opinions and perspectives as relate to a given problem. Design thinking seeks to develop innovative products and services that, above all, focus on what people need. Given this human-centred approach, the process begins with a phase of observing, identifying and understanding the needs of the target group. Insights gleaned from this phase form the point of departure for the actual creation of new ideas. One important step is the early production and

Available at: http://agilemanifesto.org/iso/de/manifesto.htm (accessed on 30th April 2018).
testing of prototypes, because it is crucial to implement and evaluate ideas quickly. The focus is less on fleshing out ideas in detail, but rather on swiftly getting potential users to try things out in practice in order to collect further new insights. The resultant iterative approach – repeating the various steps with modifications – increasingly fosters a better understanding of the problem at hand, and of possible solutions (Figure 5).

Several principles of design thinking are to be heeded throughout every phase with a view to generating as many innovative and creative ideas as possible:15

- Stay focused on the topic;
- One conversation at a time;
- Encourage wild ideas;
- Defer judgement;
- Be visual;
- Go for quantity;
- Build on the ideas of other;
- Fail early and often.

Design thinking is an approach that promotes creative solutions from ‘off the beaten track’, and that tests their practical viability as quickly as possible. Insistence on only working in interdisciplinary teams nurtures mutual understanding and collaboration across different professions (Michl, 2016).

Why is this approach of interest to a project in the context of public administration? Local governments face all kinds of complex problems that demand input from a wide variety of professions and disciplines. Although public administrations have for many years been no strangers to public participation, it is still customary for the initial conceptual design phase to take place without the involvement of external actors. The danger with this approach is that, at a very early stage of development, other options may – inadvertently, due to limited knowledge and experience in the field concerned – be overlooked, and that the concerns of the people whose needs are at stake may not be fed into the process until it is too late.

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- Fail early and often.

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**Figure 5 Design thinking process**

**3.2.3. Doing design thinking**

*a) An interdisciplinary team*

The working group consists of employees of the City of Munich both with and without a migration background. The project leader is a sociologist at the Department for Labour and Economic Development. An IT specialist, a legal professional and a teacher from the Department of Education and Sports are also on board. A construction engineer from the Department of Public Building Construction, an IT specialist from it@M16 and an art historian from the Department of Arts and Culture round off the group. All these team members are taking part in the project on a voluntary basis.

*b) Step 1: Understand, observe, point of view*

In accordance with the principles of design thinking, the first step is to understand the problem from the perspective of the target group. What is the problem? What do we need a solution for?

In our case, the issue was to provide refugees of every conceivable background with a set of tools to help them overcome language and cultural barriers, and to make this toolbox accessible to as many people as possible. The aim was to meet the needs of refugees not only through the eyes of social education, of legal, teaching, construction and financial considerations, but to embrace all angles on the issues at stake. Essentially, we wanted to know what would be of the greatest value to the refugees and their supervisors – from their perspective!

It is important to note the systemic transition in this approach: It is not the local government employees who are the experts, but the refugees themselves and the people who supervise them in the reception facilities. They know best what information is helpful and useful to them.

We began by inventorying the status quo in Munich, sorting and sifting through a wide range of documentation, information and different sources. One initial and important insight was gained even at this early stage: The team – and the target group – was unable to cope with the cluttered and unmanageable information landscape. It appears to be very difficult to structure the information and the resultant offerings for such an extremely heterogeneous target group.

Important guide points for the team’s ongoing work were set during the synthesis phase. Here, all the considerations, observations, talks with voluntary helpers and other local government colleagues, and the experience gained from visiting reception facilities were brought together.

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15 Available at: https://hpi.de/school-of-design-thinking/design-thinking/hintergrund/dt-prinzipien.html (accessed on 30th April 2018).

16 it@M is the name of the central IT-service provider of the City of Munich.
How do people find their way around in a new environment? They 'conquer' the local government space and system step by step. Their radius, their scope of activities expands continuously and changes over time. For the target group, this specifically meant finding out: What is in the immediate vicinity of my present accommodation? For schoolchildren, the question was: Where is the nearest school and how do I get there? What public bodies are important for my first steps? Which authorities do I have to visit? How do I use public transport? Where can I find the right doctors? Where can I play sports?

Getting to know a city as your new home is a very dynamic process. People's 'inner map' becomes increasingly complex and intricate over time; some things disappear from view. To begin with, the focus is on the essential basics. These may then be followed by educational offerings, perhaps sports facilities, and so on.

In this phase of our deliberations, the idea of developing a digital map came more sharply into focus. This map would include different points of reference in Munich and could be adapted depending on the users' current needs. Rather like a map of an underground rail system, different 'lines' could be offered for different focal issues. These layers could be added to or removed from the map at different times. (A prototype was produced on superimposed layers of tracing paper.)

c) Step 2: Ideate, prototype, test

At the first workshop with supervisors from various shared accommodation facilities in Munich, we asked what destinations are of importance to refugees in which phase after their arrival in Munich. First and foremost, the discussion revealed that, as refugees seek to travel to any destination in the city, the 'last 50 metres' after leaving public transport present a huge obstacle. The supervisors spoke of refugees failing to find addresses despite being armed with printed copies of Google Maps and receiving detailed verbal explanations. One major challenge for the project was therefore: How can the 'last 50 metres' problem be resolved for any given point in the city?

The workshop with the refugees themselves was very enlightening, in many respects. Many issues which we felt to be relevant were only addressed if we mentioned them explicitly. Finding the addresses of mosques and museums turned out to be surplus to requirements. For refugees, it was important to know where the nearest discounter is, where to find work, apprenticeships and companies in Munich. The services offered by the City of Munich and other local services are governed by law, such as basic social benefits for people in need and, in some cases, the sanctioning of such benefits. It is the same with official systems exist in the countries from which refugees have come to Germany especially since 2015. However, some of the refugees are indeed unfamiliar with the customary German address system and first need to be familiarised with it.

The underlying principles systematically incorporate an ‘outside view’ when looking for new and innovative solutions. Even the shared accommodation supervisors who have direct dealings with the refugees' day in, day out, had no idea that providing orientation simply by passing on an address might not work. Actively involving the users and testing and evaluating the prototype opened up a new perspective that had hitherto remained undetected.

The digital prototype that has since been further developed now adds a visual component to some addresses (e.g. photos of buildings, of the entrance or of the surroundings, along the lines of Google Street View – see Figure 6, a cut-out of a digital map of Munich).

In the design thinking process, the interdisciplinary composition of the group alone has already established necessary openness in the group. The problem of the ‘last 50 metres’ has been recognised and can now be tackled. The information is more closely aligned with the needs of the target group. Using a digital map allows tailor-made maps to be produced depending on individual needs and interests (by selecting specific topics and categories).

4. DILEMMA FOR AUTHORITIES: KEEPING IT SIMPLE BUT MAKING IT ‘WATERTIGHT’

The challenge now is to implement the insights thus gained. The section that follows explores why, in this context, the public sector’s hands are tied to some extent. Local authorities serve a variety of functions. On the one hand, they provide services to their citizens. On the other hand, sovereign tasks are delegated to them by national government. Specifically, this means that the Department of Labor and Economic Development is the point of contact for employees, individuals looking for work, and companies in Munich. The services provided by this department are voluntary offerings provided by the City of Munich as a form of goodwill. The Social Services Department fulfils a dual role. It, too, provides voluntary services such as advice and the recognition of qualifications earned abroad. At the same time, it handles mandatory services that are governed by law, such as basic social benefits for people in need and, in some cases, the sanctioning of such benefits. It is the same with official reporting procedures and the application of Germany’s aliens law at the municipal level. As the executive arm of sovereign tasks, they are thus bound by statutory

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17 This is not to suggest that no similar orientation systems exist in the countries from which refugees have come to Germany especially since 2015. However, some of the refugees are indeed unfamiliar with the customary German address system and first need to be familiarised with it.

18 On the principle of openness in social research, see for example Breuer (2009).
provisions and the rules of implementation issued by the federal states to municipal departments and their employees. Another compulsory provision is the principle of equal treatment for all sovereign government actions, which is enshrined in Germany’s Basic Law.

All of the above means that, although simple information with visual support would be useful to the target groups in question, this form of presenting information is not implemented in certain areas because the formulation of the information provided must be legally watertight.

For example, multilingual information for migrants who speak very little German would be very helpful at the Business Registration Office in order to clarify the legal, tax-related and social insurance-related consequences of registering a business. Similarly, a basic model calculation could be a useful way to provide information about the problem of unexpected tax arrears that could threaten the business owner’s existence (Schütt, 2016). Yet these ‘simple’ solutions are not implemented. The risk of the authority being exposed to liability claims because the simplified presentation of very complex issues could be interpreted wrongly is avoided. Let us take the example of the digital map: no individual or organisation is allowed to be given precedence on websites that are operated by local governments. By consequence, female doctors – who are preferred by women from Somalia and Syria – cannot be named selectively on a local government-run website. The requirement for neutrality and the principle of equal treatment force municipal departments to list either all doctors or none at all.

These are two examples of the basic dilemma facing local authorities. On the one hand, they are information brokers who provide useful and understandable information and, on the other hand, they discharge sovereign tasks which require legally ‘watertight’ information.

CONCLUSION

Local authorities are faced with a complex range of integration challenges, and they increasingly have to act quickly in response to changing demands and needs in the population. Some local authorities may be experiencing the challenge of integration for the first time and have to immediately put in place new strategies to deal with it.

Sharing this experience in a systematic way could help to enhance the ability of local authorities and their cooperation partners to develop successful integration policies. However, the objective cannot be to create an additional tool, but to experiment with ways to enrich existing tools and tailor them to the needs of ‘customers’ at the local level.

The situation of migrants in Munich is in many ways unique. Compared to other cities, migrants account for a large proportion of Munich’s population and employment base. In light of its positive and dynamic economic development, the Munich region also boasts ideal conditions for migrant entrepreneurs. The city sees migrants as an asset and values they bring to cultural and economic diversity. This positive attitude is equally reflected in the broad spread of information and advice services that are available to migrants and refugees. The challenge in Munich is not so much finding information, but finding one’s way through the almost impenetrable jungle of information. When it comes to getting the right information to the right people at the right time, the Bavarian capital sets an example. Public institutions are responsible for bundling information, passing it on and preparing it in a way that will genuinely help the recipients.

Figure 6 Prototype: Digital map of Munich for refugees

Based on two examples, we have shown how fresh stimulus and new ideas can be generated for this purpose – by conducting high-quality research, but also by adopting new, agile methodological approaches within the ranks of public administrations. Since migrants constitute a very heterogeneous group, the all-too-common ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is not very useful.

Both examples clearly show that migrants often acquire knowledge in an unplanned, incidental manner and with little useful
Agile approaches which are extremely user-centric and involve the target groups at an early stage are forward-looking tools to come up with creative and innovative ideas. For public authorities too, we see a huge potential in coming up with ‘wild ideas’, failing fast and thinking again, encouraging others, working together creatively and collaboratively, adopting interdisciplinary approaches, and deliberately involving people who see things from a different angle (as given in Section 3.2.2.). We should explore these possibilities systematically and actively incorporate them in our work processes. At the same time, it is important to be aware of the intrinsic contradictions and of the dilemma facing specific work processes and regulations. Here, too, solutions are needed that systemic knowledge is provided in a simple way. It is suggested to involve the target group to find the right information for them. Last but not least, we recommend being aware of intrinsic contradictions and dilemmas for authorities: How to keep it simple while also supplying ‘watertight’ information.

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10. Some Remarks on the So-Called Soros Migration Plan – Its Characterisation and Assessment

INTRODUCTION

The year 2015 brought to Europe various economic, political, social, environmental and other challenges. The chain of unexpected events related to developments in the field of migration seemed to be the most critical of them, substantially influencing the above-mentioned areas too. By its sudden outburst, great intensity, large-scale character, daily human tragedies, political hesitations to failures and other far-reaching implications, the migration crisis in 2015 found political representations, intellectual elites, stakeholders, the media as well as native populations of the European Union considerably unprepared to produce quick, deliberate, comprehensive, and humane solutions.

Though EU officials presented the first initiatives/plans to tackle the negative aspects of existing migration trends – then especially in the Mediterranean – already prior to 2015, exactly this year brought further escalations of violence in the Syrian Civil War. This resulted in several huge waves of emigrants from Syria, accompanied by other nationalities from the Middle East (later also from Africa), heading via Turkey to Europe – the Balkans and Central Europe. The media informed about the situation on a daily basis, but most often in a tabloid-like manner, incompetently or even with prejudices.

Besides official institutional responses, many individuals also aired their personal views on the issue. One of them was US businessman and financier of Hungarian origin, George Soros. He outlined his own possible solutions to the (European) migration crisis repeatedly, in modified versions, during 2015–2016. As G. Soros has been a well-known person in an international, not only economic, framework for a long time, a set of his opinions and recommendations – soon branded the Soros Migration Plan – drew naturally the attention of other actors in the field. Nevertheless, it seems that politicians, journalists, researchers, state institutions, non-governmental and other organisations did not study the respective texts sufficiently or have interpreted them with the intent to promote their particular – not seldom antagonistic – goals, policies and ideologies. That is why the Plan is generally misconstrued to largely distorted, or even simply ignored.

Objective and unbiased analyses of the so-called Soros Migration Plan are missing in the scientific literature to a surprising extent (and not only in the Slovak Republic). Therefore, this contribution attempts to fill the gap in the area; first, through a concise depiction of the origin and course of events preceding and accompanying the crisis. Then, a more detailed characterisation of the Plan with a critical evaluation of its positive sides and shortcomings are presented to the reader. The contribution also tries to find an answer to what position the Plan could have in debates on international migration and for creating policies to cope with the migration crisis in the European Union.

1. BASIC CONCEPTS APPLIED

In this text, I follow the fundamental and widely accepted definition of the European Union: ‘[international] migration is perceived as the action by which a person establishes (or ceases to have) his/her usual residence in a Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, at least 12 months’ (EMN, 2018, p. 255). Just for information, the United Nations identifies an international migrant very similarly (more universally) as ‘any person who changes his or her country of usual residence’ (UN, 1998, p. 9), with distinguishing long-term migrants as persons staying in a country of destination at least one year.² In the Slovak Republic, the concept of migrants is seldom used for broader statistical, administrative or research purposes (Divinský, 2017). Instead, the different category of ‘foreign nationals’ is preferred by the legal and decision spheres, statistics and research, and practitioners – among others, because of much richer data on the latter.

Furthermore, the term ‘migration crisis’ means ‘crisis with migration consequences’, i.e. large-scale, complex migration flows due to a crisis, which typically involve significant vulnerabilities for affected individuals and communities. According to IOM (2012, p. 9), ‘a migration crisis may be sudden or slow in onset, can have natural or man-made causes, and can take place internally or across borders’ (compare with ICMPD, 2018, pp. 28ff.; OECD, 2016, pp. 147ff).

The concepts ‘migration crisis’ and ‘refugee crisis’ are used as loose synonyms in the contribution, though refugees as well as asylum seekers are usually understood as categories within forced migration, which is a component of overall migration (IOM, 2011; UNAOC, 2014; EMN, 2018). However, some recent approaches tend to place the asylum seekers/refugees and the migrants on the equal level for practical and political reasons.

Likewise, the political-geographical units – Europe and the European Union – may often be purposely intermingled in the text, since refugees/migrants in many cases do not explicitly differ between the two territories as the targets of their movement. Thus, the EU often symbolises the whole continent.

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¹ This text represents a re-worked, extended and updated version of an essay on the topic published in December 2017 under the title Soros’ Migration Plan – A Myth or Reality? (Slovenský národopis/Slovak Ethnology, 65(4), 427–439).

² This definition was specified and refined by later essential literature sources (e.g. UN, 2011; IOM, 2011; IOM, 2017).
2. COURSE OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE MIGRATION CRISIS

2.1. Beginning (?)

Although most key stakeholders in the area of migration along with the public describe the events pertaining to mass inflows of refugees/migrants in 2015 as extremely sudden, unpredictable and unacceptable, it is not quite like that. Basically, there is no general scholarly consensus on the timeline and origins of this crisis situation (Collett & Le Coz, 2018). Development in the numbers of irregular migrants apprehended at borders (i.e. not overstayers) and of asylum applicants clearly signalised an incoming change already earlier, particularly in the south of Europe (Barlai et al., Eds., 2017). An upward trend in the number of undocumented migrants began to manifest itself in 2013, but especially since 2014 (a dramatic 2.6-fold growth between the years – calculated by Frontex, 2011–2018, Table 1). Similarly, after a decade of relative quantitative stabilisation or even decrease, the number of persons seeking asylum already in 2013–2014 (EP, 2016; Eurostat on-line data). Right in 2013, Germany became for the first time since 1999 the biggest recipient of asylum claims in the world (UNHCR, 2014); the same refers to the year 2014. Hence, migration trends in 2013–2014 were good prerequisites to expect large migration inflows to Europe/ the EU in the next years.

The acceleration of migratory movements was primarily a consequence of developments in the Middle East and North Africa (see also OECD, 2017; Samers & Collyer, 2017; Lindley, Ed., 2014). Among the crucial factors were notably:

- the expansion of the Syrian Civil War6 and repeated peace plan failures,
- the battle engagement and successes of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
- the partial withdrawal of US troops and continuing attacks by Taliban in Afghanistan,
- ongoing political and military instability in Libya,
- increasing concurrent waves of economic migration.

As most of the migrants tried to reach the Union through the Mediterranean in a disorderly manner, the European Commission together with the Italian government launched in October 2013 a year-long naval and air operation called Mare Nostrum to search and rescue irregular migrants on the open sea. Little willingness to share the funding burden led to its termination and to the subsequent, but rather limited, Operation Triton conducted by Frontex since November 2014 to protect EU external borders.

In this period too, top EU authorities took a series of strategic, legal and institutional measures, including constant improvements in the protection of Schengen external borders, the opening of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and next steps in building the Common European Asylum System, the adoption of the new Joint EU Resettlement Programme (2012), the enactment of Dublin III (2013), the adoption of the EUROSUR system (2013), the Fourth Euro-African Conference on Migration and Development (2014), discussions at the First meeting of the European Migration Forum (beginning of 2015), etc.

2.2. Escalation

Nonetheless, these and other activities to improve migration management in the European Union and to principally reduce the unfavourable impacts of irregular and asylum migration from third countries were unable to avert emerging events.

In this context, the crucial stage of the Syrian Civil War with rising war atrocities (the use of chemical weapons and rockets against civilians, the bombing of overcrowded hospitals and entire residential quarters, etc.), stunning military victories of ISIL, their establishment of a caliphate on occupied territories and incomprehensible brutality against various communities, the growing involvement of foreign powers in the war, the deteriorating overall situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, religious and ethnic conflicts in northern and central Africa, increasing environmental migration caused by famine, drought, deforestation (but also armed clashes) in the Horn of Africa, parallel enormous ‘opportunistic’ economic/family migration, particularly from the Middle East, southern Asia, northern and central Africa (in my opinion, the dominant migration component from most regions except for the war zones in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and some smaller areas),

- well-organised and effective networks of migrant smugglers with extended

3 Migrants in an irregular situation who legally entered but then stayed in an EU Member State beyond the allowed duration of their permitted stay (EMN, 2018).

4 More exactly, in the number of illegal EU external border crossings according to the methodology of Frontex.


6 Available at: https://prezi.com/avhh4i6s54/syrian-civil-war-time/ (accessed on 10th May 2018).

7 Available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/ (accessed on 11th May 2018).


9 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26th June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast).


corridors via the Mediterranean as well as Turkey.

In the first half of 2015, the European Commission presented an important strategic document of a comprehensive nature – the European Agenda on Migration – with the main objectives to strengthen the common asylum policy, to address the root causes behind irregular migration, to secure the EU external borders, and to dismantle smuggling and trafficking networks. However, it was quite late. Right since the spring of 2015, the phrases ‘European refugee crisis’ or ‘European migration crisis’ have begun to be widely used (Johnson, 2015; Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017). The media then became full of shocking to sorrowful stories and pictures relating to immense crowds of refugees/migrants wandering on the roads of the Balkans or central Europe and trying to break through various barriers, sailing across the Mediterranean Sea on hundreds of overcrowded and fragile leaking vessels often with whole families, dying on the way locked in lorries or getting drowned at sea – including little children, or starving in makeshift tents while waiting for a verdict.

2.3. Culmination and principal responses

As a matter of fact, the direct cardinal feature of the migration crisis was formed by an unprecedented quantitative growth of migrants newly arriving in the territory of the European Union (Europe) in 2015. Indeed, in that year, the total number of unauthorised EU border crossings detected by Frontex accounted for an astronomic 1.8 million (Frontex, 2011–2018). It was almost 6.5 times the number in 2014 or 17.5 times that in 2010 (Table 1). The actual number of persons having passed the EU external borders irregularly was, however, lower because a good part of them were registered in the Frontex database several times at different locations in the chaotic situation of that time. Owing to that, a more realistic figure of migrants coming to Europe in 2015 might be that given by the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2016–2018) – over 1 million (with the monthly maxima between August and November), which was a fourfold increase compared to 2014. Trends in the area of asylum migration showed analogically lower dynamics: the number of asylum applicants in the EU rose 2.1 times in 2014–2015 when applying Eurostat on-line data (Table 1).

The depicted development resulted in efforts to handle the situation at the EU, national, IGO and other levels, carefully monitored by the European media and the public. In the summer of 2015, the Union launched a naval and air operation named Operation Sophia to curb the activities of migrant smugglers and to rescue refugees, especially on the high seas off Libya. The Council also approved a disputable plan (i.e. the quota system) to relocate 120,000 asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to the other EU countries. Both ‘front-line’ states built up the networks of hot-spots for migrants, with five operating in Greece and four in Italy (summer 2017). Still in 2015, the Valletta Summit on Migration sought ways out of the migration crisis together with African leaders. Then, in 2016, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (re-formed Frontex) was established as a major institution to better protect the EU external borders. At the same time, significant measures in order to improve the Common European Asylum System, visa and return policies in the EU were taken.

At the beginning of 2017, EU leaders met in Malta again to discuss comprehensive immigration policies and to curtail irregular migration to the Union. Nevertheless, the decisive act with far-reaching implications was the EU-Turkey agreement aimed at stemming undocumented migration, concluded in March 2016. Though being partly controversial, it substantially reduced the massive inflow of migrants to the EU, albeit it is not the only factor with this effect (e.g. Weber, 2017; Bendel, 2017). As demonstrated in Table 1, the number of unauthorised border crossings remarkably fell 8.9 times, that of arrivals 5.6 times, and that of asylum applicants 1.9 times, comparing just two years 2015–2017. The sharp downward trends in the observed migration indicators have preliminarily manifested themselves also in 2018 (according to the identical data sources as given in the table). As a consequence, migratory pressure at the EU external borders has been still heavy, but it decreased for the second consecutive year, notably at the Balkan route and eastern and central Mediterranean routes (EASO, 2018).

However, despite an obvious quantitative restriction of mass migration flows to the Union since 2016, migration issues have remained high on the European agenda and have regularly been tackled at top EU representatives’ meetings (IOM, 2017). In my opinion, with the European Union partly divided in this question, the crisis of figures has gradually changed in the crisis of confidence, attitudes, relations, and policies.

3. SOLUTIONS PROPOSED BY SOME POLITICIANS

Illustrated dramatic developments in Europe and in the adjacent parts of Asia

14 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A European Agenda on Migration, COM (2016) 240 final of 13th May 2015.
15 Available at: https://www.operationsophia.eu/mission-at-a-glance (accessed on 12th May 2018).
and Africa – especially their political, institutional, legal, administrative, economic, social, and security impacts on the majority societies at the EU, national, regional and other levels – naturally raised the interest of relevant stakeholders (e.g. governments, politicians, research community, non-governmental organisations, international organisations, churches, etc.), the media as well as the general public and non-professionals. In this place, I intentionally do not discuss a range of solutions/plans/strategies proposed, produced or even already applied by the EU authorities, be they described above or not. Instead, I would like to present a limited selection of personal initiatives suggested by some known active European politicians in the form of their ‘migration plans’. They include more or less coherent and comprehensive sets of actions and measures to be taken by the Union to overcome the migration crisis in 2015-2016 and the following years.

### 3.1. The Merkel Plan

Since the very beginning, one of the most energetic politicians engaged intensively in dealing with the issue was German Chancellor Angela Merkel. After the opening of Germany to large numbers of refugees, emerging fears of competent authorities due to the growing immigration agenda, and heated debates in the country, with a similar situation in good part of the European Union, A. Merkel was seen as ‘the only leader in a position to take meaningful action’ already in 2015. In October of the same year, the think-tank European Stability Initiative introduced the so-called ‘Merkel Plan – A proposal for the Syrian refugee crisis’.

In this document, they recommended an immediate agreement between Germany and Turkey to reduce enormous waves of migrants heading to Europe in exchange for some concessions to the latter country. In this context, the Plan addressed Syrian refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey, a package of legal, technical and humanitarian measures, financial support and a visa-free regime for Turks. In my opinion, the greatest asset of the Merkel Plan was its early timing and the fact that it served as a basis for the later EU–Turkey agreement from March 2016.

### 3.2. The Macron Plan

In August 2017, after the summit of seven African and European leaders held in Paris, French President Emmanuel Macron put forward a plan with the aim to curb excessive migration flows across the Mediterranean. His Plan comprised several points, among others: to strictly fight against illegal migrants, to improve political stability in Libya, to process asylum applications already in African countries, to help them with border controls, to deepen cooperation between all countries involved, and to increase financial aid to (African) countries of origin and transit.

It is evident that the ‘Macron Plan’ has been oriented to counter undocumented migration primarily across the Mediterranean Sea and in Africa, in compliance with French geopolitical interests. It is paradoxical that when the president later announced the tightening of the country’s immigration and asylum policies at home, he faced much criticism from various sides.

### 3.3. The Orbán Plan

An utterly different rhetoric and practical approaches to the substance, manifestations and governance of the refugee/migration crisis in Hungary/the European Union has been shown by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Again since the very beginning, he has been in fierce opposition to Angela Merkel almost in all aspects pertaining to the comprehension, interpretation and solution of the issue.

In April 2016, V. Orbán presented a ten-point action plan for the management of the migration crisis, named ‘Action Plan for Schengen 2.0 – Maintain and Strengthen’. He has laid overwhelming emphasis on the protection of borders against illegal migrants, the restrictive approach to asylum seekers and the refusal of Muslim immigrants. Particular pervasive is his accusation of G. Soros

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of initiating, promoting and sponsoring huge immigration to Europe. It is interesting that while the Orbán Plan and stances provoked a rather strong rejection by most EU officials and countries, his Plan advances the same fundamental thesis as the Soros Migration Plan: the compulsory relocation quotas are inadmissible and the EU cannot force its Member States to accept refugees/migrants against their will.

4. SOROS’ VIEWS ON THE ISSUE

Among the individuals who reacted relatively extensively to the negative impacts of the migration crisis, was also George Soros – well-known American businessman of Hungarian origin, the founder of numerous financial, human rights and educational institutions. Owing to this fact, opinions he had published fixed the attention of many actors in the area of migration management not only in Europe. It was also for this reason that, in 2015–2017, I was reviewing some 50 print media releases and around 10 TV media reports on a daily basis. The media were of a heterogeneous nature (mainstream, non-mainstream or conspiracy; regional, national or foreign; public or commercial ones). According to my media monitoring, Soros’ proposals of how to deal with the migration crisis have been widely misapprehended or distorted in all possible directions. In this context, several categorical attitudes to the Soros Migration Plan (as labelled by the media; hereinafter also referred to as the Plan or SMP) can be observed. SMP has been most frequently regarded as:

- a dangerous plan, strategy or instrument to erode (or even destroy) the original European culture, civilisation, population structure, particular nations, etc. This opinion is mostly spread among far-right and anti-immigration parties, groups, media, and individuals;

- the existence of SMP is hardly acknowledged, doubted, or completely denied. The reasons for this are varied: from efforts to prevent its criticism through disagreement with it to a simple lack of knowledge about it;

- a valuable tool for the entire migration crisis in the EU/Europe, accentuating especially the protection of irregular migrant/refugees. This approach is mostly shared by pro-migration and/or far-left NGOs, activists, parties, and the media;

- one of the many attempts intended to ameliorate the situation, made by a person concerned (though not an expert or policymaker). Such neutral, balanced evaluations of SMP are quite rare, informal, and practically unpublished.

George Soros submitted his thoughts as a personal response to the European migration crisis to help overcome it. Therefore, SMP has been articulated in the form of comments, recommendations and measures to be taken. However, it was not a one-off act, but rather a process under development: it was put out repeatedly in several adapted versions within the period 2015–2016.

4.1. Soros Migration Plan I

In July 2015, G. Soros presented in the press his first partial and brief remarks on the EU’s failure to properly and quickly handle incoming refugees and called for a better asylum system. Later in 2015 (September 26th), George Soros released on his own website an essay named ‘Rebuilding the Asylum System’. This text was of a broader nature, addressing a whole range of contemporary migration issues in the European Union. As the author claims, ‘the EU needs a comprehensive plan to respond to the crisis’, and he drafts one, wishing to be extended beyond the borders of Europe. The Plan is composed of six components, in which G. Soros suggests to take the following principal measures (shortened):

(1) ‘The EU has to accept at least a million asylum seekers annually for the foreseeable future. And, to do that, it must share the burden fairly.’ (…) ‘The EU should provide €15,000 ($16,800) per asylum seeker for each of the first two years.’

(2) ‘The EU must lead the global effort to provide adequate funding to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey to support the four million refugees currently living in those countries.’ (…) ‘The EU would need to make an annual commitment to frontline countries of at least €8–10 billion.’

(3) ‘The EU must immediately start building a single EU Asylum and Migration Agency and eventually a single EU Border Guard.’ (…) ‘The new agency would gradually streamline procedures; establish common rules for employment and entrepreneurship, as well as consistent benefits.’

(4) ‘Safe channels must be established for asylum-seekers, starting with getting them from Greece and Italy to their destination countries.’ (…) ‘The next logical step is to extend safe avenues to the frontline region, thereby reducing the number of migrants who make the dangerous Mediterranean crossing.’

(5) ‘The operational and financial arrangements developed by the EU should be used to establish global standards for the treatment of asylum seekers and migrants.’

(6) ‘To absorb and integrate more than a million asylum seekers and migrants a year, the EU needs to mobilize the private sector – NGOs, church groups, and businesses – to act as sponsors.’

The aforementioned set of theses by Soros, presented in September 2015, can be informally deemed to be the Soros Migration Plan I, as it is the earliest in a series. It predominantly covered the refugee crisis and asylum issues, though a few others were also marginally referred to. However, in the summer/autumn of 2015, these problem points were already solved or at least intensively discussed by various official institutions and fora, chiefly by the highest authorities of the European Union (as depicted in the previous section), UNHCR, IOM, some international NGOs, governments, etc.
As a result, SMP I did not mean a special added value to the topic. Moreover, the first component of the Plan — stressing the necessity of accepting over one million refugees per year to the EU — became an extremely controversial point. This requirement was factually exaggerated, unrealistic and unsystematic, particularly in a longer-term perspective. It also provoked panic up to total rejection by many (not only) anti-immigration actors, including some national governments — a situation that has obviously persisted until now. The Hungarian government can be a notorious example of the strongest opponent of the above quota, SMP as a whole and of Soros himself. During the period from 2015 onward, Budapest has constantly laid the blame on George Soros for (alleged) supporting illegal migration and the refugee crisis in Europe, for attempts to dismantle the EU’s nation states and abolish their borders, and for undermining European religious and cultural identity.31

4.2. Soros Migration Plan II

In the spring of 2016 (April 10th), G. Soros issued on his website another article entitled “Bringing Europe’s Migration Crisis Under Control”.32 Here, the author openly expressed his discontent over progress in crisis management achieved by the European Union by that time. According to Soros, EU’s policies have several fundamental shortcomings. For instance, he argues that the EU–Turkey agreement was imposed on the Union by Angela Merkel, the policy is severely under-funded, and Greece has fallen in poor conditions as regards the capacity of its asylum facilities. But Soros’ most interesting reproach is that EU’s asylum policy is not voluntary as ‘it establishes quotas that many member states oppose and requires refugees to take up residence in countries where they do not want to live’.

In his article, George Soros also recommended that:

1. The European Union within its comprehensive asylum policy should take 300,000 to 500,000 refugees annually.
2. Procedures pertaining to asylum seekers should be amended in order to reduce the current chaos.
3. The EU should finally create a common asylum agency and border force, address the humanitarian crisis in Greece, and establish common standards for receiving and integrating refugees.
4. As this plan requires at least €30 billion a year, restrictive EU’s fiscal rules should be removed and new taxes levied. The existing EU financial mechanisms should secure the sufficient funding to cope with the migration crisis.
5. The front-line states as Jordan, Turkey and Greece should be provided with enough financial support and should not be obliged to repay the money they receive.

Since the author himself uses the word ‘plan’ in this essay, the text can be named the Soros Migration Plan II. It differs from SMP I in two essential features. First, the number of asylum seekers from third countries that should be admitted to the territory of the European Union per year has markedly decreased – 2 to 3 times. G. Soros has very likely become aware of the fact that the previously proposed figure of at least one million persons would be absolutely inappropiate in the present political, economic and social conditions in the EU, mainly from a long-term viewpoint. Second, SMP II was overly focused on a wide range of financial issues at the expense of other significant migration factors. Moreover, the businessman warns in the conclusion: ‘It would be irresponsible to allow the EU to disintegrate for lack of financing to bring the crisis under control.’

4.3. Soros Migration Plan III

Subsequently, George Soros wrote a large article “This is Europe’s Last Chance to Fix Its Refugee Policy” in July 2016.33 It was followed by an essay published on his website (September 12th of that year) under the title “Saving Refugees to Save Europe”.34 Both texts have basically the same philosophy and very similar contents. The first work presents a rather extensive analysis of hitherto developments, a quite critical evaluation of migration policies applied by the EU, a subjective identification of shortcomings in the process of managing the crisis, and a set of recommendations and measures to be done without delay. The latter work is a condensed, only moderately modified version of the former; it thus comprises all its key comments, conclusions and suggestions. Due to the complex and coherent character, the given contribution(s) can be called the Soros Migration Plan III.

According to the author, he submits this Plan as an effective alternative to the EU’s current approach to the migration crisis. SMP III is based on seven fundamental pillars (shortened and selected for the purposes of this text):

1. ‘The EU must take in a substantial number of refugees directly from front-line countries in a secure and orderly manner.’ (…) ‘If the EU made a commitment to admit even a mere 300,000 refugees annually’.
2. ‘The EU must regain control of its borders. There is little that alienates and scares publics more than scenes of chaos.’
3. ‘The EU needs to find sufficient funds to finance a comprehensive migration policy. It is estimated that at least €30 billion per year will be needed for a number of years.’
4. ‘The EU must build common mechanisms for protecting borders, determining asylum claims, and relocating refugees. A single European asylum

32 Available at: https://www.georgesoros.com/2016/04/10/bringing-europes-migration-crisis-under-control/ (accessed on 14th May 2018).
process would remove the incentives for asylum shopping.’

(5) ‘A voluntary matching mechanism for relocating refugees is needed. The EU cannot coerce member states to accept refugees they do not want, or refugees to go where they are not wanted.’

(6) ‘The EU must offer far greater support to countries that host refugees, and it must be more generous in its approach to Africa.’ (…) ‘This means creating jobs in refugees’ home countries, which would reduce the pressure to migrate to Europe.’

(7) ‘The eventual creation of a welcoming environment for economic migrants. Given Europe’s aging population, the benefits migration brings far outweigh the costs of integrating immigrants.’

The last Soros Migration Plan as an organic whole (i.e. with the remarks on the situation, outlined flaws and challenges, and seven pillars with recommendations) constitutes a relatively elaborate text, being of a more logical, precise and balanced nature than the two earlier versions described above (SMP I and SMP II). It is considerably critical of the overall work and concrete activities undertaken by the European Union to tackle the migration crisis in Europe. This is well apparent in the introductory statements, such as: ‘The EU is trying to impose quotas… forcing refugees to take up residence in countries where they are not welcome and do not want to go… This is unfortunate.’ or ‘The agreement with Turkey was problematic from its inception.’ Though I totally agree with the first statement, a crucial question should be posed pondering the second statement: how to stop/diminishing in a different way the unceasing massive influx of immigrants to Europe through Turkey at that time?

As far as the individual pillars of the Soros Migration Plan are concerned, in my opinion, it is possible:

• to agree with Points 2, 4, 5 and 6 of SMP III. Much of them has already been realised or planned. For example, the Border and Coast Guard Agency (former Frontex) has been in operation since autumn 2016 and is conducting several missions at present. The reform of the Common European Asylum System is one of the most important tasks within migration management in the EU (EP, 2016; Bendel, 2017) and, especially, the revision of the Dublin Regulation is under heavy discussion now (as of May 2018). The European Union has recently also manifested its growing interest in cooperation with and support to African countries as the principal source of migrants (EU–Africa summits, mutual dialogues, other initiatives); this should be even more intensive. In view of the compulsory quotas and distribution of asylum seekers across the EU Member States, I have believed from the very beginning that this approach is ineffective, unsystematic, inhuman and untenable;

• to practically agree with Point 3: the financial means assigned to sustainable and comprehensive migration policy in the Union should be unambiguously much greater, but an appropriate sum should be subject to thorough analyses by expert teams from respective EU institutions;

• to be in partial accordance with Point 7 of SMP III. As regards economic migration in the EU, this is basically in the competence of Member States and depends on the particular conditions in the domestic labour markets. Then, in a long-term perspective, migration can help decelerate the enormous rate of ageing in some countries of Europe only to a limited extent (UN, 2000; Bleha et al., 2013; UN, 2017). Certainly, improving the integration process of migrants is beneficial to all parties involved;

• to absolutely disagree with Point 1. There cannot be a fixed annual quota for taking asylum seekers/refugees to the EU as a whole (though the figure suggested by Soros fell from 1 million persons set in SMP I to 300,000 in SMP III). The real number should flexibly reflect the situation in affected regions of the world and should be based on common consent among the Member States. It is also worth mentioning that the European Union has long been a significant destination for ‘legal’ migrants from third countries. Even before the migration crisis, the number of these persons legally arriving in the EU each year accounted for 1.5 million (by Eurostat on-line data – see Table 1).

5. ASSESSMENT OF THE SOROS MIGRATION PLAN IN ITS ENTIRETY

The influx of migrants/refugees into European countries, especially into the European Union, in the course of 2015–2016 was the biggest since the end of the Second World War (Kingsley, 2016; Divinský, 2016). But not only has the quantitative aspect been momentous. The Union as such and its Member States, their chief political representatives, elites, stakeholders, and the general public were not sufficiently prepared to act deliberately, jointly, quickly, effectively, and sensitively (e.g., Barlai et al., Eds., 2017; Dinan et al., 2017). The EU immigration, asylum, integration systems as well as its border management thus came under unprecedented pressure.

It is clear now that the migration crisis became one of the most serious threats to the internal cohesion of the European Union in its history and a fundamental challenge for its future. From another viewpoint, some designated the events of 2015–2016 as the greatest humanitarian crisis of our generation (Deliso, 2017). Nevertheless, a detailed evaluation of EU's migration approaches, policies and activities, their merits or failures, is much beyond the topic of this contribution. My primary objective was to present, describe, discuss and assess the so-called Soros Migration Plan in the background of migration development in the given years and within the territorial framework of the EU. After examining a number of available sources, (political) declarations, media outputs, reports and literature, one may state that:

• though it is sometimes negated from various sides, the Soros Migration Plan does really exist. It is a series of three essays, published by George Soros successively in September 2015, April 2016, and July/September 2016 on his own website and in the media, and is freely accessible to all. Therefore, the existence of SMP should be neither questioned, nor denied;
the author himself used the word ‘plan’ in these text(s). As they have a coherent structure with distinguishable textual passages and – notably – sets of proposed measures to be introduced over a certain time period, this word has been properly applied;

the last of the three characterised versions – SMP III – has been not only the most updated, but also the most balanced, comprehensive and quite realistic. Hence, this version can be fully legitimately named the Soros Migration Plan in general and used for further purposes;

some of the key recommendations changed substantially within the submitted versions over time. It was mainly the number of asylum seekers to be accepted or being prepared. Simultaneously, the Plan categorically opposes the compulsory quota system and forced relocation of asylum seekers across the Member States. This fact of utmost importance can also be one of the causes for its misinterpretation to disregard by competent authorities and interest groups;

since George Soros is not a scholar, politician, official or journalist deeply engaged in migration issues – simply said, not a migration specialist – his Plan should be perceived only as a subjective non-professional response to the EU (European) refugee/migration crisis from 2015 onward. That is why, SMP cannot meet the standard of an expert analysis, report, study, strategy, reform, etc.;

for the above reasons, the Soros Migration Plan should not be overestimated at all in the academic debates, decision-making processes or practical activities. Likewise, heated disputes over SMP in the (political) fora, media, public or elsewhere are completely useless and non-pragmatic. The Plan represents just personal opinions of a well-known businessman on one of the biggest contemporary global challenges.

CONCLUSION

As evident, the refugee/migrants crisis culminating in Europe in 2015–2016 with grave consequences until today revealed a great number of weaknesses in collaboration among the Member States and in the capacity of the European Union as a whole. Many relevant institutions and individuals tried to offer their proposals to curb the crisis. One of them was also American financier George Soros, who repeatedly released a set of statements labelled as the Soros Migration Plan. When evaluating its contribution, efforts to provide a reasonable, effective and comprehensive instrument for EU policymakers are obvious and some ideas may be interesting and inspiring. However, SMP also contains a multitude of incorrect starting points, refutable claims, shortcomings and unfeasible goals, as depicted above. Therefore, the Soros Migration Plan can be considered a well-intentioned, but amateurish solution to the persisting problems.

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